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Zusammenfassung 
Die steigenden Nachfrage nach landwirtschaftlichen Ressourcen zur Produktion von 
Nahrungsmitteln und anderen Gütern seit Mitte der 2000er hat zu einem starken Anstieg 
ausländischer Direktinvestitionen in die Agrar- und Ernährungswirtschaft in 
Entwicklungsländern geführt (Cotula et al, 2009; Deininger et al., 2010). Eine zentrale Rolle 
nimmt dabei Subsahara Afrika (SSA) ein, wo ein bedeutsamer Anteil der großflächigen 
Agrarinvestitionen in den vergangenen Jahren zu beobachten ist (Deininger et al., 2010; 
Schoeneveld, 2014). So gab es laut Schoeneveld (2014) zwischen 2005 und 2013 in 37 
afrikanischen Staaten 563 großflächige Landakquisitionen, die nahezu 23 Millionen Hektar 
umfassten. Die Entwicklung dieser Flächen zur Produktion von Biokraftstoffen war dabei 
zunächst der Hauptmotor (FAO, 2009) – nach ersten Schätzungen waren 78% der 
verhandelten Flächen für Energiepflanzen wie Jatropha oder Zuckerrohr vorgesehen 
(Anseeuw et al., 2012). Eine erhöhte Nahrungsnachfrage, u.a. aus Regionen des mittleren 
Ostens und Asiens, verstärkte in jüngeren Jahren das Interesse, Grundnahrungsmittel (u.a. 
Reis und Mais) in Großbetrieben in SSA zu produzieren. Obwohl viele dieser Investitionen, 
vor allem die zur Produktion von Biokraftstoffen, nicht oder noch nicht umgesetzt wurden 
(Maltsoglou et al, 2013; Singh et al, 2014.), lässt sich ein langfristiger Trend hin zu einer 
zunehmenden Bedeutung von Großbetrieben und großflächigen Agrarinvestitionen in SSA 
erwarten (Gibbon 2011; Deininger und Byerlee, 2012). 
Die möglichen Auswirkungen dieser Investitionen sind jedoch stark umstritten (Cotula et al., 
2009; Deininger et al, 2011). Einerseits weisen insbesondere Nichtregierungsorganisationen 
und Medien auf die sozialen und ökologischen Risiken dieser Investitionen hin. Dabei wird 
besonders vor großflächigem Landraub gewarnt, der mit dem Verlust der Lebensgrundlagen 
lokaler Bevölkerungsgruppen einhergehen würde. Anderseits betonen oftmals Regierungen 
und internationale Organisationen die sich durch diese Investitionen ergebenden Chancen für 
wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Armutsbekämpfung, z.B. durch die erhöhte Arbeitsnachfrage 
in der Agrar- und Ernährungswirtschaft, durch den verbesserten Zugang von Kleinbauern zu 
hochpreisigen Märkten und zu modernem Knowhow und Technologien. 
Biokraftstoffinvestitionen können darüber hinaus zu einer verbesserten Energiesicherheit und 
Deviseneinsparungen beitragen, was insbesondere für nicht-ölproduzierende Binnenstaaten 
von großer Relevanz ist (Mitchell, 2011).  
In vergangenen Jahren wurden auf internationaler Ebene Richtlinien für verantwortungsvolle 
Agrarinvestitionen ins Leben gerufen (siehe z.B. Committee for Food Security, 2014). Die 
Art des Investitionsmodells wird dabei in der Regel als ein wichtiger Parameter angesehen, 
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der die sozioökonomischen Auswirkungen stark beeinflusst (Vermeulen & Cotula 2010; 
Deininger et al 2011). Insbesondere werden Modelle, die Kleinbauern in 
Wertschöpfungsketten als Produzenten integrieren, wie z.B. Vertragsanbau, oftmals als 
effektive Ansätze gesehen, um die armutsreduzierende Wirkungen dieser Investitionen zu 
vergrößern (Vermeulen und Cotula 2010; Smalley, 2013). 
Trotz der politischen Relevanz großflächiger Agrarinvestitionen in SSA gibt es bisher kaum 
empirische Studien über deren sozioökonomischen Auswirkungen. Empirische Evidenzen 
sind jedoch Voraussetzung für die Bewertung und Steuerung solcher Investitionen. Die 
Hauptmotivation der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es daher, einen Beitrag zu dieser Evidenz zu 
liefern. 
Erste Simulationen über mögliche Auswirkungen solcher Investitionen von Arndt et al. 
(2010) in Mosambik und Baumgartner et al. (2015) in Äthiopien zeigen die Potentiale für 
Beschäftigung und Einkommen auf, aber betonen jeweils auch die besonderen Chancen 
alternativer Modelle wie Vertragsanbau für eine breitenwirksame Gestaltung dieser 
Investitionen. Deininger et al. (2015) nutzen in einer jüngeren Studie tatsächliche Ex-post-
Daten über Groß- und angrenzende Kleinbetriebe in Mosambik, um Spillover-Effekte zu 
messen. Die Autoren finden tatsächliche positive Effekte, die sich in der Übernahme 
verbesserter Inputs und Anbaumethoden der Kleinbauern ausdrücken. Die Autoren stellen 
jedoch auch negative Wirkungen auf das persönliche Wohlbefinden der Bauern fest. 
Ex-post Studien in SSA über tatsächliche Auswirkungen großflächiger Agrarinvestitionen 
über direkte Teilnahmekanäle, wie z.B. den Arbeitsmarkt oder Vertragsanbau, existieren nur 
wenige. Bestehende Studien zu Arbeitsmarkteffekten beziehen sich vielmehr auf weniger 
landintensive hochpreisige Exportketten, wie z.B. den Obstbau und Gemüseanbau. Studien 
hierzu weisen einerseits auf die geringe Qualität und Bezahlung von Arbeitsplätzen hin (z.B. 
Barrientos und Kitzinger, 2004; Barrientos et al., 2005). Andererseits stellen z.B. Maertens et 
al. (2011) im Senegal in einer haushaltsökonomischen Wirkungsanalyse in 
Gemüseexportketten insbesondere für ärmere Haushalte positive Einkommenseffekte fest. 
Studien zu Vertragsanbau in der afrikanischen Landwirtschaft kommen zu sehr 
unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen hinsichtlich ihrer Wohlfahrtseffekte. So wird vor der Gefahr 
der Ausbeutung von Bauern in diesen oftmals monopsonen Marktstrukturen oder aber der 
Ausgrenzung ärmerer Bauerngruppen gewarnt (Little und Watts, 1994; Porter und Phillips-
Howard, 1997). Evaluationsstudien zu Einkommenseffekten mit Kontrollgruppenvergleichen 
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kommen wiederum meistens zu positiven Ergebnissen für Vertragsbauern (z.B. Bolwig et al, 
2009; Bellemare 2012; Väth und Kirk, 2014). 
Das übergeordnete Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, einen Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der 
möglichen Auswirkungen ausländischer Direktinvestitionen in die afrikanische Agrar- und 
Ernährungswirtschaft für die Wohlfahrt ländlicher Bevölkerungsgruppen zu leisten. Konkret 
verfolgt die Arbeit das Ziel, die Auswirkungen ausländischer Direktinvestitionen auf 
Haushaltseinkommen und Einkommensarmut zu messen, insbesondere über die 
Wirkungskanäle (1) Vertragsanbau, (2) Lohnarbeit in der Landwirtschaft und im 
verarbeitenden Gewerbe und (3) Spillover-Effekte im Rahmen von Technologietransfer-
Projekten. Die Ziele werden im Rahmen von drei Artikeln (Kapitel 2-4) bearbeitet, die jeweils 
Fallstudienuntersuchungen von Investitionen in Malawi und Tansania im Zucker- und 
Reissektor darstellen. 
Der erste Artikel (Kapitel 2) untersucht die direkten sozioökonomischen Wirkungen einer 
Zucker- und Ethanol-Investition in Dwangwa, Malawi  (Herrmann und Grote, 2015). Der 
Artikel vergleicht individuelle Vertragsbauern, gruppenbasierte Bewässerungssysteme und 
Plantagenbeschäftigung mit Kontrollgruppen hinsichtlich ihrer Einkommens- und 
Armutssituation. Der Artikel basiert auf Haushaltsdaten, die 2010 und 2011 in Zielgruppen- 
und Kontrolldörfern von 225 Vertragsbauern, 60 Plantagenarbeitern und 328 
Kontrollgruppenhaushalten erhoben wurden. Zur Überwindung von Selektionsverzerrungs- 
und Endogenitätsproblemen wurde ein Treatment-Effects Modell geschätzt sowie Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) und zahlreiche Robustheitsprüfungen eingesetzt. Die Ergebnisse 
zeigen u.a., dass Einkommensarmut unter Vertragsbauern im Vergleich zur Kontrollgruppe 
deutlich geringer ist, während Plantagenarbeiter nur mit Blick auf die extreme Armutsgrenze 
besser dastehen. Das lässt vermuten, dass Plantagenbeschäftigung in erster Linie ein Beitrag 
zur Reduzierung extremer Armut sein kann. Qualitative Interviews bestätigen die Ergebnisse, 
verweisen jedoch auf Risiken von Konflikten im Rahmen der großflächigen Erweiterungen 
von Bewässerungsprojekten und der Vertragsgestaltungen, was die armutsmindernden 
Potenziale dieser Investitionen untergräbt. 
Der zweite Artikel (Kapitel 3) untersucht Wohlfahrtseffekte auf Haushaltsebene zweier 
großflächiger Agrarinvestitionen in Tansania. Die beiden Investitionen befinden sich in 
Kilombero, einer Hauptregion zur Förderung von Agrarinvestitionen im Rahmen des 
Südlichen Agrarentwicklungskorridors Tansanias (SAGCOT) (SAGCOT, 2011). Die beiden 
untersuchten Investitionen, Kilombero Sugar Company Limited und Kilombero Plantation 
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Limited, werden aufgrund ihrer Integration von lokalen Bevölkerungsgruppen als Vorbilder 
für zukünftige Investitionen gesehen. Die verwendete Stichprobe stammt von 
Haushaltsbefragungen aus 2013 mit insgesamt 516 Interviews, darunter Zuckerrohr-
Vertragsbauern, Reis- und Zuckerarbeiter und Nichtteilnehmer.  Während die Studie positive 
Wirkungen der Investitionen hinsichtlich der untersuchten Kanäle Vertragsanbau und 
Lohnarbeit bestätigt, sind große Unterschiede zwischen Kanälen und Subsektoren 
festzustellen. Vertragsbauern profitieren am meisten, jedoch Land-reiche mehr als Land-arme. 
Zuckerarbeiter erwirtschaften größere Gewinne als Arbeiter in der Reis-Investition, wobei in 
beiden Fällen Ressourcen-ärmere Haushalte zu profitieren scheinen. Die Studie zeigt somit 
positivere Auswirkungen von Investitionen auf, die Vertragsbauern integrieren, jedoch betont 
zudem die Chancen der Lohnarbeit insbesondere für Ressourcen-arme Haushalte. Der Artikel 
betont die Notwendigkeit, Hindernisse für Ressourcen-arme Vertragsbauern zu reduzieren. 
Insbesondere lassen qualitative Interviews eine wachsende Gefahr des 
Verdrängungsprozesses kleinerer Bauern durch lokale Eliten vermuten. 
Artikel drei (Kapitel 4) misst technologische Spillover-Effekte von großflächigen 
Agrarinvestitionen. Hierzu wird ein öffentlich-privates Projekt zwischen Kilombero 
Plantation Limited und USAID analysiert, das eine Erhöhung der Reisproduktion im 
Kleinbauernsektor durch Förderung verbesserter Verfahren, Hochertragssorten und Dünger 
zum Ziel hat. Die Stichprobe besteht aus 144 am Projekt teilnehmenden Reisbauern, 152 
nicht-teilnehmenden Haushalten und 61 Fabrik- bzw. Plantagenarbeitern. Der Artikel schätzt 
Treatment Effects Modelle, Einfachregressionsmodelle und PSM, um Ertrags- und 
Einkommenseffekte zu analysieren. Während Reisertrags- und Einkommenseffekte auf 
Haushaltsebene relativ gering sind, zeigt eine ergänzende disaggregierte Analyse einzelner 
Parzellen signifikante Effekte. Lohnbeschäftigung im Rahmen der Investition ist auch mit 
höherem Pro-Kopf-Einkommen verbunden, welches jedoch geringer ist als die 
Spillovereffekte. Die Studie zeigt somit die Potentiale derartiger Technologietransfer-Projekte 
auf, weist jedoch auch auf einige Hindernisse für eine weitere Verbreitung der Technologien 
hin, wie z.B. Finanzierung und Arbeitskräftemangel. 
Die Gesamtheit dieser Arbeit versucht fünf konkrete Beiträge zur Literatur zu leisten. Erstens 
handelt es sich um eine der wenigen empirischen ex-post Analysen, die mit Haushaltsdaten 
und Kontrollgruppenvergleichen Auswirkungen großflächiger Agrarinvestitionen in SSA 
untersucht.  Die unterschiedlichen Artikel bauen somit auf oben erwähnte Simulationen von 
Arndt et al. (2010) und Baumgartner et al. (2015) mit tatsächlichen Ex-post-Daten auf. Die 
untersuchten Teilsektoren und Länder sind dabei von besonderer Relevanz. Zucker und Reis 
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gehören zu den in den derzeitigen Agrargroßprojekten und -investition zentralen 
Agrarrohstoffen (Landmatrix Datenbank, 2015). Tansania ist zudem eins der drei Hauptziele 
für Agrarinvestitionen innerhalb SSAs, neben Äthiopien und Mosambik (ebd.). 
Zweitens handelt es sich speziell bei der Fallstudie Malawi (Kapitel 2) um eine der wenigen 
empirischen Analysen über die möglichen sozioökonomischen Auswirkungen einer 
zukünftigen möglichen agroindustriellen Biokraftstoffproduktion in SSA. Malawi ist das 
einzige Land SSAs, das seit 1982 kontinuierlich in industriellem Maßstab Ethanol-
Biokraftstoff basierend auf Zuckerrohr-Melasse produziert (Amigun et al., 2011). Ethanol 
basierend auf Zuckerrohr wird derzeit als vielversprechendster und  kostengünstigster 
Biokraftstoff für SSA gesehen, insbesondere für erdölimportierende Binnenstaaten (Johnson 
und Seebaluck 2012; Mitchell 2011). 
Drittens trägt die Arbeit zu einem besseren Verständnis der Auswirkungen alternativer 
Geschäftsmodelle großflächiger Agrarinvestitionen in SSA bei. Insbesondere die Analyse der 
Einkommens- und Armutswirkungen von Lohnbeschäftigung  ist von zentraler Bedeutung 
zum Verständnis großflächiger Agrarinvestitionen, da dies der zentrale Kanal ist, durch den 
ländliche Bevölkerungsgruppen direkt an diesen Investitionen partizipieren. Die 
Studienergebnisse ergänzen die Erkenntnisse von Maertens et al. (2011) zu Arbeitsmärkten 
im Gemüseexportsektor Senegals. Zudem ergänzt die Arbeit die bestehende empirische 
Literatur zu Vertragsanbau in SSA durch Analyse für großflächige Agrarinvestitionen 
relevanter Subsektoren sowie Investitionsmodelle, die Plantagen und Vertragsanbau koppeln 
(Outgrower-Estate-Modelle). Diese werden oftmals als innovative Lösung angesehen, um 
betriebswirtschaftliche und entwicklungspolitische Ziele in Einklang zu bringen. Diese Arbeit 
ergänzt Arbeiten von Väth und Kirk (2014, 2015) zu Palmölinvestitionen in Ghana. Viertens, 
trägt sie zu einem besseren komparativen Verständnis der Vorteile unterschiedlicher 
Investitionsmodelle bei, insbesondere des Plantagen- und Vertragsanbaus, und ergänzt somit 
Maertens und Swinnens (2009) Arbeit im Senegal. Schließlich trägt die Arbeit zu einem 
besseren Verständnis von Spillover-Effekten großflächiger Agrarinvestitionen bei. Die Arbeit 
ergänzt somit die landesweite Analyse von Deininger et al. (2015) zu Mosambik, mit 
empirischen Erkenntnissen zu einem konkreten Beispiel eines Technologietransferprojekts. 
Stichworte: Großflächige Agrarinvestitionen, Ausländische Direktinvestitionen, 
Großbetriebe, Vertragsanbau, landwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung, Technologie-
Spillover, Tansania, Malawi 
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Abstract 
The rising demand for agricultural crops for food and non-food uses has led to a surge of 
foreign investors attempting to acquire agricultural land in developing countries since the 
mid-2000s (Cotula et al., 2009; Deininger et al., 2010). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has 
received a major share of such large-scale agricultural investments (LSAIs) (Deininger et al., 
2010; Schoeneveld, 2014). Growing biofuel demand was an initial major driver, with early 
data suggesting 78% of land under negotiation earmarked for biofuel crops, such as jatropha, 
sugarcane or oil palms (Anseeuw et al., 2012). In addition, foreign investors started to acquire 
lands in SSA for staple food production. Many investments, especially those targeting 
biofuels, have been abandoned or have not yet materialized (Maltsoglou et al., 2013; Singh et 
al., 2014). However, the broad trend of an increasing area under large-scale farming in SSA is 
likely to continue in the future (Gibbon, 2011; Deininger and Byerlee, 2012).  
The potential implications of LSAIs have been highly controversial (Cotula et al., 2009). On 
the one hand, there are widespread concerns voiced by non-governmental organizations and 
the media of substantial social and ecological risks (Cotula et al., 2009; FAO, 2009; 
Deininger et al., 2011). On the other hand, governments and International Organizations often 
argue in favour of the potential of LSAIs to contribute to economic development and poverty 
reduction, for example, by providing jobs in agriculture and agro-processing or enabling 
small-scale farmers to access high-value markets, modern knowledge and technologies. 
Especially investments in biofuels may also lead to greater energy security and import 
substitution, which is particularly relevant for non-oil producing land-locked countries 
(Mitchell, 2011). 
At the international level, policy guidelines have been developed in recent years to encourage 
responsible agricultural investments (Committee on Food Security – CFS, 2014).  The type of 
investment model is considered a crucial parameter in this context for influencing the 
development impacts of LSAIs, with models creating linkages with smallholder farmers, such 
as contract farming or outgrower schemes, often seen as most effective (Deininger et al., 
2011; Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010). 
In spite of the relevance for development and for policy making, there is little empirical 
evidence yet of the welfare effects of LSAIs in general and specific investment models in 
particular. Contributing to this evidence is the main motivation for this thesis. Recent ex-ante 
simulations by Arndt et al. (2010) in Mozambique and Baumgartner et al. (2015) in Ethiopia 
have suggested potential positive welfare effects, particularly of investments involving 
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outgrower systems. Deininger et al. (2015) use country-wide survey data of large-scale and 
small-scale farmers in Mozambique to study actual effects. The authors found positive 
spillover effects, with small-scale farmers surrounding such large-scale farmers adopting 
improved input and methods. Yet, they also find negative impacts on subjective well-being. 
There are hardly any ex-post evaluations of actual impacts of LSAIs in SSA through direct 
participation channels, such as the labor market or contract farming/outgrower schemes.  
Existing evidence on labor market effects mainly comes from the high-value horticulture 
exports sector in SSA. This literature, on the one hand, criticises the low quality of jobs and 
low wages created (Barrientos and Kitzinger, 2004; Barrientos et al., 2005), whereas on the 
other hand, the only existing econometric study of household welfare effects by Maertens et 
al. (2011) in Senegal finds positive income effects from participation, with benefits especially 
occurring to poorer households. Empirical studies on contract farming or outgrower schemes 
in SSA come to rather mixed conclusions regarding the welfare effects. Some studies note the 
risk of exploitation of farmers and the exclusionary processes, whereas impact evaluations 
that use control-group comparisons, mostly find positive household welfare effects for 
farmers integrated in such supply chains (e.g., Bolwig et al., 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 
2009; Bellemare, 2012; Vaeth and Kirk, 2014).  
The overall objective of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the potential 
implications of LSAIs for rural households’ welfare in SSA. Specifically, the objectives are to 
measure income and poverty effects of LSAIs through different institutional arrangements, 
namely (1) product market linkages through outgrower schemes, (2) labor market linkages 
through estate and factory employment, and (3) spillover effects as part of technology transfer 
projects. The thesis approaches these objectives via three articles (Chapters 2-4) drawing on 
case studies of LSAIs in Malawi and Tanzania in the sugar and rice sub-sectors. 
The first article (Chapter 2) explores the direct socio-economic impacts of a sugar and ethanol 
investment in Dwangwa, Malawi (Herrmann and Grote, 2015). The article compares 
participation through individual rainfed outgrower schemes, group-based irrigation outgrower 
schemes, and estate employment with a control group in terms of income and poverty status. 
The article uses cross-section data collected in 2010 and 2011 in treatment and control 
villages, including 225 outgrowers, 60 estate workers, and 328 non-participating households. 
To account for selection bias and endogeneity problems a Treatment Effects Model, 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM), and numerous of robustness checks are used. The results 
show significant positive income differences between participants in either supply-chain set-
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up and the respective control group. Income poverty is significantly lower among outgrowers 
relative to the control group, but for the case of estate workers differences are only significant 
for the extreme poverty line, which suggests estate employment to primarily reduce extreme 
poverty. Although qualitative interviews confirmed these results, they allude to risks of social 
conflicts in the outgrower scheme expansions and lack of transparency in their operations, 
likely undermining their poverty-reducing potentials. 
The second article (Chapter 3) investigates household welfare effects of two LSAIs in 
Tanzania, comparing labor and outgrower models. The two LSAIs operate in Kilombero 
Valley of Morogoro Region, which is a priority cluster for attracting agribusiness investments 
under the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) (SAGCOT, 2011). 
The investments analyzed, namely Kilombero Sugar Company Limited and Kilombero 
Plantation Limited, are considered best-practice cases for future investments under SAGCOT. 
The sample comes from surveys conducted in 2013 with 516 households, comprising 
sugarcane outgrowers, rice and sugar agro-industry workers and non-participants. The results 
confirm positive effects through the analyzed impact channels, but find large differences 
between arrangements and subsectors. Outgrowers benefit the most, yet land-rich more so 
than land-poor. Sugar workers experience larger gains than workers in the rice investment, 
though in both investments land-poor workers seem to benefit. Hence, the study suggests 
large direct benefits for participation in outgrower schemes, but also potentials of agro-
industry wage employment for the land-poor to escape extreme poverty. The article also 
underlines the need to address constraints particularly of land-poor outgrowers. Qualitative 
interviews, for example, pointed to risks for this group due to elite capture by wealthier 
outgrowers. 
Article three (Chapter 4) evaluates spillover effects of LSAIs. The article studies a Public-
Private Partnership technology transfer project between Kilombero Plantation Limited and 
USAID, which aims at improving rice production of farmers surrounding the investment by 
promoting improved methods, high-yielding varieties and fertilizer (SAGCOT, 2013). The 
sample comprises 144 farmers participating in the project, 61 factory and plantation workers, 
and 152 non-participants from the 10 project villages. The article combines plot- and 
household-level analyses and uses a treatment effects model, ordinary least squares 
regressions and PSM to analyze yield and income effects. Although only slightly higher yield 
and income effects are observed at the household level, by adding plot-specific analysis to 
account for partial adoption, effects from adoption are substantial. Labor market participation 
is also associated with higher per capita incomes, but is lower than the effects of the 
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smallholder rice project. The results suggest that participation in such investments have 
potentials to contribute to income improvements. Yet particularly projects that increase the 
productive capacity of surrounding areas, such as smallholder intensification projects or 
contract farming, are likely to yield greater welfare benefits of such investments. 
The thesis attempts to make five major contributions to the literature. Firstly, this thesis is one 
of the few empirical studies using micro-level survey data to investigate impacts of LSAIs in 
SSA. It thereby adds actual ex-post evidence to simulations by Arndt et al. (2010) and 
Baumgartner’s et al. (2015) referred to before. The sub-sectors and countries analyzed are 
interesting in this context as both are among the most targeted in LSAIs, with Tanzania 
among the main destinations for LSAIs in SSA (Land Matrix Database, 2015). 
Secondly, the thesis is among the few to analyze the socio-economic effects of a nascent 
biofuel industry in SSA. Malawi has been the only country in SSA to continuously produce 
biofuel-ethanol on an industrial scale since 1982 (Amigun et al., 2011). Sugarcane-to-ethanol 
is considered to be the most promising, lowest-cost biofuel option at the moment in SSA, 
particularly for landlocked countries (Mitchell, 2011; Johnson and Seebaluck, 2012). 
Thirdly, the thesis contributes to a better understanding of the welfare effects of different 
business models for LSAIs in SSA. Especially, investigating income and poverty effects of 
wage employment is crucial to understanding the overall implications of LSAIs given that this 
is the major channel through which the rural poor are integrated in LSAIs. The study results 
complement the evidence on high-value horticultural export crops (Maertens et al., 2011) with 
insights on LSAIs. In addition, the thesis contributes to the literature on contract 
farming/outgrower schemes in SSA, with an analysis of subsectors relevant for LSAIs and 
models combining plantation and contract farming approaches (outgrower-estate-models), 
often considered solutions to combine goals of competitiveness with inclusiveness. The thesis 
adds to recent work done by Vaeth and Kirk (2015) on similar palm oil investments in Ghana. 
Fourthly, the thesis adds to an understanding of the relative benefits of different institutional 
arrangements for LSAIs, adding to Maertens’ and Swinnen’s (2009) work in Senegal. 
Measuring these welfare differences is important to understand socioeconomic implications of 
changes in the production of these subsectors. At the same time, the type of institutional 
arrangement may be an important parameter that governments could influence, for example, 
by making investment permits or land leases conditional on contract farming arrangements. 
XIV 
Finally, the thesis contributes to a better understanding of spill-over effects of LSAIs. The 
work complements Deininger et al.’s (2015) study in Mozambique, by providing micro-level 
evidence and insights into a specific technology transfer model for LSAIs in Tanzania.  
Keywords: large-scale agricultural investments, foreign direct investments, smallholder 
farmers, Tanzania, Malawi, outgrowers; agro-industry employment; spillovers; 
sugarcane; rice 
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1 Synthesis 
1.1 Background and problem statement 
After decades of neglecting the agricultural sector, the rising demand for agricultural crops for 
food and non-food uses, such as biofuels, has led to a surge of foreign investors attempting to 
acquire agricultural land in developing countries since the mid-2000s (Cotula et al., 2009; 
Deininger et al., 2010). Between 2008 and 2009 alone, an estimated 46.6 million hectares of 
land were under negotiation globally according to Deininger et al. (2010). Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) has received a major share of such large-scale agricultural investments (LSAIs) (ibid.), 
with recent estimates by Schoeneveld (2014), for example, showing 563 large-scale land deals 
between 2005 and 2013 in 37 countries of SSA, covering nearly 23 million hectares.  
Most of these LSAIs have targeted the production of biofuel or food crops (Figure 1). 
Growing biofuel demand was an initial major driver, with early data suggesting 78% of land 
under negotiation earmarked for energy or mixed crops, such as jatropha, sugarcane or oil 
palms (Anseeuw et al., 2012). The production and use of liquid biofuels had been heavily 
promoted since the early 2000s mainly in industrialized countries as a strategy to address 
climate change and energy security concerns (Doornbosch and Steenblik, 2007). Although 
SSA countries continued to play a minor role in global biofuel production (Maltsoglou et al., 
2013), a number of countries were considered to have substantial production potential, thanks 
to favorable climatic conditions and large areas of underutilized land (e.g. Smeets et al., 2007; 
Watson and Purchase, 2012). Consequently, many countries developed strategies and policies 
to foster domestic biofuel industries and attract foreign investments (Jumbe et al., 2009). In 
addition, foreign investors started to increasingly acquire lands in SSA for staple food 
production, partly as a response to increased food demand in parts of Asia and the Middle 
East.  
Many LSAIs, especially those targeting biofuels, have been abandoned or have not yet 
materialized, often because of unviable business plans, lack of capital, changing biofuel 
legislations or bureaucratic hurdles (Maltsoglou et al., 2013; Singh et al., 2014). However, the 
broad trend of an increasing area under large-scale farming in SSA is likely to continue in the 
future (Gibbon, 2011; Deininger and Byerlee, 2012). 
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Table 1: Number of large-scale land deals in Sub-Saharan Africa (by crop)  
 
Source: Land Matrix data base (2015) 
The potential implications of LSAIs have been highly controversial (Cotula et al., 2009; 
Deininger et al., 2011). On the one hand, there are widespread concerns mainly voiced by 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media of substantial social and ecological 
risks. Such concerns are reinforced by research showing that LSAIs have so far often targeted 
countries or regions with weak governance systems and poor protection of local people’s land 
rights (Arezki et al., 2015, Osabuohien, 2014). In addition, a number of case studies confirm 
these risks and show that LSAIs often had lower benefits than expected and resulted in local 
conflicts for land (‘land grabbing’) (e.g., Nhantumbo & Salomao, 2010; Borras et al., 2011a; 
Borras et al., 2011b).  
On the other hand, governments and International Organizations often argue in favor of the 
potential of LSAIs to contribute to economic development and poverty reduction, for 
example, by providing jobs in agriculture and agro-processing or enabling small-scale farmers 
to access high-value markets, modern knowledge and technologies. In addition, they may 
contribute to overall economic development via investments in schools and hospitals as part 
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) commitments (Deininger and Byerlee, 2012) or by 
increasing tax revenues. Especially investments in biofuels may also lead to greater energy 
security and import substitution, which is particularly relevant for non-oil producing land-
locked countries (Mitchell, 2011).   
At the international level, policy guidelines have been developed in recent years to encourage 
responsible agricultural investments (RAI) that contribute to poverty reduction and economic 
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development, e.g., the RAI-Principles (Committee on Food Security – CFS, 2014). The type 
of investment model or supply chain set-up is considered a crucial element in this context for 
influencing the development impacts of LSAIs (ibid.; Vermeulen & Cotula, 2010). The 
literature discusses a variety of alternative models to large-scale land acquisitions, such as 
contract farming, nucleus-outgrower schemes, or joint ventures (Vermeulen and Cotula, 
2010). Models that create linkages with smallholder farmers, such as contract farming or 
outgrower schemes,
1
 are often considered most effective (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010; 
Smalley, 2013). 
In spite of the relevance for development and for policy making, there is little empirical 
evidence yet of the welfare effects of LSAIs in general and specific investment models in 
particular, which is the main motivation for this thesis. Recent ex-ante simulations by Arndt et 
al. (2010) in Mozambique and Baumgartner et al. (2015) in Ethiopia suggest potential positive 
welfare effects. Arndt et al. (2010), for example, assessed potential income implications of 
large-scale biofuel investments in Mozambique using a country-wide computable general 
equilibrium evaluation framework, exploring both sugarcane plantation-based expansion and 
jatropha outgrower investments. Although they predict overall income improvements, they 
predict outgrower-based models to be more pro-poor. Baumgartner et al. (2015) provides 
micro-level insights by simulating expansions of a large-scale rice investment in Ethiopia 
using a linear programming approach based on survey data. While they also predict overall 
positive employment effects, they also argue that investments partly based on outgrower 
systems to generate more inclusive results. 
In a recent study, Deininger et al. (2015) use country-wide survey data of large-scale and 
small-scale farmers in Mozambique to assess actual spillover effects of large-scale farms.  
The authors find evidence of some positive spillovers, with surrounding farmers adopting 
some practices and accessing fertilizer and pesticides as used by large-scale farms. Yet they 
find also negative impacts on smallholder farmers’ subjective well-being.  
There are hardly any ex-post evaluations of actual impacts of LSAIs in SSA through direct 
participation channels, such as the labor market or contract farming/outgrower schemes. 
Existing evidence on labor market effects mainly emanates from the high-value horticulture 
exports sector in SSA. This literature, on the one hand, criticizes the low quality of jobs and 
                                                 
1 In this article, the terms contract farming and outgrower schemes are used interchangeably. Eaton and Shepherd (2001, p.2) define contract 
farming “as an agreement between farmers and processing and/or marketing firms for the production and supply of agricultural products 
under forward agreements, frequently at predetermined prices,” often involving production support through advice and input provision.  
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low wages created (Barrientos and Kitzinger, 2004; Barrientos et al., 2005). On the other 
hand, the only existing econometric study of household welfare effects by Maertens et al. 
(2011) on tomato export chains in Senegal finds positive income effects from participation, 
with benefits especially occurring to poorer households. Empirical studies on contract farming 
or outgrower schemes in SSA come to rather mixed conclusions of their effects. Some 
studies, for example, note the risk of exploitation of farmers (e.g., Little and Watts, 1994) as 
well as their exclusionary processes (e.g., Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997; Singh, 2002). In 
contrast, some impact evaluations in recent years that use control-group comparisons mostly 
find positive household welfare effects for farmers integrated in such supply chains (Warning 
and Key, 2002; Bolwig et al., 2009; Bellemare, 2012; Vaeth and Kirk, 2014). Vaeth and Kirk 
(2014) is the only study analyzing contract farming in sub-sectors most relevant for LSAIs, in 
this case palm oil in Ghana. There is hardly any study comparing different business models or 
investment channel using ex-post data, with an exception of Maertens’ and Swinnen’s (2009) 
study on contract farming and wage-labor participation in Senegal.  
1.2 Research objectives 
The overall objective of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the potential 
implications of LSAIs for rural households’ welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Specifically, the objectives are to measure income and poverty effects of different impact 
channels and business models, namely (1) product market linkages through outgrower 
schemes, (2) labor market linkages through estate and factory employment, and (3) spillover 
effects as part of technology transfer projects. 
The thesis approaches these objectives via three articles (Chapters 2-4) drawing on case 
studies of LSAIs in Malawi and Tanzania in the sugar and rice sub-sectors: 
 Article 1 evaluates a foreign direct investment (FDI) in Malawi’s sugar sector on 
household income and income poverty via participating as estate workers and different 
outgrowers models. 
 Article 2 studies income and poverty effects of LSAIs in Tanzania, by comparing two 
foreign investments in the sugar and rice sub-sectors via factory and estate worker 
channels and outgrowers schemes. 
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 Article 3 analyses plot- and household level yield and income spillover effects of the 
large-scale rice investment Tanzania and compares it to direct labor market effects.  
1.3 Case studies & data 
Case studies 
The thesis comprises three case studies of LSAIs in Malawi and Tanzania.  
In Malawi, the analysis relies on a major sugar and ethanol producing cluster in the Central 
Region, with Dwangwa Sugar Company (DSC) at its core. DSC is under leadership of the 
British-South African sugar producer Illovo Ltd. and was established in 1979 through a sugar 
factory, a 6,000 ha estate on swamp land, and initially an integrated smallholder irrigation 
scheme. Later, an ethanol plant was constructed by another company. The investment was 
selected as case study because of the growing importance of different smallholder 
arrangements, which allows for a comparison of estate investments with smallholder-based 
arrangements. Since the 1990s, independent smallholders started to participate as rainfed 
outgrowers and since the 2000s, the Government of Malawi (GoM) started implementing 
large-scale smallholder irrigation schemes, financed by the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) and the European Union (EU). 
In Tanzania, the analysis relies on two LSAIs in Kilombero Valley, Morogoro Region. 
Kilombero District of Morogoro Region is a priority cluster for attracting agribusiness 
investments under the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania – SAGCOT 
(SAGCOT, 2011). Kilombero contains the largest low-altitude freshwater wetland of East 
Africa (Kangalawe & Liwenga, 2005) and is a major rice and sugarcane producing area of 
Tanzania. However, large-scale farming is not well developed (Nindi et al., 2001). 
Investments under SAGCOT were still in a preparatory phase when the survey started. The 
two investments analyzed in this thesis, namely Kilombero Sugar Company Limited (KSCL) 
and Kilombero Plantation Limited (KPL), existed already.  
KSCL is the largest sugar producer in Tanzania, accounting for more than 60% of the 
country’s sugar output (SBT, 2015). KSCL was established already in the 1960s and 
comprises two adjacent agricultural estates and sugar factories, as well as an alcohol distillery 
(Illovo, 2014). Employment is created for 870 permanent staff and 2,073 seasonal workers at 
peak periods (ibid.). The share of outgrowers increased substantially since the early 2000s, 
contributing to around 60% of total sugarcane production. Outgrowers are linked to KSCL 
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through associations that have sugarcane supply agreements with KSCL. Harvesting and 
transportation is organized by the associations. 
KPL is a large-scale rice investment established in 2008 as joint venture between the British 
company Agrica and RUBADA, a Tanzanian parastatal organization, on an almost 6,000 ha 
government property. The investment comprises an industrial rice mill, a large warehouse, 
and cleaning and drying facilities. At full operation, employment of 180 full-time and up to 
300 seasonal workers is expected. As processes are highly mechanized, agricultural jobs are 
mainly in weeding. Although KPL buys at times rice from surrounding farmers, no real 
contract farming scheme had been yet established. However, in partnership with USAID, a 
smallholder rice intensification project was installed that aims at improving the rice 
production of 5,000 farmers in the area by promoting improved methods, high-yielding 
varieties, and fertilizer, with varieties and fertilizer also used by KPL (SAGCOT, 2013). 
Data sets 
Three household surveys were conducted as part of the articles for this thesis.  
The first household survey and qualitative interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2011 
around DSC in Malawi. The household survey includes a representative sample of sugarcane 
outgrowers, estate workers and non-participants in the villages surrounding DSC. The sample 
comprised 225 sugarcane outgrowers, 60 estate workers as well as 328 non-participating 
households from the outgrower villages and control villages. 
The second household survey was conducted in 2013 in villages surrounding KPL. The 
survey comprised 357 households, 144 of which were small-scale rice farmers participating in 
the rice intensification project, 61 households who were factory or estate workers, and 152 
non-participants. Project participants and non-participants were randomly selected from the 
10 project villages. Agro-industry workers came from three KPL surrounding villages, but 
were interviewed at their work place.  
The third survey was also conducted in 2013 with groups including sugarcane outgrowers, 
sugar factory and estate workers and non-participants in villages surrounding KSCL. 
Interviewees were selected through a two-stage stratified random sampling procedure. First, 
three wards were purposely selected because it was where most of the sugarcane growers 
came from. Households were selected from all villages within the three wards. Village 
population lists were used to categorize households according to the three groups (outgrowers, 
workers, non-participants) and participants were randomly selected accordingly. 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis and main conclusions 
The thesis’ specific objectives are addressed in three different articles, which are as follows:   
The first article (Chapter 2) explores the direct socio-economic impacts of the sugar and 
ethanol investment in Malawi (Herrmann and Grote, 2015). The article compares participation 
through individual rainfed outgrower schemes, group-based irrigation outgrower schemes, 
and estate employment with a control group in terms of income and poverty status. The article 
uses the Malawian cross-section data collected in treatment and control villages of a total of 
613 households (outgrowers, estate workers and non-participating households). In addition, 
focus group discussions and individual qualitative interviews are used to cross-check and 
understand underlying processes. To account for selection bias and endogeneity problems a 
Treatment Effects Model and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and numerous robustness 
checks are used. The findings show significant positive income differences between 
participants in either supply-chain set-up and the respective counterfactual group. Income 
poverty is significantly lower among outgrowers relative to the counterfactual, but for the 
case of estate workers differences are only significant for the extreme poverty line, which 
suggests estate employment to primarily reduce extreme poverty. Although qualitative 
interviews confirmed these results, they allude to risks of social conflicts in the outgrower 
scheme expansions and lack of transparency in their operations, likely undermining their 
poverty-reducing potentials. 
The second article (Chapter 3) investigates the household welfare effects of the two LSAIs in 
Tanzania in the two sub-sectors rice and sugar, comparing labor and outgrower models. It 
uses parts of the two surveys conducted in 2013 in Kilombero Valley. The sample used for 
this article comprises 516 households, including sugarcane outgrowers, rice and sugar agro-
industry workers and non-participants. The results confirm positive effects through the 
analyzed impact channels, as found by Herrmann and Grote (2015). However, there are large 
differences between arrangements and subsectors. Outgrowers benefit the most, yet land-rich 
more so than land-poor. Sugar workers experience larger gains than workers in the rice 
investment, though in both investments land-poor workers seem to benefit. Hence, the study 
suggests large direct benefits for participation in outgrower schemes, but also potentials of 
agro-industry wage employment for the land-poor to escape extreme poverty. The article also 
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underlines the need to address constraints of land-poor outgrowers in particular. Qualitative 
interviews pointed specifically to risks for land-poor outgrowers due to elite capture of 
outgrower services by wealthier outgrowers. 
Article three (Chapter 4) analyzes spillover effects of LSAIs to small-scale farmers. 
Specifically, it evaluates the Public-Private Partnership project between KPL and USAID, 
involving training farmers through farmer-field schools and distributing improved 
technologies. In addition, it compares this spillover channel to the agro-industry wage labor 
channel. The article relies on part of the previous data set of agro-industry rice workers and 
non-participants as well as participants of the rice project. The sample size for this article is 
357, comprising 144 farmers participating in the project, 61 factory and plantation workers, 
and 152 non-participants from the 10 project villages. The article combines plot- and 
household-level analyses and uses a treatment effects model, ordinary least squares 
regressions and PSM to analyze yield and income effects. Although only slightly higher yield 
and income effects are observed at the household level, by adding plot-specific analyses to 
account for partial adoption, effects from adoption are substantial. Labor market participation 
is also associated with higher per capita incomes, but is lower than the effects of the 
smallholder rice project. The results, among others, suggest that participation in such 
investments have potentials to contribute to income improvements. Yet particularly projects 
that increase the productive capacity of surrounding areas, such as smallholder intensification 
projects or contract farming, are likely to yield greater welfare benefits of such investments. 
Table 2: List of papers included in the dissertation 
Chapter Authors Title Published in / Submitted to / Presented at 
2 Herrmann, 
R., Grote, 
U. (2015) 
Large-scale Agro-
Industrial Investments and 
Rural Poverty: Evidence 
from Sugarcane in 
Malawi. 
Published in: Journal of African Economies, 24 (5): 645-676. 
Accepted paper for presentation at the PEGNet Conference 2012, 
Dakar, Senegal, September 6-7, 2012.  
Accepted paper for presentation at the 14th World Bank Land & 
Poverty Conference, 2013, Washington D.C., April 8-11, 2013. 
Accepted paper for presentation at Tropentag 2011, Bonn, October 
5-7, 2011. 
3 Herrmann, 
R.  
Large-scale agricultural 
investments and 
smallholder welfare: a 
comparison of wage labor 
and outgrower channels in 
Tanzania. 
 
Submitted Paper at the Journal “World Development”. 
Accepted paper for presentation at the 2014 Global Land Project / 
Open Science Meeting, Berlin, March 19- 21, 2014. 
Accepted paper for presentation at the 15th World Bank Land & 
Poverty Conference, 2014, Washington D.C., March 24-27, 2014. 
Accepted paper for presentation at the Tropentag 2015, Berlin, 
October 5-7, 2015. 
Accepted paper for presentation at the CSAE Conference 2016: 
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Economic Development in Africa, Center for Studies of African 
Economies, Oxford, March 20-22, 2016. 
4 Herrmann, 
R.  
Technology spillovers and 
labor market effects of a 
large-scale rice 
investment in Tanzania. 
Submitted paper to the Journal “Agricultural Economics”. 
Accepted paper for presentation at the 17th World Bank Land & 
Poverty Conference, 2016, Washington D.C., March 14-18, 2016. 
 
1.5 Contributions to the literature 
The thesis attempts to make five major contributions to the literature about the welfare 
implications of LSAIs in SSA.  
Firstly, this thesis is one of the few empirical studies using micro-level survey data to 
investigate ex-post impacts of LSAIs in SSA. It thereby adds to recent ex-ante analyses by 
Arndt et al. (2010) on biofuel crops in Mozambique and Baumgartner’s et al. (2015) on rice in 
Ethiopia. The sub-sectors and countries analyzed in this thesis are interesting cases. Both, rice 
and sugarcane are among the most relevant sub-sectors targeted in LSAI proposals in SSA 
(Land Matrix Database, 2015), as a consequence of rising demand from within and from 
outside SSA (Larson et al. 2010; Johnson & Seebaluck, 2012). Tanzania has been among the 
main destinations for LSAIs in SSA, apart from Mozambique and Ethiopia (Land Matrix 
Database, 2015). Whereas biofuel production has been an initial driver for LSAIs in Tanzania 
(Locher & Sulle, 2013), recent policy programs have been launched to attract large 
agribusiness investments more broadly, namely the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of 
Tanzania (SAGCOT) and Big Results Now (BRN) (GoT, 2013; GoT, 2015). Rice and sugar 
are priority subsectors in SAGCOT and BRN (SAGCOT, 2011; GoT, 2015). The rice and 
sugar investments analyzed in this thesis are located within the SAGCOT corridor and are 
considered best-practice investments. The thesis is the first empirical evaluation of their 
socio-economic effects. Although Malawi has not been a major recipient of LSAIs given its 
small land-locked nature, it has been one of the lowest-cost producers globally (LMC, 2005). 
Between 2010 and 2013, sugarcane yields averaged 107 tons per hectare, only topped by 
Peru, Egypt and Senegal (FAOSTAT, 2015). The sugarcane-based industries are supported as 
one of three pillars under the new National Export Strategy (NES, 2014). 
Secondly, the thesis is among the first to analyze the socio-economic effects of a nascent 
large-scale biofuel industry in SSA. Malawi has been the only country in SSA that has 
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continuously produced biofuel-ethanol based on sugarcane-molasses on an industrial scale 
since 1982 (Amigun et al., 2011; Maltsoglou et al., 2013). Sugarcane-based ethanol is 
currently the main source for biofuel production in SSA (Amigun et al., 2011) and is 
considered to be the most promising, lowest-cost biofuel feedstock, particularly for 
landlocked countries (Mitchell, 2011; Johnson and Seebaluck, 2012). The case is therefore 
particularly suitable for a study of the potential effects of an expanding biofuel industry in 
SSA. 
Thirdly, the thesis contributes to the understanding of the welfare effects of different business 
models an impact channels for LSAIs in SSA. In this context, the thesis investigates the 
impact of factory and plantation/estate wage employment as part of LSAIs on household 
income and poverty, which is crucial to understand the overall implications of LSAIs given 
that the labor market is likely to be the major channel through which the rural poor are 
integrated in LSAIs. This study contributes to closing the gap on empirical evidence on their 
welfare implications by evaluating income and poverty effects of participation in factory or 
estate employment of LSAIs. It thereby complements existing evidence on high-value 
horticultural export crops (Maertens et al., 2011) with insights on rice and sugar sub-sectors. 
In addition, the thesis contributes to an understanding of the welfare impacts of outgrower 
schemes within LSAIs by studying sugarcane schemes in Malawi and Tanzania. The thesis 
therefore adds to the literature on contract farming in high-value crops in SSA, by focusing on 
outgrower schemes in a sub-sector relevant in LSAI, similar Vaeth’s and Kirk’s (2015) 
research on palm oil in Ghana. Sugarcane production in SSA is particularly interesting as it 
commonly relies on large estates (Yamba et al., 2008), but with small-scale farmers also often 
integrated through outgrower schemes to complement estate production (outgrower-nucleus 
estate) (ISO, 2008). Land Matrix data reveals, for example, that 25% of sugarcane 
investments intend to integrate such contract farming arrangements (Land Matrix, 2015). 
Governments see outgrower schemes often as main instrument to increase the inclusiveness of 
LSAIs, e.g. SAGCOT in Tanzania and Malawi’s NES (GoT, 2015; GoM, 2014). Their 
welfare implications are unclear as these supply chains present extreme forms of monopsonic 
relationship with a single processor usually sourcing from a large number of farmers that have 
no alternative market outlets, making them highly depend (Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008; 
White, 1997). Yet, smallholders could also benefit from the buyer’s monopsonic position as 
the buyer may invest in the suppliers’ production capacity due to the lower risk of side-selling 
(Glover, 1990). In addition, sugar farmers may also benefit from highly protected sugar 
markets and sale of other by-products (e.g. molasses for ethanol production in Malawi).  
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Fourthly, the thesis adds to an understanding of the relative benefits of different institutional 
arrangements for LSAIs, adding to Maertens’ and Swinnen’s (2009) comparative study on 
alternative supply chain set-ups in horticultural export chains in Senegal. Understanding 
differences in welfare effects of different institutional arrangements, is of high relevance 
given the importance often attached to the institutional arrangement to influence the 
development outcomes of such investments. Moreover, the type of institutional arrangements 
is a potential parameter for governments to influence, for example, by making investment 
permits or land leases conditional on contract farming arrangements.    
Finally, the thesis contributes to an understanding of spill-over effects of LSAIs. The study 
therefore complements and adds to Deininger et al.’s (2015) study in Mozambique by 
providing micro-level evidence from a specific investment in rice in Tanzania. It provides 
insights into a particular Public-Private Partnership (PPP) project to transfer knowledge and 
rice technology (high-yielding varieties, fertilizer) to the smallholder sector. 
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3 Large-scale agricultural investments and smallholder welfare: a 
comparison of wage labor and outgrower channels in Tanzania 
Abstract 
This article evaluates household welfare effects of large-scale agricultural investments in 
Tanzania, one of the main recipients of such investments in Africa. Specifically, the article 
compares households participating in sugar and rice investments through outgrower schemes 
or as agro-industry worker with non-participants in terms of household income and income 
poverty. Building on primary household data, it is one of the first studies to empirically 
analyze ex-post impacts of large-scale agricultural investments in Africa. The analysis draws 
on cross-section survey data of 516 households collected in Kilombero District, a priority 
cluster for the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). The results 
suggest overall positive effects of the investments on the participants. However, there are 
large differences between arrangements and subsectors. Outgrowers benefit the most, yet 
land-rich more so than land-poor. Agro-industry workers in the sugar investment experience 
larger gains than those in the rice investment, though in both investments land-poor workers 
seem to benefit. Hence, the study suggests large direct benefits of outgrower schemes and 
potentials of agro-industry wage employment for the land-poor to escape extreme poverty. 
Yet, it also stresses particularly the need to address the constraints of land-poor outgrowers. 
Qualitative interviews, for example, pointed to growing risks for land-poor outgrowers in the 
context of rising elite capture by larger outgrowers.   
Keywords: large-scale agricultural investments, socio-economic impacts, outgrowers, agro-
industry employment, Tanzania 
3.1 Introduction 
The biofuels boom and sharply rising global food prices since the mid-2000s have led to a 
massive surge in foreign investors attempting to acquire agricultural lands in developing 
countries (Deininger et al., 2011). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has received a major share of 
such large-scale agricultural investment (LSAI) proposals (Cotula et al., 2009). Recent 
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estimates by Schoeneveld (2014) suggest 563 large-scale land deals between 2005 and 2013 
in 37 countries, covering nearly 23 million hectares. However, past experiences with LSAIs in 
SSA provide plenty of examples of failures of such investments (Collier and Dercon, 2009; 
Deininger and Byerlee, 2012; Tyler and Dixie, 2013) and many of these new LSAIs have also 
been abandoned, especially those targeting biofuels (Maltsoglou et al., 2013; Singh et al., 
2014), or have not yet materialized (Land Matrix Global Observatory – LMGO, 2015). Still, 
the share of large-scale farming and investments in SSA is likely to rise in future, given the 
technological innovations to manage large farms, growing demand for standardized products 
and governments’ motivations to expand into uncultivated areas (Deininger and Byerlee, 
2012). 
The potential implications of LSAIs have been highly controversial. On the one hand, there 
are widespread concerns of substantial social and ecological risks of such investments that 
threaten the very livelihoods of poor farming households (Cotula et al., 2009; Hall, 2011; 
Global Land Grabbing Conference, 2011). Previous experiences in SSA also show that LSAIs 
were often associated with substantial social conflicts with negative long-term repercussions 
(Deininger and Byerlee, 2012). A recent econometric analysis of Arezki et al. (2015) also 
finds that LSAIs have so far often targeted countries with weak governance systems and 
protection of poor people’s land rights, reinforcing such concerns. On the other hand, LSAIs 
may contribute to economic development and poverty reduction by generating rural 
employment, enabling local farmers to access high-value markets, modern knowledge and 
technologies or by contributing to investments in infrastructure, schools, and hospitals as part 
of Corporate Social Responsibility commitments or through tax revenues (Deininger et al., 
2011; Deininger and Byerlee, 2012). At the international level, policy guidelines have been 
developed in recent years to encourage such responsible agricultural investments that 
contribute to poverty reduction and economic development (e.g., Committee on Food Security 
– CFS, 2014). The type of institutional arrangement is considered an important parameter in 
this context (Vermeulen & Cotula, 2010), with arrangements that create linkages with 
smallholder farmers, such as contract farming or outgrower schemes,
2
 often considered most 
effective (Arndt et al., 2010; Deininger et al., 2011).  
In spite of the relevance for development and policy making, there is still a paucity of 
empirical evidence on the welfare and poverty effects of LSAIs (Deininger and Byerlee, 
2012; Oya, 2013a). Studies have so far used ex-ante simulations to measure potential impacts, 
                                                 
2 Eaton and Shepherd (2001, p.2) define contract farming “as an agreement between farmers and processing and/or marketing firms for the 
production and supply of agricultural products under forward agreements, frequently at predetermined prices,” often involving production 
support through advice and input provision. In this article, the terms contract farming and outgrower schemes are used interchangeably. 
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with Arndt et al. (2010) simulating large-scale biofuel expansions through jatropha or 
sugarcane production in Mozambique and Baumgartner et al. (2015) assessing the expansion 
of a rice investment in Ethiopia. Both studies suggest positive welfare effects, but more pro-
poor effects if smallholders are integrated in the supply-chains. Deininger et al. (2015) have 
recently used survey data of large-scale and small-scale farmers in Mozambique to study 
spillover effects. The authors find evidence of some spillovers to small-scale farmers in terms 
of adoption of farming practices, fertilizer and pesticides, but also negative impacts on 
farmers’ subjective well-being.  
However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on the actual impacts through the most 
relevant direct channels of LSAIs, i.e. labor market linkages via plantations and large-scale 
farming or product market linkages via outgrower schemes. Studies on labor market effects 
have so far focused on less land-intensive high-value horticulture export sectors in SSA, 
which often have viewed these jobs critically because of their low quality and low wages 
(e.g., Barrientos and Kitzinger, 2004; Barrientos et al., 2005).The only study applying a more 
rigorous approach using a control-group comparison (Maertens et al., 2011, on horticulture 
exports in Senegal), however, finds positive welfare effects, with benefits especially occurring 
to poorer households. The existing literature on contract farming comes to rather mixed 
conclusions of their effects. On the one hand, authors have noted the risk of exploitation of 
farmers (e.g., Little and Watts, 1994) and exclusionary processes (e.g., Porter and Phillips-
Howard, 1997; Singh, 2002). On the other hand, more recent impact evaluations mostly find 
positive household welfare effects for contract farmers (Warning and Key, 2002; Bolwig et 
al., 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Bellemare, 2012; Vaeth and Kirk, 2014; Herrmann 
and Grote, 2015). Vaeth and Kirk (2014) on palm oil in Ghana and Hermann and Grote 
(2015) on sugar in Malawi are the only two studies that analyze contract farming as part of a 
LSAI. In addition, only two studies exist that compare the effectiveness of different 
institutional arrangements, which are Maertens and Swinnen (2009) and Hermann and Grote 
(2015), who assess contract farming and wage employment in Senegal and Malawi, 
respectively. 
The aim of this study is to contribute to the literature on the welfare effects of LSAIs by 
evaluating the household income and income poverty implications of outgrower schemes and 
estate/plantation and factory employment in large-scale rice and sugar investments in 
Tanzania. The analysis is based on cross-section data of sugarcane outgrowers, agro-industry 
workers (sugar and rice) and non-participants in villages surrounding two LSAIs in 
Kilombero District, Morogoro Region. The article is among the first that attempts to measure 
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actual ex-post impacts of LSAIs in SSA, thus, contributing to filling the literature gap 
identified by Deininger and Byerlee (2012) and Oya (2013a). Moreover, it attempts to 
contribute to a better understanding of the heterogeneous effects of LSAIs because of 
differences in sub-sectors and institutional arrangements.  
Rice and sugar in Tanzania are very interesting cases. Demand for rice and sugar has been 
increasing within and outside the region amid rising incomes and urbanization (Larson et al. 
2010; Johnson & Seebaluck, 2012). Both subsectors have been among the main targeted crops 
under LSAI proposals in SSA (LMGO, 2015), with Tanzania among the top three recipient 
countries, apart from Ethiopia and Mozambique (ibid.). Sugar and rice are considered priority 
sub-sectors in Tanzania’s national strategies to develop commercial agriculture (Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania - SAGCOT, 2011; Government of Tanzania - GoT, 
2013). The case study area is within SAGCOT, a major public–private partnership initiative to 
attract agribusiness investments. The two investments have been referred to as role models for 
future SAGCOT investments (SAGCOT, 2011).  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 describes the 
context of agro-industry investments in Tanzania. Section 4 explains the data source and 
methodology, before Section 5 presents and discusses descriptive and econometric results. 
Section 7 concludes. 
3.2 Literature review 
This chapter summarizes existing literature on the effects of contract farming or outgrower 
schemes and employment linked to LSAIs. Contract farming may help smallholder farmers 
overcome their previous lack of access to credit, quality inputs, high-value output markets or 
know-how (Barrett et al., 2012). Input market access, for example, can be facilitated if either 
(a) farmers use their output-contracts as collateral, (b) the output-contracts have inbuilt credit 
schemes (e.g., tri-partite arrangements with commercial banks) or (c) cash earnings are 
sufficient to buy inputs (Grosh, 1994; Govereh et al., 1999). As a result of improved access to 
quality inputs, extension, and high-value output markets, producer prices and/or quantity may 
increase, leading to overall higher incomes. Yet negative welfare effects may also arise due to 
increased exposure to production and marketing risks from adopting a new crop and accessing 
previously unknown markets (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Simmons et al., 2005). Most 
problematic may be situations in which farmers face a single buyer, and relationship-specific 
investments are undertaken, potentially locking them in (Sivramkrishna & Jyotishi, 2008). 
Sugar, for instance, is an extreme case of monopsonic market relations, where usually a single 
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processor sources from a large number of outgrowers with no alternative market outlet. Side-
selling is made difficult due to the bulkiness and perishability of the crop, as well as 
legislation, which often creates regional monopolies.
3
 At the same time, outgrowers may 
benefit from the processor’s output market security if it creates incentives for the processor to 
invest in the outgrowers, as side-selling risks are reduced (Glover, 1990; Tiffen & Mortimore, 
1990). Some recent studies find positive participation effects of contract farming in terms of 
household welfare (Warning & Key, 2002; Miyata et al., 2009; Bellemare, 2012), although 
there are a few exceptions (Simmons et al., 2005; Narayanan, 2014). 
The direct welfare effects of participating as wage laborers in LSAIs are more uncertain. As 
agricultural wage employment usually involves high monitoring costs, hired labor has usually 
been used for only simple tasks involving low wages (Otsuka & Yamano, 2006; Oya, 2013). 
Agricultural wage employment is therefore often argued to be performed by those households 
lacking the ability to engage in high-rewarding non-farm or on-farm jobs (Davis et al., 2010). 
Consequently, although it may be an important coping strategy against shocks, it is usually 
believed to add little to lift the poor out of poverty (Otsuka & Yamano, 2006; Oya, 2013). 
There is some indication, however, that jobs in large-scale investments may have more 
significant effects, especially if foreign capital is involved, as in the cases analyzed here. 
Foreign firms may bring in capital, new ideas and technologies, thereby increasing worker 
productivity (Harrison, 1994). Paying higher wages may also be a strategy to increase 
efficiency or to retain productive workers (efficiency-wage hypothesis) (Akerlof & Yellen, 
1986), or be a result of exposure to global consumer scrutiny (Oya, 2013). Te Velde & 
Morrissey (2003), for example, found in manufacturing industries in SSA that foreign firms 
tend to pay higher wages than domestic firms. Some studies on agro-industries in SSA 
regarding foreign-owned firms (Cramer et al., 2008, for Mozambique) or food exports 
(Maertens & Swinnen, 2009; McCulloch & Ota, 2002) also provide some positive evidence to 
this hypothesis. 
3.3 Large-scale agricultural investments in Tanzania 
3.3.1 Context of LSAIs in Tanzania 
Agro-industry investments involving large-scale land acquisitions have been a matter of 
considerable debate throughout SSA (Gibbon, 2011).
4
 Prior to independence, large-scale 
foreign estates that produced export crops were strongly promoted by governments in 
                                                 
3 The Tanzanian Sugar Board Act of 2001, for example, effectively creates regional monopsonies by prohibiting the establishment of 
different sugar factories within a certain area (Nkonya and Barreiro-Hurle, 2014).  
4 Yet, this is in spite of their relative low importance. Gibbon (2011), for example, estimates that on average only 5%–7.5% of all cultivated 
land in Sub-Saharan Africa has been under plantations or large-scale farming.  
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Tanzania and elsewhere, leaving the small-scale sector often with little support (ibid.; 
Rweyemamu, 1973). Yet smallholder cash-crop production flourished in some regions (ibid.; 
Mrema & Ndikumana 2013) and received widespread state support after independence, e.g., 
through cooperative development (Maghimbi, 2010) or outgrower programs linked to agro-
industry investments (e.g., World Bank, 1994). After the state-led period in the 1990s, 
policies focused again on promoting commercial private investments as an engine for 
agricultural growth,
5
 though recognizing small-scale farmers’ role in poverty reduction (e.g., 
National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies – MKUKUTA I and II). 
Since the mid-2000s, Tanzania has experienced a rapid increase in biofuel and other 
agricultural investment proposals and has become one of the main destinations in Africa for 
LSAIs (Figure 1). By 2008, an estimated 4 million hectares had been under negotiation for 
biofuel projects alone (Sulle & Nelson, 2009). Most biofuel investments, however, have failed 
(Locher & Sulle, 2013), while numerous studies reported conflicts with local communities 
(e.g., Action Aid 2009, HAKIARDHI, 2014, Daley & Scott, 2011). Although the area under 
negotiation declined thereafter, an estimated 1 million hectares was still negotiated in 2012, 
though focusing now on food crops and forestry products (Locher & Sulle, 2013). In this 
context, recent major investment promotion initiatives in Tanzania were formulated to attract 
LSAIs. The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), for example, 
was established in 2010 at the World Economic Forum on Africa as an international public–
private partnership to mobilize agribusiness investments throughout the southern transport 
corridor (SAGCOT, 2011). In addition, Big Results Now (BRN) was adopted in 2012 as a 
government initiative, complementing SAGCOT, to accelerate investments in agriculture, 
with the specific aim of establishing 25 large-scale commercial farming deals (GoT, 2013; 
GoT, 2015). 
Controversies around early biofuel investments have led to proposals for regulatory changes, 
such as Biofuels Guidelines that put a ceiling on land purchases in biofuels and incentives for 
implementing outgrower schemes (GoT, 2010). Amendments had previously been made to 
the Land Act to involve local communities, allowing for joint ventures between villages and 
private investors (Sulle & Nelson, 2009). SAGCOT and BRN have also adopted inclusive 
business models in their blueprints by focusing on outgrower schemes or collective farming 
arrangements (block farms) (GoT, 2015). 
 
                                                 
5 The Investment Promotion Act of 1996 provided investment incentives and led to the establishment of the Tanzanian Investment Center 
(TIC), which is mandated to actively promote large-scale agricultural investment (TIC, 2015). 
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Figure 1: Number of large-scale land deals in Sub-Saharan Africa (2014) 
 
Source: LMGO (2015) 
3.3.2 Development of sugar and rice sub-sectors 
Sugar and rice are priority subsectors in SAGCOT and BRN (SAGCOT, 2011; GoT, 2015). 
Despite the potential for sugar production (FAO, 2010; SAGOCT, 2011), the industry has 
lacked competitiveness, with exports making up less than 5% of production (FAOSTAT, 
2015), similar to other producing countries (LMC, 2004). The first factory and estate 
investments occurred in the 1930s and expanded after independence, involving state-
supported outgrower schemes (World Bank, 1994). Parastatal ownership after 1967 led to the 
financial problems of the industry (ibid.) and eventual government divesture in 1998 (Sugar 
Board of Tanzania - SBT, 2015). After privatization, production increased sharply by 16% 
annually between 2000 and 2005, while imports declined (FAOSTAT, 2015).
6
 Outgrower 
area more than doubled to 20,000 ha between 2000 and 2012 (35% of total area) (ibid.), 
which is in contrast to many other countries, where outgrowers have played a minor role 
(LMC, 2004). Since mid-2000s, output growth has slowed to around 2% annually 
(FAOSTAT, 2015), resulting in imports more than tripling and reaching more than 40% of 
total supply (ibid.). Low factory efficiency and low farm yields are major production 
constraints (Nkonya & Barreiro-Hurle, 2012). Yet, operating under full capacity would not be 
sufficient to meet demand (Smalley et al, 2014). Consequently new investments are given 
high political priority (SAGCOT, 2011).  
                                                 
6
 Despite sharp employment cuts (e.g. Holt Norris & Worby, 2012), 14,000 continued to be directly employed 
during peak seasons (2011/12) (SBT, 2015). 
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Rice has become an important staple in SSA, with demand increasingly being met by imports 
from outside the region (Larson et al., 2010). In contrast to the rest of SSA, imports to 
Tanzania have declined as production increased annually by 6% between 2000 and 2012, 
making it the largest producer in East Africa (FAOSTAT, 2015). Production is dominated by 
smallholder farmers; more than 1.1 million households are estimated to produce rice in 
Tanzania (GoT, 2012a). Large commercial farms have played a minor role (GoT, 2012b). 
Tanzania has become a marginal exporter of rice (FAOSTAT, 2015) and could even become a 
major exporter to the entire region (SAGCOT, 2011). Yet, current trade policies and low rice 
productivity have constrained exports (Barreiro-Hurle, 2012).
7
 A National Rice Sector 
Development Strategy was therefore formulated to increase technology adoption (ibid.), while 
large-scale rice investments are also being increasingly promoted (SAGCOT, 2011, BRN, 
2013). 
3.3.3 Large-scale agricultural investments in the Kilombero Valley 
Kilombero District of Morogoro Region has been identified as a priority cluster for 
investments under SAGCOT (SAGCOT, 2011). Kilombero contains the largest low-altitude 
freshwater wetland of East Africa (Kangalawe & Liwenga, 2005) and provides soil and 
climatic conditions highly suitable for production of a variety of crops (Beck, 1964), for some 
of which yields are the highest in the region (GoT, 2012c).
8
 Kilombero is also the largest rice 
producer in Morogoro (ibid.). Agriculture is the main income source, which is largely 
conducted by small-scale farmers, most of whom produce rice and maize (ibid.). Poor 
infrastructure and other factors have constrained diversification into high-value crops. Still, 
the area has experienced strong in-migration by farmers in previous decades (Kangalawe & 
Liwenga, 2005; Nindi et al., 2001). Large-scale farming is not well developed, except for 
some teak, sugarcane and rice estates (Nindi et al., 2001). Investments under SAGCOT were 
still in a preparatory phase when the survey started. The two investments analyzed – 
Kilombero Sugar Company Limited (KSCL) and Kilombero Plantation Limited (KPL) – 
existed already, but are considered best-practice cases for investments under SAGCOT 
(SACGOT, 2013). 
Kilombero Sugar Company Limited (KSCL) 
KSCL was established in the 1960s as the first major commercial project in Kilombero, with a 
concession of more than 10,000 hectares and state-promoted outgrower schemes (Beck, 
                                                 
7 FAOSTAT data suggests that while Tanzania is the 28th most important rice producer in the world, it is only in 99th place in terms of rice 
yields (2010–13 averages) (FAOSTAT, 2015) 
8
 At the same time, the Kilombero Valley is surrounded by sites of great biodiversity value that constrain overall agricultural expansion 
(Nindi et al., 2001). 
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1964). After near collapse during nationalization (Smalley et al., 2014), it was acquired in 
1998 by British–South African Illovo and ED&F Man, with GoT retaining a 25% share (SBT, 
2015).  
KSCL is the largest sugar producer in Tanzania, accounting for more than 60% of the 
country’s sugar output (SBT, 2015). KSCL comprises two adjacent agricultural estates and 
sugar factories, as well as an alcohol distillery (Illovo, 2014). Employment is created for 870 
permanent staff and 2,073 seasonal workers at peak periods (ibid.).
9
 In addition, more than 
10,000, mostly small-scale, farmers are integrated through outgrower schemes. As estate 
expansion is limited due to land constraints, production increase has relied on estate yield 
improvements through irrigation (ibid.), as well as outgrower expansions on customary land, 
which more than tripled to nearly 12,000 hectares of rainfed land in 2011/12 (60% of total 
sugarcane area) (SBT, 2015). Outgrowers are linked to KSCL through associations that have 
sugarcane supply agreements with KSCL. Harvesting and transportation is organized by the 
associations. Farmers buy certified seed cane through associations, some additionally 
purchase fertilizer and other inputs. Outgrower yields are very low, averaging 35–40 tons per 
hectare compared to 80-ton estate yields (Illovo, 2014). Recent government and donor support 
has aimed at raising outgrower yields by promoting block farms (European Commission – 
EC, 2012; GoT, 2013).  
Kilombero Plantation Limited (KPL) 
KPL is a recent rice joint venture between the British company Agrica and RUBADA, a 
Tanzanian parastatal organization mandated to promote agricultural investments in the Rufiji 
Basin. In 2008, Agrica purchased a 5,818-ha government property called Mngeta Rice Farm, 
which began as a Tanzanian–North Korean joint venture in 1986, but which was liquidated in 
1993 (KPL, 2009). KPL established an industrial rice mill, a large warehouse, and cleaning 
and drying facilities (SAGCOT, 2013). At full operation, 20,000 tons of milled rice are 
expected to be produced, making it Tanzania’s largest rice producer (KPL, 2009; SAGCOT, 
2013), with employment of 180 full-time and up to 300 seasonal workers (ibid.). As processes 
are highly mechanized, agricultural jobs are mainly in weeding, with other jobs in processing, 
warehousing and support services. At the time of the survey, KPL had, at times, bought rice 
from smallholders, but no real contract farming scheme had been yet established. However, in 
partnership with USAID, a smallholder rice intensification project was installed, aimed at 
improving the rice production of 5,000 farm households in the area (SAGCOT, 2013). 
                                                 
9
 Most workers are employed on the estate and within the factories, many of whom are cane cutters involved in the manual sugarcane 
harvesting during the 9–10-month-long harvesting season. Other estate jobs include fertilizer application, truck driving, or gap filling. 
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3.4 Data and methodology 
Data 
The article is based on structured interviews from surveys conducted between April and June 
2013 in villages surrounding KSCL and KPL, which focused on three groups: KSCL 
outgrowers, workers at KSCL and KPL (factory and estate) and non-participating households. 
Non-participants are not involved in sugarcane production, but focus on maize and rice 
farming as well as non-farm activities (e.g. local brewery, trade or casual wage labor).  
In the sugar survey, interviewees were selected through a two-stage stratified random 
sampling procedure. First, three wards (group villages) (Ruhembe, Mkula, and Sanje), were 
purposely selected because it was where most of the sugarcane growers lived according to 
information provided by KSCL extension officers. Ruhembe includes all the villages that sell 
sugarcane to the northern sugar factory (K2), except for those sugarcane growers living in 
urban areas. The households living in urban areas, who are usually non-farm business 
operators with sufficient capital to acquire sugarcane plots, were not included in the sample 
and only interviewed through qualitative interviews. The other two wards are the main 
sugarcane-producing areas selling to the southern factory (K1). Almost all sugar agro-industry 
workers that live around the estates and factories, and are not migrant workers, come from 
these wards. Households were selected from all villages within the three wards. Village 
population lists were used to categorize households according to the three groups (outgrowers, 
workers, non-participants) and participants were randomly selected accordingly.  
The agro-industry workers in the rice survey live in three villages directly surrounding KPL. 
As it was difficult to identify workers within the villages, sampling and interviews were 
conducted at the work place. Non-participants were sampled as control groups from within 10 
villages surrounding the investment, based on population lists. The overall sample for this 
article comprises 209 and 307 households for the rice and sugar survey respectively.
10
 
Methodological issues 
In order to understand the direct household welfare effects, this study estimates the average 
treatment effect of the treated (ATT), which is the average outcome difference between 
participation, ]1D | E[Y(1)  , and the situation had the participant not participated, 
0]D | E[Y(1)  : 
1]D | E[Y-1]D | E[Y1]D | Y-E[Y=ATT i0ii1ii0i1i  . 
                                                 
10 Due to missing data and outliers in the income section, seven households of the rice investment survey and five households of the sugar 
investment survey had to be discarded. 
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To overcome the problem that the outcome in absence of participation is unobservable 
(Heckman et al., 1997), randomly assigning households into treatment and control groups 
would allow both groups to be statistically equivalent except for participation, so that 
1]D  Z,| E[Y(0)   = 0]D  Z,| E[Y(0)  . Yet, participation is rarely random in observational 
studies and, instead, participants and non-participants usually differ before treatment, which 
may lead to over- or underestimating the true treatment effect (selection bias). Such a 
selection bias may arise from (a) project placement and selection decisions by the company as 
well as (b) households’ self-selection into the respective channel. Companies, for instance, 
may prefer working with better-off farmers to reduce transaction costs (Barrett et al., 2012). 
Households may decide to participate, depending on their expected returns, risks and their 
capacity to participate. In the literature on agricultural market access or contract farming (e.g. 
Benfica, 2006; Barrett et al., 2012; Bellemare, 2012), participation is often influenced by the 
initial physical, educational and financial asset base, entrepreneurial ability, social networks, 
risk aversion or technical skills (Barrett et al., 2012). For the case of agro-industry wage 
employment, the non-farm diversification literature also indicates that initial wealth status 
influences household-level diversification opportunities (Ellis, 2000). Poorer households may 
therefore rather self-select into the rural labor market due to their low agricultural earning 
potentials. 
In the sugarcane outgrower case studied, participation has been relatively open. Smallholder 
outgrower participation first increased strongly at the end of 1970s. The company promoted 
sugarcane growing among all farmers in surrounding villages and provided infrastructure 
support as well as financial and agricultural assistance (Smalley et al., 2014). However, 
during the 1980s and 1990s most outgrowers quit (ibid.). Given the objective to increase 
sugar self-sufficiency after privatization, smallholders were encouraged again in the early 
2000s to join through a number of public–private partnerships, involving outgrower 
infrastructure rehabilitation, technical assistance, micro-finance, and bulk input supply, 
making it easier for farmers to participate (see Befeki, 2006; Smalley et al., 2014). In 
addition, KSCL encouraged participation by improving factory efficiency and more 
transparent payment systems (ibid.). Low rewards from alternative crops also led many 
farmers to join sugarcane outgrower schemes (ibid.). The Sugar Industry Act of 2001 governs 
outgrower participation, requiring outgrowers to join an outgrower association and to register 
with the Sugar Board of Tanzania. There are no additional requirements, except for having 
land available and start-up capital to acquire inputs, as well as paying a small association fee 
(Smalley & Sulle, 2014), which are therefore hypothesized to be the main entry barriers. 
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Likewise, interviews with non-participants still revealed that lack of capital (85%), land 
(72%), and sufficient family labor (24%) were perceived to be the main factors impeding 
participation.  
In the case of agro-industry workers, the participation process and barriers are not as clear. As 
far as sugar investment is concerned, during the early years of the investment, employment of 
migrant laborers was common (World Bank 1994), many of whom later on stayed in the 
region and acquired farm land (Smalley & Sulle, 2014). With privatization, many workers 
quit their jobs at the estates due to declining salaries and fewer additional benefits, but were 
replaced by other workers on seasonal contracts with lower wages (ibid.). Although it may 
suggest that households lacking alternative income sources would mainly work in these jobs, 
qualitative interviews still suggested an overall very high demand among households for this 
work, which is understandable, especially given the high youth underemployment. In the rice 
case, qualitative interviews suggested that participants and non-participants view employment 
on the estates as inferior to other jobs. Yet, demand for factory as well as estate jobs is also 
very high. Some even noted the need to pay bribes to access these jobs. 
Evaluation approach 
In order to address potential selection bias, the article uses propensity score matching (PSM) 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). PSM compares outcome means of 
participants and non-participants with similar propensity scores, i.e. their probability of 
participating P(Di=1 | Z ) given a vector of household characteristics Z. Using a probit model, 
the treatment effect is derived for those participants and non-participants overlapping in 
propensity scores using different matching algorithms. 
PSM’s validity depends on two major assumptions (ibid.): First, all factors influencing 
participation and outcomes can be accounted for (selection of observables). Second, there is 
sufficient similarity of participants and non-participants (overlap condition). Selection on 
observable characteristics only, however, is highly unlikely in practice. PSM is therefore 
considered a second-best approach to randomized experiments or difference-in-difference 
methods (Barrett et al., 2012) and estimates have to be seen as suggestive rather than 
conclusive. To ensure comparability, only units within a common support area in terms of 
propensity scores are matched. A number of tests are performed to check whether the 
distribution of variables in the group of participants and non-participants is balanced 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The probit model control variables are based on the 
discussions in the previous section. Human capital variables of the household head (age, 
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gender and educational level) were included, which are likely to affect a household’s capacity 
to overcome access barriers to outgrower schemes or to access agro-industry jobs. The 
household size (male and female working members, number of dependants) may determine 
whether the household can take up labor-intensive on-farm jobs or join the labor market. Land 
ownership is an important physical capital when adopting a new crop and is used as a wealth 
proxy. Membership of local organizations and migratory background (place of birth of 
household head) are further included as social-capital variables.   
Endogeneity may be a problem in the model due to reverse causality for some variables (land, 
assets, and liquidity constraints). The outgrower model therefore includes lagged formulations 
for some variables (land ownership, livestock) through retrospective questions about the 
situation in 2003.
11
 The 67 outgrowers who had already participated before that time were 
excluded for the main model. Some potentially endogenous variables for which baseline 
information is missing (especially credit access) were excluded. The probit models were then 
estimated for outgrower or worker villages only, respectively, to derive estimates for 
households assumed to have an actual chance to participate. The model results were then 
extrapolated to estimate propensity scores for the entire group of non-participants (see e.g. 
Bernard et al., 2008, for a similar approach). Lagged explanatory variables, however, may 
introduce further endogeneity problems through recall bias (Raphael, 1987) and unobserved 
heterogeneity (Bellemare et al., 2015). Therefore, further robustness tests are conducted by re-
estimating the model without using lagged variables.
12
 Although there still may be difficulties 
measuring confounders (e.g., risk perception, entrepreneurial behavior or social capital), 
different robustness tests were used to check model results, including re-estimation of the 
models with alternative sub-samples and using alternative model formulations. In addition, 
Rosenbaum-bounds were estimated to test how strong unobserved factors would need to be in 
order to alter the inferences drawn from the model (Rosenbaum, 2005). In order to cross-
check the quantitative information, qualitative information was integrated in the analysis from 
group discussions and qualitative questions in the questionnaires.  
3.5 Descriptive results 
Sample characteristics 
The relevancy of LSAIs for rural poverty reduction depends on the entry barriers, particularly 
for poorer household groups. Table 1 therefore compares household characteristics of the 
groups analyzed in the study: (1) agro-industry workers in the rice and sugar sectors, which 
                                                 
11 See Maertens & Swinnen (2009) and Maertens et al. (2011), who follow a similar approach. 
12 Yet these problems cannot be completely avoided in this article.  
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are households with at least one member employed at the estate or factory of KPL or KSCL in 
2011–12; (2) outgrowers, which are sugarcane farmers selling to KSCL;  (3) groups of non-
participants living in the vicinity of KPL and KSCL, but neither involved in group (1) or (2).
13
 
Sugarcane outgrowers are significantly better equipped in terms of human and physical 
capital than non-participants: they have larger areas of land, are better educated and own more 
livestock and other assets than non-participants. Land ownership among outgrowers averages 
4.8 acres, almost twice the area owned by workers and non-participants, but still small 
compared to mean farm sizes in Tanzania and other land-abundant countries in SSA (e.g., 
Jayne et al., 2014). Moreover, outgrowers are on average older than non-participants, which 
may suggest difficulties experienced by younger households in accessing land, or other 
factors preventing them from participating. Agro-industry workers in both sub-sectors tend to 
have younger heads and fewer household members than non-participants. In terms of land 
ownership, workers are similar to non-participants in the sugarcane survey, but have 
significantly less land than non-participants in the rice survey. Credit access is low among all 
groups, but significantly higher for outgrowers (38% have access to credit) than for the other 
groups (8%–10%), which may suggest some benefits from participating in outgrower schemes 
in terms of lower credit-access barriers. 
The importance of participating as a worker or outgrower in the LSAIs for overall household 
income varies between groups. Agro-industry workers in the rice survey continue to rely 
largely on agricultural income sources, but with wage income already making up 44%. Agro-
industry workers in the sugar survey generate 64% of overall income from wages. Sugarcane 
outgrowers instead specialize in agriculture, from which they derive nearly 80% of their 
income. 
Table 1: Characteristics of outgrowers, agro-industry workers and non-participants 
  Rice sample 
 
Sugar sample 
  
Agro-
industry 
worker 
(N=61) 
Non-
participants 
(N=148)  
Outgrowers 
(N=144) 
Agro-
industry 
worker 
(N=63) 
Non-
participants 
(N=100) 
Average age of household (hh) head 
(yrs.) 
38.8* 42.02 
 
49.2***  39.8* 42.4 
Female hh head (Female = 1) 7% 7% 
 
8%** 5%*** 18% 
Hh head with some primary education 75% 89% 
 
88% 92% 86% 
Hh head with at least secondary 59% 47% 
 
48%*** 28% 28% 
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 In the sugar survey, only four of the households sampled were both outgrowers and agro-industry workers.  
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education 
Number of hh members 4.3* 4.8 
 
4.8*** 4.7 4.4 
No. of women in hh > 16 years  1.19 1.29 
 
1.56*** 1.33 1.26 
No. of men in hh > 16 years  1.43 1.38 
 
1.39**  1.18 1.15 
Dependants 1.7** 2.3 
 
1.81 1.78 1.91 
Farming household (binary) 98.4% 99.5% 
 
100% 90% 98% 
Average land holding (acre) 2.2*** 3.6 
 
4.82*** 2.5 2.66 
Total asset ownership (PCA) 1.38* 1.43 
 
1.20*** 0.97 0.95 
Livestock (log of TLU) 0.33 0.22 
 
0.31*** 0.16 0.13 
Credit access 9% 10% 
 
38%*** 10% 9% 
Access to non-farm self-employment 33%** 46% 
 
33% 25% 38% 
Access to wage employment 100% 30% 
 
36% 100% 62% 
Organizational membership 41% 39% 
 
94%*** 38% 27% 
Hh head born in the village 54% 44% 
 
57%** 67% 67% 
Income shares: 
      
Total agricultural income 45%*** 74% 
 
79%*** 27%*** 54% 
Total hh wage income 44%*** 5% 
 
6%*** 64%*** 24% 
Other non-agricultural income 11%*** 21% 
 
15%** 9%*** 21% 
Notes: Agro-industry workers are households of which at least one member has worked in 2011/12 at the estate 
or factory of KPL or KSCL. Outgrowers are households producing sugarcane and selling it to KSCL. Non-
participants are households neither involved as agro-industry workers nor outgrower schemes. The significance 
tests are t-tests comparing the participant (outgrowers or agro-industry workers) with the non-participant groups: 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero 
survey rice & sugar 
 
Gross margin, wage and household income comparisons 
Participation as agro-industry wage laborer or outgrower is hypothesized to directly influence 
wages or agricultural incomes (intermediate outcomes) respectively. Yet, in order to capture 
intra-household substitution and spillover effects – not captured by crop gross margins or 
wages – and to compare welfare effects for different groups, the article focuses on annual per 
capita household income as the main impact indicator. Household income is the sum of 
marketed, subsistence and in-kind farm and non-farm income. In addition, income poverty is 
calculated following the National Bureau of Statistics’ methodology for the national poverty 
line, but using income instead of expenditure data.
14
 Table 2 reports intermediate outcomes 
for the outgrow channel in terms of technology use and gross margins of sugarcane 
                                                 
14 Total household income is converted in adult-equivalent scales (HBS, 2007) and compared to the Tanzanian national basic needs poverty 
line of Tsh 36,482 per adult equivalent per month in 2011/12 (NPS 2012/13).  
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outgrowers compared to the most common alternative crops, rice and maize. Sugarcane gross 
margins are calculated as the difference between sugarcane revenues and all field and off-field 
production costs. Initial investment costs are converted to annual figures. Rice and maize 
gross revenue is the total production valued at market prices received by the households for 
the sold produce. Although adoption of sugarcane is associated with higher costs, overall 
income from sugarcane production per acre still exceeds the alternatives by a factor of three. 
Participation in the sugarcane outgrower scheme is also associated with a higher adoption rate 
of fertilizer (80%) and pesticides (65%), most of which is financed through own savings 
(90%). 
Table 2: Technology adoption and gross margin analysis (sugar survey) 
 
  
Sugarcane production 
(N=144) 
 
Rice production 
(N=262) 
 
Maize production 
(N=107) 
Area allocated to crop (acre) 2.67 
 
2.0 
 
1.18 
Fertilizer use (binary) 78% 
 
30% 
 
3% 
Pesticide use (binary) 65% 
 
46% 
 
1% 
Labor hiring for weeding (binary) 66% 
 
51% 
 
14% 
Total production (t) 62.3 
 
1.6 
 
0.8 
Total yields (t / acre) 21.1 
 
0.85 
 
1.57 
Percentage sold (%) 100% 
 
38% 
 
16% 
Value of gross revenue per acre 1,424,295 
 
537,999 
 
360,448 
Total costs per acre 467,249 
 
161,344 
 
47,027 
Value of net revenue per acre 953,561 
 
361,256 
 
299,082 
Block farm profits (per acre)* 951,711 
    Total value of net revenue 2,826,091 
 
672,236 
 
346,077 
Notes: The rice and maize production figures include both sugarcane and non-sugarcane farmers.  
*49 of the interviewed sugar cane farmers reported receiving additional income from having plots in the 
collective farming schemes (block farms). Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey sugar 
 
Table 3 compares agro-industry wage workers with households reported to work in other 
wage jobs, most of which (85% in the sugar cane survey) is casual wage employment in the 
smallholder sector (rice and maize). Around 50% of workers mentioned working for other 
farmers. In the sugar survey, 35% specified working for sugarcane outgrower farmers, an 
indication of potential indirect effects of the investment. Nearly 80% of sugar workers are 
seasonally employed; the rest are divided into casual and permanent staff. On average, 
employment is for 9 months per year, which is also the length of the harvesting season. Thus, 
although most employment is seasonal, it still covers three-quarters of the year, mainly during 
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the dry season. In the rice survey, workers were employed for an average of 7 months, but this 
may overestimate the situation, as factory workers were oversampled. Agricultural work in 
the rice industry, instead, is mainly through short-term casual contracts. Average daily wages 
do not differ significantly between the agro-industry and local sectors, which may come as a 
surprise, but which could also suggest that the higher agro-industry wages exert upward 
pressure on local wages. But given that annual employment duration is almost twice as high 
in the agro-industry compared to local jobs, monthly wages and annual incomes differ by 
factor two and three compared to local jobs in the two sectors respectively. 
Table 3: Agro-industry vs. other agricultural wage employment (median values) 
Variables 
Rice investment Sugar investment 
Agro-industry 
employment 
Other agric. 
wage labor 
Agro-industry 
employment 
Other agric. 
wage labor 
     Years working in this job 2 6 4 10 
Number of months per year 7 3 10 4 
Number of days per month 25 11 26 12 
Number of person days per year 162 31 243 56 
Average income per month in Tsh 90,500 45,000 151,233 50,000 
Average income per day in Tsh 3,673 4,000 5,833 5,000 
Annual income from this job in Tsh 612,500 142,500 1,440,000 205,000 
Total number of observations 61 74 63 132 
Notes: Most of the wages in the agro-industry are paid bi-weekly or monthly. We therefore used the self-
reported information on average number of days to calculate daily wages. The exchange rate in 31 December 
2011 was 1580 Tanzanian Shilling to USD. Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice & sugar 
 
Table 4 shows that differences in wage and crop income are also reflected in household 
income differences. Sugarcane outgrowers have the highest per capita incomes, which is more 
than twice the income of non-participants. Incomes of agro-industry workers are also higher 
than that of non-participants in both surveys, but differences are small in the rice survey. On 
the one hand, this is because per-capita average incomes of agro-industry workers in the two 
investments differ slightly, i.e. sugar workers have 20% higher incomes than rice workers on 
average. On the other hand, non-participants seem to be better-off in the vicinity of the rice 
investment site, compared to non-participants around the sugar investment (18% richer). 
Relative differences in the two investments compared to the respective groups of non-
participants are therefore substantial – 76% in sugar and 24% in rice. Average poverty rates of 
all participant groups are also significantly lower than that of non-participants.  
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Table 4: Total household income and income poverty comparisons 
  Rice   Sugar 
 
Agro-industry 
employment 
Non-
participants  
Sugarcane 
outgrowers 
Agro-industry 
employment 
Non-
participants 
Total agricultural income 1,291,891 1,697,674 
 
3,520,426 1,010,704 930,294 
Total hh wage income 966,137 108,116 
 
271,672 1,575,381 346,110 
Other non-agricultural 
income 
464,019 586,925 
 
776,745 705,812 544,602 
Total household income 2,722,046 2,416,484 
 
4,568,842 3,291,897 1,811,621 
Per capita hh income 811,145 651,974 
 
1,217,941 974,790 552,779 
Below food poverty line 15% 34% 
 
6% 6% 43% 
Below basic poverty line 20% 48% 
 
23% 18% 53% 
Observations 61 148  144 63 100 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice & sugar 
 
3.6 Econometric results of household welfare effects 
3.6.1 Probit model and balancing tests 
Table 5 shows the probit model results to derive the propensity scores. In the rice wage-labor 
case, education, number of male household members in working age, total number of 
dependants and land ownership are significantly associated with participation. The correlation 
with household members and land ownership is expected: households with less land but 
sufficient family labor rely more often on wage labor. The significant education coefficient 
may be linked to the fact that many younger, even educated, families may lack land and 
therefore have to rely on wage employment. But better-educated families may also more 
easily get a job at the company as they may be expected to be better workers.  
In both sugar sector models, land is not a significant predictor of participation. Although the 
variable may suffer from measurement problems more than other variables, it could suggest 
that the outgrower schemes have lower land-based entry barriers than qualitative interviews 
suggested (see Section 4).
15
 Yet, more educated households as well as male-headed 
households have a higher likelihood of participating. For agro-industry wage employment, 
participation is negatively correlated with the age of the household head, but positively with 
                                                 
15 Qualitative observations also partly confirmed this result. Moreover, most sugarcane outgrowers in the interviewed villages own relatively 
small plots, whereas the large sugarcane farmers usually come from outside the villages in urban settlements surrounding the factories and 
are not part of the survey, as mentioned above. 
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group membership, which could suggest the importance of social capital. The main intention 
for estimating the models is, however, to balance the differences in observable characteristics 
between the groups.  
Table 5: Probit model 
 
Rice investment 
(worker)  
Sugar investment 
(worker) 
 
Sugar investment 
(outgrower) 
 
Coeff 
 
Coeff 
 
Coeff 
Age head (years) 0.004 (0.015) 
 
-0.041** (0.018) 
 
0.001 (0.013) 
Female-headed household (1=yes) 
    
-0.866*** (0.276) 
Education head (1=at least secondary) 0.739*** (0.085) 
 
0.182 (0.210) 
 
0.583*** (0.153) 
Male working members (number) 0.293** (0.120) 
 
0.240 (0.262) 
 
-0.132 (0.163) 
Female working members (number) -0.236 (0.225) 
 
0.187* (0.113) 
 
0.007 (0.186) 
Dependents (number) 0.179** (0.083) 
 
-0.011 (0.124) 
 
-0.085 (0.141) 
Land ownership (acre) (log)* -1.537*** (0.261) 
 
-0.200 (0.229) 
 
0.125 (0.154) 
Group membership* 0.073 (0.227) 
 
0.509* (0.268) 
 
0.113 (0.352) 
Born in village (1=yes) -0.287 (0.247) 
 
-0.284 (0.401) 
 
0.225 (0.305) 
Village fixed effects No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Constant 0.887 (0.739) 
 
1.341** (0.632) 
 
0.274 (0.431) 
      Observations 115 
 
134 
 
175 
Pseudo R
2
 0.21 
 
0.08 
 
0.16 
Sensitivity 66.04 
 
58.73 
 
65.33 
Specificity 82.26 
 
59.15 
 
73.00 
Correctly classified 74.78 
 
58.96 
 
69.71 
Notes: a) lagged variables using retrospective questions for the outgrower model about the situation in 2002-3. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Participants in the probit models comprise 
only households living in the same villages: 61 workers and 54 non-participants in the rice model, 63 workers 
and 71 non-participants in the sugar worker model, and 75 outgrowers and 100 non-participants in the outgrower 
model. Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice & sugar 
 
Results of the balancing quality checks are reported in Figure 2 and Tables 6 and A1. Figure 2 
shows the histograms of the predicted propensity scores of treated and control groups. For the 
sugar outgrower and worker models they are within a similar range, whereas treated and 
control groups differ more in the rice case, though substantial overlap in the propensity scores 
remains. In all channels, the common support area includes most of the participating 
households, which is important for the matched participant sample to be representative of the 
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initial sample (Blundell & Dias, 2000).
16
 The mean comparisons of the model covariates 
(Table A1) suggest good balancing for all the three models. There is, however, some 
heterogeneity between different measures and matching algorithms – kernel (KM), radius 
(RM) and nearest neighbor matching (NNM)
17
 – when comparing the pseudo-R2 and 
likelihood ratio tests as well as absolute mean and median bias test before and after matching 
(Table 5). Good matches (cf., Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008) are reached with KM and RM, 
whereas NNM leads to weaker matches, especially in the rice worker case, which requires 
some caution when interpreting the results.
18
 
Figure 2: Propensity score distribution 
Propensity score distribution – Rice worker comparison 
 
PS distribution – Sugar worker comparison 
 
PS distribution – Sugar outgrower comparison 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice & sugar 
 
                                                 
16 Only seven adopters are lost in total when applying the common support condition (3 rice workers and 4 sugar outgrowers) 
17
 The default 0.06 bandwidth is used for the KM and 0.1 calipers for the RM, while five nearest neighbors are used with the NNM. 
18 Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008) argue that a bias reduction below 5% is usually seen as sufficient.  
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
Chapter 3: Large-scale agricultural investments and smallholder welfare: a comparison of wage labor and 
outgrower channels in Tanzania 
 
36 
Table 6: Matching quality – summary measures 
    Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 MeanBias MedBias 
Sugar (outgrower) 
 
  
      NNM Raw 0.161 38.56 0.001 19.0 16.7 
    Matched 0.03 5.95 0.981 9.4 8.7 
  KM Raw 0.161 38.56 0.001 19.0 16.7 
    Matched 0.014 2.82 1.000 6.3 6.4 
  RM Raw 0.161 38.56 0.001 19.0 16.7 
    Matched 0.005 0.93 1.000 2.8 2.3 
Sugar (worker) 
 
  
    Model 5 NNM Raw 0.088 16.39 0.037 16.1 10.6 
  
Matched 0.039 5.07 0.750 11.5 9.9 
 
KM Raw 0.088 16.39 0.037 16.1 10.6 
  
Matched 0.02 2.69 0.952 9.7 8.7 
 
RM Raw 0.088 16.39 0.037 16.1 10.6 
   Matched 0.02 2.73 0.950 8.1 6.1 
Rice (worker) 
 
  
    Model 4 NNM Raw 0.196 31.15 0.000 27.5 22.7 
  
Matched 0.126 10.5 0.232 19.4 17.7 
 
KM Raw 0.196 31.15 0.000 27.5 22.7 
 
  Matched 0.074 6.21 0.623 16.8 13.8 
 
RM Raw 0.196 31.15 0.000 27.5 22.7 
   Matched 0.053 4.56 0.804 13.5 14.2 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice & sugar 
3.6.2 Matching results 
The estimation results for the ATT of the different channels are reported in Tables 7a and 7b, 
including the different PSM matching algorithms compared to ordinary least squares (OLS). 
ATTs are estimated for agricultural income, total household income, per-capita household 
income and basic needs poverty. For all the analyzed cases, OLS results are similar to PSM, 
yet with some differences in the size of the ATTs. For the case of sugarcane outgrowers 
(Table 7a), the models predict ATTs for agricultural income of 1.3 million to 1.5 million 
Tanzanian Shilling (Tsh), which are between 150% to 215%. In terms of total household 
income and per-capita income, outgrowers’ ATTs are also between 120% (2.2–2.5 million 
Tsh) and 151% (530–590,000 Tsh), respectively. Income poverty is around 40% lower 
compared to the control group. 
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For the agro-industry employment cases (Table 7b), results differ between both sectors. 
Participation in the rice investment as worker is associated with lower agricultural incomes 
compared to the counterfactual situation, which suggest some negative household-level 
substitution effects, while the ATT is positive in the sugar case; yet in both cases the ATT is 
not statistically significant. In terms of per capita household income, participation as agro-
industry worker in the sugar sector is associated with ATTs of 84% and 99% (450–490,000 
Tsh), which are lower than in the outgrower case, but still very substantial. For the case of 
rice workers, ATTs for total household income are positive, although the models fail to 
predict statistically significant ATTs, but do so for per-capita income of around 50%. 
Differences between sectors may reflect different lengths of harvesting seasons as well as the 
differences in control groups’ income level, as discussed in Section 4. Yet, while average 
income differences may be lower, around the poverty line differences are significant in both 
cases: income poverty is 24% to 28% lower in the rice case and 40% lower in the sugar labor 
channel. This result may suggest that while participation in the rice investments may not 
contribute to large income improvements, it could provide protection against extreme poverty. 
The estimated income difference in the outgrower scheme is largely in line with most other 
studies attempting to quantify the impact of contract farming. However, other studies find 
significantly lower participation effects of 30% to 50% (e.g. Warning and Key, 2001; Rao and 
Qaim, 2011; Bellemare, 2012). Such differences may result from the fact that these studies 
focus on crops also produced locally by non-participating farmers. In this study, contracting is 
interlinked with introducing a new crop into a region not well integrated into high-value 
markets, which potentially results in much larger income differences between the common 
alternative income strategies (cf. the case of poultry in Simmons et al. 2005; tomatoes in 
Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). For the labor market cases, the significant and high positive 
household incomes for sugar industry workers are in line with previously cited studies in the 
horticultural export sector (McCulloch and Ota, 2002; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). 
 
Table 7a: ATT: sugarcane outgrower scheme 
 
OLS 
 
NNM 
 
KM 
 
RM 
 
ATT (SE) %diff 
 
ATT (SE) %diff 
 
ATT (SE) %diff 
 
ATT (SE) %diff 
Agricultural 
income (in `000 
Tsh) 
1,352*** 
(244) 
146% 
 
1,650*** 
(288) 
216% 
 
1,629*** 
(301) 
210% 
 
1,627*** 
(110) 
209% 
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Total hh income 
(in `000 Tsh) 
2,200*** 
(377) 
122% 
 
2,521*** 
(460) 
153% 
 
2,494*** 
(485) 
149% 
 
2,505*** 
(461) 
151% 
            
Per capita hh 
income (in `000 
Tsh) 
528** 
(93) 
116% 
 
596*** (106) 147% 
 
593*** 
(107) 
146% 
 
595*** 
(110) 
147% 
            
Basic needs 
poverty 
-0.400*** -40% 
 
-0.397*** 
(0.094) 
-40% 
 
-0.406*** 
(0.099) 
-41% 
 
-0.400*** 
(0.099) 
-40% 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The OLS models comprise the 
entire group of participants and non-participants from all villages (209, 163, and 175 in the rice worker, sugar 
worker, and outgrower model, respectively). The PSM models comprise all households within the common 
support are from all villages (209, 163, and 171 in the rice workers, sugar worker and outgrower model, 
respectively).  Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice & sugar 
 
Table 7b: ATT: agro-industry wage employment 
 
Rice sector 
 
OLS  NNM  KM  RM 
 
Coeff (SE) %diff  Coeff (SE) %diff  Coeff (SE) %diff  Coeff (SE) %diff 
Agricultural income 
(in `000 Tsh) 
149 (204) 9%  -161 (190) -12%  -128 (172) -10%  -121 (175) -9% 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
Total hh income  
(in `000 Tsh) 
595* (302) 24%  502 (323) 25%  444 (291) 21%  470* (248) 23% 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
Per capita hh income 
(in `000 Tsh) 
170** (70) 31%  
265*** 
(85) 
64%  
240*** 
(77) 
54%  
232*** 
(77) 
52% 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
Basic needs poverty 
-0.30** 
(0.074) 
-31%  
-0.37*** 
(0.091) 
-37%  
-0.35*** 
(0.096) 
-35%  
-0.35*** 
(0.082) 
-35% 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Sugar sector 
 
OLS  NNM  KM  RM 
 
Coeff (SE) %diff  Coeff (SE) %diff  Coeff (SE) %diff  Coeff (SE) %diff 
Agricultural income 
(in `000 Tsh) 
133 (223) 14%  244 (332) 24%  280 (322) 29%  267 (307) 27% 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
Total hh income 
(in `000 Tsh) 
1,883*** 
(468) 
104%  2,051 (575) 97%  2,189 (570) 109%  2,194 (561) 112% 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
Per capita hh income 449*** 99%  455** 84%  493*** 96%  495*** 96% 
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(in `000 Tsh) (118) (179) (136) (122) 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
Basic needs poverty 
-0.403*** 
(0.091) 
-40%  
-0.416*** 
(0.085) 
-42%  
-0.397*** 
(0.077) 
-40%  
-0.401*** 
(0.076) 
-40% 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The OLS models comprise the 
entire group of participants and non-participants from all villages (209, 163, and 175 in the rice worker, sugar 
worker, and outgrower model, respectively). The PSM models comprise all households within the common 
support are from all villages (209, 163, and 171 in the rice workers, sugar worker and outgrower model, 
respectively).  Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice & sugar 
 
3.6.3 Heterogeneity of effects 
As average differences may hide heterogeneity within the group of participants, Table 8 
presents income differences separately for land-poor (< 2 acres) and land-rich households (> 2 
acre). The results suggest that participation in sugarcane outgrower schemes has a positive 
and significant effect on agricultural and per capita income for both land-poor and land-rich 
households, but significantly more for the latter group. Thus, whereas land-rich and land-poor 
outgrowers have significantly higher agricultural and per capita incomes than non-
participants, larger sugarcane outgrowers seem to benefit more than land-poorer outgrowers. 
For sugar workers, differences in terms of per capita income are significant and positive for 
both groups. Although ATTs for land-poor workers are relatively lower than for land-rich 
households compared to the group of non-participants, it is still positive and significant. Yet, 
ATTs of agricultural incomes among land-poor workers is negative and significant, which 
may suggest negative effects on agricultural income, whereas the ATTs are positive for land-
rich sugarcane workers. For the case of rice agro-industry workers, land-poorer households 
also have significantly lower agricultural production compared to non-participants, which is 
not the case for land-richer workers. Yet in per capita income terms land-poor rice workers 
are predicted to have higher per capita incomes relative to land-rich households.  
Table 8: Heterogeneity of impacts (Kernel matching) 
  Sugar cane outgrower scheme  
  Treated Untreated ATT SE % change 
      Agricultural income  
     Land poor (<2 acres) 29 100 782,424*** 240,570 101% 
Land rich (>2 acres) 42 100 2,181,397*** 382,767 269% 
      Per capita total income 
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Land poor (<2 acres) 29 100 215,708** 112,393 64% 
Land rich (>2 acres) 42 100 811,880*** 143,507 201% 
  
    
  
  Sugar agro-industry worker  
  Treated Untreated ATT SE % change 
      Agricultural income  
     Land poor (<2 acres) 32 100 -477,421*** 168,427 -50% 
Land rich (>2 acres) 30 100 1,088,385* 566,834 109% 
      Per capita total income 
     Land poor (<2 acres) 32 100 346,607** 138,292 66% 
Land rich (>2 acres) 30 100 648,567*** 219,626 129% 
            
  Rice agro-industry worker  
  Treated Untreated ATT SE % change 
      Agricultural income  
     Land poor (< 3 acre) 28 156 -328,928** 127,844 -29% 
Land rich (>3 acres) 25 156 324,374 359,829 21% 
      Per capita total income 
     Land poor (< 3 acre) 28 156 329,415*** 99,674 84% 
Land rich (>3 acres) 25 156 206,142 135,237 41% 
            
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations, 
Kilombero survey rice & sugar 
 
3.6.4 Robustness analysis  
Table 9 presents a number of robustness tests for estimating the ATT for per capita income, 
by adjusting some key parameters: (i) restricting matching to treatment villages only (labor 
market models); (ii) estimating the logit model by using the entire non-participant sample 
(labor market models); (iii) estimating the logit model using different logit specifications 
(labor market model), (iv) estimating the logit model without using some variables that 
suffered from potential reverse causality (land ownership and group membership) and (v) 
replacing lagged with current values. The results highlight the robustness of the models for 
sugarcane outgrower and agro-industry labor; in the case of rice, the estimated differences are 
positive, though not statistically significant.  
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Table 9: Robustness checks (per capita household income) 
  
 
ATT SE 
 
Mean 
bias 
Median 
bias 
1) Agro-industry employment - Matching only with non-participants in treatment villages 
  Rice sub-sector: 
      
    
 
NNM 132,198 132,537 17.9 18.2 
    
 
KM 116,821 119,193 9.8 9.4 
    
 
RM 122,743 99,790 11.2 11.8 
    
Sugar sub-sector: 
     
    
 
NNM 667,194*** 132,244 5.6 6.1 
    
 
KM 674,398*** 128,787 4.1 4.6 
    
 
RM 671,216*** 129,343 3.5 3.2 
    
      
    
2) Agro-industry wage models: Propensity scores estimated from entire group of non-participants 
 Rice sub-sector: 
     
     
 
NNM 143,974 95,742 5.6 4.3 
     
 
KM 144,664 84,880 5.9 6.3 
     
 
RM 151,949* 78,449 5.0 5.4 
     
Sugar sub-sector: 
     
     
 
NNM 533,088*** 131,436 4.8 4.3 
     
 
KM 543,926** 123,644 3 2 
     
 
RM 537,707*** 129,685 2.4 2 
     
       
     
3) Agro-industry wage models: Different specification of logit model 
   
 
Rice sub-sector: 
      
     
 
NNM 98,658 104,591 8.8 6.5 
     
 
KM 111,765 103,760 4.4 3.3 
     
 
RM 124,038 98,138 4.4 4.2 
     
Sugar sub-sector: 
     
     
 
NNM 573,424*** 457,561 6.2 5.6 
     
 
KM 602,466*** 478,139 5.3 2.2 
     
 
RM 565,237*** 484,577 3.4 3.1 
     
      
     
4) Sugarcane outgrower - PS estimated w/o land and group membership variable 
  
 
 
NNM 623,238***  110,184 7.7 6.1 
     
 
KM 627,076***  103,518 7.3 5.2 
     
 
RM 605,756***  105,503 6.9 5.7 
     
      
     
5) Sugarcane outgrower - Different logit model (current land holding, livestock) 
   
 
 
NNM 560,947***  462,830 6.4 6.6 
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KM 549,091***  461,074 6.3 5.1 
     
 
RM 551,387***  447,970 4.9 4.0 
     
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations, 
Kilombero survey rice & sugar 
 
In spite of the robustness checks, limitations in the data and model (small sample size, lack of 
baseline data, unobserved heterogeneity) preclude drawing clear causal inferences. Yet, a 
Rosenbaum-bounds test was also conducted to test the models’ sensitivity to hidden bias, 
which suggested results for both sugarcane models to be very robust to hidden bias but less so 
for the rice investment.
19
 
Qualitative interviews and group discussions also suggested a less clear picture of the 
potential effects. Only 39% mentioned being satisfied with the sugarcane income they 
generate. Reasons noted were high production costs as well as low or unstable market prices. 
Still, around 80% of outgrowers would recommend their children to go into sugarcane 
farming. Compared to others, 85% of outgrowers mentioned having slightly or much higher 
standards of living, whereas only 3% perceived it to be worse. Compared to before they 
joined, 74% noted a slight improvement, 2% a much better situation, whereas 19% felt a 
worsening situation. For agro-industry workers, when asked about their satisfaction regarding 
their labor contract, 51% of sugar workers replied that they were satisfied, whereas only 22% 
rice workers were satisfied. Yet, when comparing their well-being to others, 75% of sugar and 
74% of rice workers felt their well-being to be higher and only 2% and 12% to be worse, 
respectively. Compared to before participating, 76% of sugar workers and 54% of rice 
workers noted an improvement, though only slightly. Still, most sugar and rice workers (67% 
and 75%, respectively) would not recommend their children to take up this job. 
The qualitative interviews also pointed to further problems in the outgrower model that may 
undermine their poverty-reducing potential. Whereas power imbalances between sellers and 
buyers are considered major sources of conflict in the literature (e.g., Little & Watts, 1994), 
they seemed less relevant here. Instead, governance issues within the outgrower associations 
were more problematic, as larger outgrowers seem to influence service provision (harvesting, 
transport) leaving resource-poorer outgrowers with less access (elite capture). Often, these 
smaller outgrowers are not serviced for several seasons, causing some to abandon their land, 
which may eventually lead to greater land concentration among larger farmers. Institutional 
                                                 
19
 Results are not shown because of space limitations, but are available upon request. 
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innovations such as block farming (see Section 2), which could enhance smallholder 
competitiveness, seem to be not well supported by outgrower associations. Other factors are 
worsening extension support and input availability among smallholders, which keeps their 
yields low (cf. Smalley et al., 2014). In addition, waiving of import tariffs at times is making 
domestic producers more vulnerable to market shocks. 
3.7 Conclusions 
This article examined the effects of large-scale agricultural investments (LSAIs) on household 
welfare in Tanzania, one of the main recipients of LSAIs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Building on 
primary household-level data, it compared income levels and income poverty of households 
involved in different investment schemes -  large-scale factory and estates investments in rice 
and sugar and outgrower schemes for smallholders in the sugar sector – with those not 
participating in these schemes.  
The empirical analysis, conducted by means of propensity score matching accompanied by 
several robustness and sensitivity tests, suggests significant and strong positive effects from 
participating in sugarcane outgrower schemes as well as some positive results from 
participating in the agro-industry labor market. The positive results for the outgrower channel 
are broadly in line with other studies on contract farming and outgrower schemes (e.g. Rao 
and Qaim, 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Vaeth and Kirk, 2014). However, land-rich 
outgrowers seem to benefit more than land-poor in absolute and relative terms. For agro-
industry workers in the sugar investment, estimated income effects are slightly lower than for 
outgrower farmers, but still very large. For workers in the rice investment, predicted effects 
are significantly lower, but still positive and significant. In particular the results concerning 
the sugar industry contrast with commonly voiced concerns about this type of employment, 
but are in line with Maertens’ et al. (2011) study on tomato exports in Senegal. The findings 
show that, in the context of few alternative market and employment opportunities, this type of 
employment is often an improvement compared to alternative vulnerable farming systems. 
The results, however, have to be seen as suggestive rather than conclusive evidence due to the 
data and model limitations, as is often the case in studies on contract farming (Bellemare, 
2015). Qualitative interviews as part of this study support the general results, although they 
also pointed to a number of challenges, especially regarding the operation of outgrower 
schemes, which may constrain the investments’ potential to reduce poverty.  
In order to derive more general conclusions about the implications of the investments, 
however, further research would first need to account for a broader set of outcome variables 
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to capture the multi-dimensionality of poverty (particularly nutrition, health, education). Well-
implemented investments may also involve investments in schools and health facilities as part 
of their Corporate Social Responsibility approach, generating additional welfare benefits 
(Deininger and Byerlee, 2012), as was the situation for the cases analyzed. Secondly, indirect 
effects to the non-farm and small-scale farming sector influence their development impacts. 
Such investments may, for example, introduce new farming methods, inducing spillovers to 
small-scale farmers. In one of the investments studied a partnership with USAID was initiated 
to support small-scale rice intensification in the region. In addition, there may also be positive 
effects for the entire sub-sector, when large agribusiness firms may have more influence 
producer and processor benefiting policies. Lastly, industrial hubs might arise due to various 
inter-industrial linkages. In contrast to that, however, large-scale producers targeting the 
domestic market may push small-scale farmers and local processors out of market due to 
oversupply. Increasing land demand due to estate or outgrower expansions may also reduce 
land availability and cause local conflicts. 
Lastly, case study results have to be seen as context specific and are only to a limited extent 
generalizable. The case studies revealed important differences between the investments and 
sub-sectors, but are not representative of the sub-sectors. The investments considered have 
been referred to as best-practice cases in Tanzania (SAGCOT, 2013). For the outgrower case 
studied, for example, participants benefited considerably from substantial public–private 
partnership support after privatization (see Section 5). In other cases, relationships between 
processors and outgrowers have been more contentious and schemes less inclusive. At 
Mtibwa Sugar, another sugar factory in the same region, for instance, conflicts as a result of 
pricing policies and continuous factory breakdowns leave large amounts of outgrower 
produce unprocessed (Nkonya et al., 2014), leading many farmers to quit participation (cf. 
SBT, 2015). Factory efficiency in terms of capacity utilizations, for instance, is as different as 
54% (Mtibwa) and 87% (Kilombero) (ibid.). Outgrowers at Kilombero have also received 
higher prices than those at Mtibwa (38% difference) due to different pricing models, which in 
Kilombero includes, apart from sugar sales, molasses and biogas utilization (Nkonya & 
Barreiro-Hurle, 2012). Outgrowers at the investment studied make up also around 60% of the 
total sugarcane area. In other schemes, such as those in Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe or 
Zambia, outgrowers often play only a marginal role in relation to the area and production of 
the estate, thus limiting the schemes poverty-reducing potentials and farmers negotiation 
power (Oya, 2012; Gibbon, 2011).  
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For the case of agro-industry employment, conclusions about the overall benefits are strongly 
influenced by the labor intensity of the investments as it determines the potential for creating 
direct and indirect effects. For sugarcane, the number of workers employed per 1,000 ha may 
range from only 150 for mechanical harvesting in Mozambique to around 700 on irrigated 
plantations with manual harvesting in Tanzania (Deininger et al., 2011). In addition, although 
the study finds improvements to the status quo, wages would need to increase in the long-term 
in order to lift workers out of poverty (cf. Jayne et al., 2014). 
Both investments analyzed were also special cases as they operate on previous government 
land, whereas investments targeting village land may face a multitude of legitimate claims by 
rural people, with a greater risk of land conflicts. Alternative models, such as joint ventures 
with communities, where the community retains land ownership, might be more suitable in 
such cases (cf. Cotula & Leonard, 2010).  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Matching quality – covariance balance (appendix) 
    Unmatched Mean %reduct t-test       
  Variable Matched Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
Rice 
worker age_head Unmatched 39.00 41.89 -26.9 
 
-1.44 0.153 
    Matched 39.00 39.64 -5.9 78 -0.22 0.829 
  edu_type_bin Unmatched 0.58 0.49 18.5 
 
0.99 0.325 
    Matched 0.58 0.56 4.1 77.9 0.15 0.88 
  agework_maleb Unmatched 1.45 1.42 3.6 
 
0.19 0.849 
    Matched 1.45 1.54 -9.7 -172.8 -0.35 0.728 
  agework_femaleb Unmatched 1.15 1.38 -35.9 
 
-1.93 0.056 
    Matched 1.15 1.30 -23 35.8 -0.99 0.324 
  dependentsb Unmatched 1.60 1.73 -11.4 
 
-0.61 0.543 
    Matched 1.60 1.54 5.4 52.7 0.2 0.841 
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  lntotal_land Unmatched 1.02 1.43 -73.4 
 
-3.94 0.00 
    Matched 1.02 1.22 -36.3 50.6 -1.42 0.16 
  orga_member Unmatched 0.45 0.29 33.1 
 
1.77 0.079 
    Matched 0.45 0.30 31.8 3.9 1.15 0.253 
  born_village Unmatched 0.53 0.62 -17.1 
 
-0.91 0.362 
    Matched 0.53 0.62 -17.8 -4.3 -0.66 0.513 
 
    Unmatched Mean %reduct t-test       
  Variable Matched Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
Sugar 
(worker) age_head Unmatched 39.40 42.74 -30.2   -1.81 0.072 
    Matched 39.40 38.68 6.5 78.6 0.41 0.685 
  edu_type_bin Unmatched 0.29 0.28 1.3   0.08 0.938 
    Matched 0.29 0.31 -5.1 -304.6 -0.28 0.779 
  agework_maleb Unmatched 1.24 1.16 11.5   0.7 0.483 
    Matched 1.24 1.11 19.1 -65.6 1.14 0.258 
  agework_fem~b Unmatched 1.33 1.26 9.9   0.63 0.532 
    Matched 1.33 1.29 6.6 34 0.37 0.713 
  dependentsb Unmatched 1.79 1.90 -9.1   -0.56 0.574 
    Matched 1.79 1.87 -6.1 32.3 -0.35 0.727 
  ln_totland08 Unmatched 0.70 0.83 -18.7   -1.16 0.248 
    Matched 0.70 0.69 2.2 88.5 0.12 0.901 
 
    Unmatched Mean %reduct t-test       
  Variable Matched Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
Sugar 
(outgrower) age_head Unmatched 44.56 42.74 14.8   0.97 0.335 
  
Matched 44.44 43.77 5.4 63.3 0.34 0.734 
 
sex_head Unmatched 0.09 0.18 -25.3 
 
-1.62 0.106 
  
Matched 0.10 0.11 -3.8 84.8 -0.25 0.8 
 
edu_type_bin Unmatched 0.41 0.28 28.1 
 
1.85 0.065 
  
Matched 0.38 0.37 2.2 92.3 0.12 0.901 
 
agework_maleb Unmatched 1.32 1.16 21.2 
 
1.39 0.165 
  
Matched 1.30 1.27 3.1 85.5 0.19 0.852 
 
agework_fem~b Unmatched 1.32 1.26 8.4 
 
0.55 0.582 
  
Matched 1.24 1.24 -0.6 93.1 -0.04 0.971 
 
dependentsb Unmatched 1.83 1.90 -6.4 
 
-0.42 0.675 
  
Matched 1.89 1.79 8.7 -35 0.54 0.59 
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ln_totland03 Unmatched 0.83 0.67 21.7 
 
1.44 0.152 
  
Matched 0.81 0.80 0.9 95.8 0.05 0.958 
 
member_before Unmatched 0.27 0.27 -0.7 
 
-0.05 0.961 
  
Matched 0.27 0.27 -1.4 -89.4 -0.08 0.933 
 
born_village Unmatched 0.65 0.67 -3.5 
 
-0.23 0.819 
   Matched 0.63 0.62 2.4 32.9 0.14 0.891 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice & sugar 
 
 Chapter 4: Technology spillovers of large-scale agricultural investments: case study evidence from rice in 
Tanzania 
 
54 
This chapter is a version of: 
Herrmann, R.: Technology spillovers and labor market effects of large-scale rice investments: case 
study insights from Tanzania. 
Submitted paper to the Journal “Agricultural Economics” 
 
4 Technology spillovers of large-scale agricultural investments: 
case study evidence from rice in Tanzania 
Abstract  
This article studies the potential socio-economic effects of large-scale rice investments in 
Tanzania, focusing on productivity spillovers on small-scale farmers. Specifically, a public-
private-partnership that aims at increasing productivity among farmers surrounding a large-
scale rice investment through training improved methods and distribution of a Green 
Revolution type technology package is evaluated. Yield and income effects of adoption are 
assessed on plot and household level and compared to the labor market effects of the 
investment. Cross-section data on project participants, non-participants and agro-industry 
workers collected in Kilombero Valley, a priority cluster for Tanzania’s Southern Agricultural 
Growth Corridor, is analyzed using propensity score matching and a treatment effects model. 
Although at the household level only small yield and income effects are observed, a plot-
specific analysis to account for partial adoption reveals substantial effects from technology 
adoption. Labor market participation is also associated with higher per capita incomes but has 
effects inferior to those of the smallholder rice project. The results suggest that participation 
as worker in such investments may contribute to improving incomes, especially for land-poor 
households. However, projects that increase the productive capacity of surrounding areas, 
such as smallholder productivity projects, are likely to yield greater welfare benefits if 
technology use and diffusion continues after the end of the projects. 
Keywords: large-scale agricultural investments, technology spillovers, smallholder farmers, 
rice Green Revolution, Tanzania 
4.1 Introduction 
Agricultural productivity and output growth are important for food security and poverty 
reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2011a). However, compared 
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with other regions, major food crops have experienced little improvement in terms of 
productivity (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2011a; Otsuka, 2006). This is also true for rice, which 
played a central role in the agricultural growth of many Asian countries that adopted Green 
Revolution (GR) type strategies (Estudillo and Otsuka, 2013). In SSA, the demand for rice 
has grown over the last decades, mainly driven by increased urbanization and income growth 
which have made rice an important staple crop for many countries (Balasubramanian et al., 
2007). In most countries, however, domestic production has failed to meet the demand so that 
SSA has become the world’s largest rice-importing region, with imports needed for nearly 
40% of the rice consumed (Larson et al., 2010). Increased reliance on imports has created 
greater concerns about food security – most recently when prices for domestic rice and other 
cereals skyrocketed in the wake of the 2007 global-food-price crisis (Ivanic and Martin, 2008; 
Otsuka and Kijima, 2010). As a result, increasing rice production has become an important 
policy priority for many SSA countries (Seck et al., 2010).  
In much of SSA, low rice production is associated with poor yields that are due to the low 
adoption of high-yielding varieties, fertilizer, irrigation,
20
 and improved cultivation practices 
(Balasubramanian et al., 2007) that were key to the rice GR in Asia (Estudillo and Otsuka, 
2013; Otsuka, 2013). Some argue that increasing the use of such modern practices and 
technologies in SSA will significantly boost productivity (Estudillo and Otsuka, 2013).  
In recent years, one strategy to modernize agriculture in SSA has been attracting large-scale 
agricultural investments (LSAIs) in rice and other crop subsectors from other countries 
(Deininger et al., 2011; LMGO –Land Matrix Global Observatory, 2015). The development 
implications of such investments have been controversially debated, with widespread 
concerns voiced over their social and ecological risks, including the negative effects for 
smallholder farmers’ access to land (‘land grabbing’) (Cotula et al., 2009). However, such 
LSAIs may also boost productivity in the smallholder sector through such spillovers as 
improved access to modern inputs, credit, know-how, or high-value markets – factors that are 
deemed important for a rice GR in SSA (Diao et al., 2007; Otsuka and Kijima, 2010).  
The empirical research about rice GR methods and technologies in SSA and their contribution 
to smallholder farmers’ productivity and welfare is still limited. Some studies have been made 
on the adoption of modern rice types, such as the new NERICA upland varieties (in Uganda, 
Kijima et al., 2008) or improved lowland rain-fed varieties (in Tanzania, Nakano and Kajisa, 
2012; in Uganda, Kijima et al., 2012), which hold great potential for climatically favorable 
                                                 
20Less than 20% of rice produced in SSA comes from irrigated land (Balasubramanian et al., 2007). 
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regions in SSA (Balasubramanian et al., 2007; Larson et al., 2010; Kijima et al., 2012). Only a 
few studies have focused on entire technology packages: adopting irrigation and fertilizer (in 
Mozambique, Kajisa and Pyongayong, 2011; in Kenya, Njeru et al., 2014) or improving 
cultivation practices (e.g., water control techniques, line-planting, and construction of bunds) 
and using modern inputs (in Ghana, DeGraft-Johnson et al., 2014). Almost no research has 
been conducted on productivity spillover effects of LSAIs in SSA, except for Deininger et al. 
(2015), who used data about large- and small-scale farmers throughout Mozambique. The 
authors found evidence of some positive spillovers, with small-scale farmers adopting some 
of the same practices, fertilizer, and pesticides used by their large-scale-farmer neighbors. 
This article aims to make three contributions to the literature: First, by studying the yield and 
income effects of introducing a rice GR technology package in Tanzania that includes 
improved varieties, fertilizer, and cultivation practices (line-planting, bund construction, and 
field-leveling), it contributes to the literature on rice technology adoption in smallholder 
agriculture. It adds to the work of DeGraft-Johnson et al. (2014), who show that, in Ghana, 
the dissemination of a technology package like the one in this study has been associated with 
large gains in productivity and income.  
Second, the article investigates the potential spillover effects of LSAIs on the smallholder 
sector by studying a technology transfer project in the area around the largest rice investments 
in Tanzania. The project is a public-private-partnership (PPP) between Kilombero Plantation 
Limited (KPL) and USAID. Finally, the article compares the spillover channel of LSAIs with 
the most relevant alternative direct impact channel – labor market effects due to plantation 
and factory employment. Despite their relevance in influencing the development outcomes of 
LSAIs, only a few studies have compared how effective the different impact channels and 
business models are for LSAIs (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010; Deininger et al., 2011). Notable 
exceptions are Maertens and Swinnen (2009) on horticulture in Senegal and Herrmann and 
Grote (2015) on sugar in Malawi, both of which focus on contract farming and wage 
employment. 
Rice in Tanzania is an interesting case. Tanzania is one of SSA’s major rice producers with 
large expansion potentials (FAOSTAT, 2015; Barreiro-Hurle, 2012). The country has been 
one of the top three recipients of LSAI in SSA, with much government attention focusing on 
attracting LSAIs in the rice subsector via major investment promotion initiatives, such as the 
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT) and Big Results Now (BRN) (GoT – 
Government of Tanzania, 2015; LMGO, 2015). The study uses data from a farm and worker 
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household survey implemented in villages participating in the smallholder rice project that 
surround the country’s largest rice investment.  
The next section presents the background of rice production in Tanzania and the case studies. 
Section 3 describes the data source and methodology, Section 4 presents descriptive results, 
Section 5 contains the econometric results, and Section 6 concludes.  
4.2 Rice investments in Tanzania and the smallholder project 
Rice sector development in Tanzania 
As in most SSA countries (Larson et al., 2010), rice is important for human consumption in 
Tanzania, where it is third only to maize and cassava in terms of cereal intake (Barreiro-
Hurle, 2012). Tanzania is the largest rice producer in East Africa and the fifth largest in SSA, 
with an annual increase of 6% in rice production between 2000 and 2012 (FAOSTAT, 2015). 
In contrast to the rest of the region, imports to Tanzania have declined since the 2000s; in 
some years the country even exported rice (FAOSTAT, 2015). Further production potential is 
considered large, which could transform Tanzania into a major exporter to the region 
(SAGCOT, 2011; Wilson and Lewis, 2015). However, low rice yields and current trade 
policies continue to constrain production and exports (Barreiro-Hurle, 2012).  
Rice production in Tanzania is dominated by small-scale farmers, of which more than 1.1 
million are estimated to produce rice (GoT, 2012). Most production is under rainfed 
conditions (70% of locally produced rice) dominated by lowland production systems (GoT, 
2012). Large commercial farms play a limited role, with only around 5,500 hectare (ha) (139 
farms) estimated to be used for large-scale rice farming 2007–08 (GoT, 2012), although 
growing LSAIs have probably increased the area (see GoT, 2015). Yields for rainfed lowland 
rice production have been estimated to be only about 1.5–1.8 tons per ha (Seck et al., 2010; 
Nakano and Kajisa, 2012) – comparable to the SSA average (Seck et al., 2010) but 
significantly lower than global averages of 4.3 tons per ha (Fischer et al., 2014). As in other 
parts of SSA, low yields are associated with the low adoption of new technologies (Seck et 
al., 2010; GoT, 2009).  A National Rice Sector Development Strategy was therefore 
formulated to boost the adoption of modern methods (high-yielding seeds, fertilizers, 
machinery, and improved farming practices) and introduction of innovative approaches and 
partnerships in order to double production to almost 2 million tons by 2018 (GoT, 2009). 
Another strategy to increase rice production has been to promote LSAIs through SAGCOT 
and BRN. SAGCOT was established in 2010 as a multi-stakeholder initiative to mobilize 
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agribusiness investment along Tanzania’s southern transport corridor (SAGCOT, 2011). BRN 
was adopted in 2012 as a government initiative to accelerate agricultural investments and 
complement SAGCOT, in particular by establishing 25 large-scale commercial farming deals 
(GoT, 2015). SAGCOT and BRN consider rice to be a priority subsector for LSAIs 
(SAGCOT, 2011; GoT, 2015). Both strategies have also adopted inclusive business models in 
their blueprints, for example, by focusing on outgrower schemes (SAGCOT, 2013).  
Rice investments in the Kilombero Valley 
Kilombero District in Morogoro Region, one of Tanzania’s major rice-producing areas, is a 
priority cluster for SAGCOT (2011). The district has extensive freshwater wetlands – the 
largest at low altitudes in East Africa (Kangalawe and Liwenga, 2005). Agriculture is the 
main economic activity there; most farmers use the wetlands found along Kilombero river to 
grow a range of crops, with paddy rice the most popular (Kangalawe and Liwenga, 2005; 
Kato, 2007). Although poor infrastructure and other factors have limited diversifying into 
high-value crops, the area’s high agricultural potential has led to strong immigration (Kato, 
2007; Nindi et al., 2014). Large-scale farming is underdeveloped, except for some teak, 
sugarcane, and rice plantations (Nindi et al., 2014). When this study’s survey was conducted, 
SAGCOT investments were still in preparation. One exception was KPL, a large-scale 
commercial rice investment already operational in the area and which was considered a best-
practice case for future SAGCOT investments because of its linkages to smallholder farmers 
(SAGCOT, 2013).  
The smallholder rice project 
KPL is a joint venture between the British company Agrica and RUBADA (Rufiji Basin 
Development Authority), a Tanzanian parastatal organization. KPL started operations in 2008 
on a 5,818-ha government property, a former Tanzanian–North Korean joint venture that had 
been liquidated in 1993 (KPL, 2009). Since its establishment, KPL has built an industrial rice 
mill and a large warehouse (SAGCOT, 2013). When fully operational, KPL is expected to 
produce 20,000 tons of milled rice, making KPL Tanzania’s largest rice producer, employing 
160 full-time and 300 seasonal workers (KPL, 2009). 
The plantation investment is based on highly mechanized rice cultivation, with weeding the 
main activity for casual manual labor. The capital-intensive model is unsuitable for 
smallholder producers, but in 2009, KPL initiated a project with USAID to increase spillovers 
to local communities through a smallholder “rice intensification” project (SAGCOT, 2013). 
The project is based on Asian GR methods and technologies: it follows best agricultural 
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practices (transplanting, line-planting, and bund construction) and improves access to a high-
yielding variety of rice used by KPL, named SARO 5
21
, as well as chemical fertilizer and 
weeding machines. Assistance includes training in Farmer Field Schools (FFS), support to 
form associations, and linkages to microcredit institutions to facilitate access to inputs. 
Farmers access microfinance loans through collateral provided by the investor. 
The project started in 2009 with an initial group of 25 farmers in the villages around the KPL 
investment, increased to 250 farmers in the second year, and finally targeted 4,000 farmers in 
2013 (SAGCOT, 2013). It covers all of the 10 villages in an approximately 65-km2 area. 
Project extension officers, most of whom are employed by KPL, operate at least one 
demonstration plot for each participating village. In the first year, farmers are trained on 
demonstration plots and receive improved seeds and chemical fertilizer free of charge if they 
apply improved cultivation techniques and technologies on their 0.25-acre plots. In the second 
year, after successfully completing the training and joining a local rice-growers association, 
the farmers get subsidized access to improved seeds and fertilizer through microfinance, first 
for a one acre and the subsequent year for a one hectare plot size. KPL has also considered 
developing contract farming. At times, it has bought rice from the smallholders, but at the 
time the survey was conducted, there was no contract-farming scheme in operation.   
4.3 Data and methodology 
Data 
The main objective of the study was to measure the welfare effects of adopting the GR-type 
of technology package for rice promoted through the project (a high-yielding variety, 
fertilizer, and modern farming practices) and comparing it with the labor market channel of 
LSAIs. Between April and May 2013, a farm household survey was conducted in the 10 
project villages, focusing on three household groups: (1) farmers participating in the 
smallholder rice project, (2) households employed by KPL as factory or plantation workers, 
and (3) a control group of non-participating households. 355 households were interviewed, 
142 of which participated in the project, 61 had members employed as factory or estate 
workers, and 152 did not participate.
22
 
Project participants were selected by the random sampling of lists provided by KPL. The 
sampling frame comprised all farmers who had participated in the FFSs during the first two 
                                                 
21
 SARO 5 (TXD-306) is a variety developed in 2002 at the Rice Research Center in Dakawa, Morogoro Region (GoT, 
2009). 
22Because of missing data on labor, 16 households (10 participants and 6 non-participants) were excluded from the analysis. 
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years of the project and had a chance to adopt the practices and sell their harvests. Data was 
collected for the 2012 season when rice brought high prices: these declined by 50% the 
following year due to abrupt tariff waiving and rice import surges (Agritrade, 2014). In the 
same villages, non-participants were sampled from existing village population lists, lists 
drawn up by knowledgeable villagers, or by applying a random walk method. Agro-industry 
workers live in three of the villages. They were sampled and interviewed at the workplace.  
Measurement issues 
Project benefits are expected to come from increased adoption of new technologies and 
techniques, which could raise yields and crop and household income. At the same time, 
however, income may be adversely affected because adopting an input-intensive system may 
raise the costs of inputs and household labor (Takahashi and Barrett, 2014) and reduce returns 
from other income sources. Empirical evidence exists about the positive yield and income 
effects of similar rice innovations in SSA (DeGraft-Johnson et al., 2014), and recent studies 
have also found positive yield effects from adoption of improved cultivation practices, such as 
SRI (Sustainable Rice Intensification) (Noltze et al., 2013; Takahashi and Barrett, 2014). 
However, the labor intensity of these practices – which can lead to their later rejection – 
returns ambiguous evidence regarding income effects (Moser and Barrett, 2006). Producer 
prices of improved and traditional varieties may also differ if, for example, consumers 
perceive traditional varieties to be superior.
23
 However, learning effects with the new 
technologies as well as changing consumer perceptions can reduce costs, thereby increasing 
prices and project benefits over time. Agro-industry employment is sometimes seen critically 
because of the low quality of the jobs (Barrientos et al., 2005) – although such jobs may be 
significantly better than most of their other rural job opportunities. International agribusiness 
firms, for example, may bring in capital, new ideas, and technologies – thus increasing both 
worker productivity and incentives to pay higher wages (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; 
Herrmann and Grote, 2015). 
Measuring the welfare effects of these different channels is not straightforward. First, it is 
difficult to evaluate adoption of the technology package because the project is still in an early 
stage, with many farmers still benefiting from free access to the new technologies (seeds and 
fertilizer). Therefore, the study imputes market prices for the technology package in order to 
simulate conditions under ‘real’ market conditions. Second, at this early stage, farmers are 
                                                 
23
Rice traders, for example, claimed that improved varieties have lower prices given their inferior aroma compared with local 
varieties (personal communication). 
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unlikely to adopt the technology package for an entire rice farm and are more likely to follow 
a stepwise approach of initially testing specific plots before expanding it to the entire farm (cf. 
Barrett et al., 2006). Thus, measuring average outcomes across the entire rice farm may 
understate the technologies’ true potential. The survey has detailed plot-level information on 
rice revenues, costs, planting methods, rice varieties, and input use, so that  traditional 
technology plots can be compared with new ones, and plot-level can be compared with 
household-level effects. 
Finally, it is difficult to measure impacts with cross-section data. In impact evaluation, we are 
usually interested in estimating the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) 
(Heckman et al., 1999): ATT=E[Y1i-Y0i|X,D=1] = E[Y1i|X,D=1]-E[X0i|X,D=1], where 
conditional on covariates X and treatment D, ATT is the average outcome difference between 
adopting/participating and non-adopting/non-participating. E[Y1i|X,D=1]  can be calculated 
using survey data on adopters/participants, but E[Y0i|X,D=1] is unknown and must be 
estimated using average outcomes of non-adopters/non-participants, E[Y0i|X,D=0] (Heckman 
et al., 1998). Technology adoption and labor-market participation decisions are seldom 
random because households or plots are selected due to certain characteristics. Thus, 
estimating ATTs by simply comparing adopters/participants with non-adopters/non-
participants leads to under- or overestimating the true effects (selection bias). Selection bias 
may arise, for example, if those farmers who are more skilled are also more likely to adopt 
because they can expect higher yields than less-skilled farmers (De Janvry et al., 2011b). 
Farmers might also adopt technologies on plots with better or worse soil or water conditions 
(Barrett et al., 2006). Labor-market participation may be influenced by wealth status or social 
capital, for example, with well-connected households accessing better-paid jobs and the 
resource-poor pushed into low-paid off-farm jobs (Ellis, 2000). 
Empirical approach 
In order to address the measurement issues, first plot-level yield and income functions for 
technology adopters and non-adopters were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), 
which yields efficient ATTs if Di is exogenous. Since Di is likely to be endogenous, a plot-
level Heckman treatment effects model (TEM) with an endogenous binary variable was 
estimated. Previous studies (e.g., Jena and Grote, 2012; DeGraft-Johnson et al., 2014) have 
used this to address the selection bias. It relies on two equations: a first-stage selection 
equation, , with the adoption/participation dummy Di, a vector of explanatory iZD   11
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variables Zi, and the error term δi, and a second-stage outcome equation, , 
with outcome Yi as a function of Di, other characteristics Wi, and an error term εi. TEM 
corrects for the part of εi that is correlated with Di (λi) so that E(εi - λi | Di, Xi)=0. The 
correction term λi, the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR), is estimated using a probit model and is 
included as an additional covariate in the outcome equation. Thus, the correlated part between 
Di and εi is withdrawn from the error term. However, TEM has limitations because it relies on 
its strong functional form and normality assumptions and requires an exclusion restriction 
(Briggs, 2004). 
As a robustness check, propensity score matching (PSM) (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) was 
used to compare adoption plots with non-adoption plots that are similar in terms of pre-
adoption characteristics, expressed as ‘propensity scores’ (Faltermeier and Abdulai, 2009). 
The propensity scores – the probabilities of adopting – were estimated using a probit model. 
Matching only plots that are sufficiently similar improves the overall model efficiency – as 
opposed to using the entire sample (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). PSM is not based on 
linearity assumptions or exclusion restrictions. It requires (a) sufficient similarity of 
adoption/non-adoption plots in terms of propensity scores and (b) selection only on 
observables. Condition (b) is particularly challenging in technology adoption studies (De 
Janvry et al., 2011b) because adopters and non-adopters may also differ in unobservable plot 
and household characteristics (e.g., soil quality, risk behavior, and experience) (see Barrett et 
al., 2006). 
In a second step, PSM was used to estimate rice-farm and household-level yield and income 
effects by comparing the two treatment groups (rice project participants and agro-industry 
workers) with non-participants. 
Outcome and explanatory variables 
Household welfare was measured using intermediate and overall outcome indicators: (1) rice 
yields (plot level), (2) rice income (plot and farm level), (3) agricultural income, and (4) total 
household income. Rice income (paid out) is defined as ‘producer net revenue’ – the 
difference between total production value and the variable costs of production (Barnard et al., 
2012). Total production value comprises both marketed and self-consumed produce valued at 
the 2011–12 season’s market prices. Production costs include all costs for inputs, hired labor, 
and land rental. Rice net return (profits) was calculated by deducting imputed family labor 
costs from rice income. Agricultural income is the sum of marketed, subsistence, and in-kind 
iii WDY   1
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crop and livestock income, while total household income also accounts for non-farm income 
sources, including wages and income from self-employment.
24
 
To derive credible PSM estimates, it is necessary to account for a large set of relevant 
covariates (Caliendo and Kopeneig, 2008). For that reason, the adoption and outcome models 
used a wide range of plot-level and household-level explanatory variables – as found in the 
literature on technology adoption and diversification (e.g., Barrett et al., 2006; Ellis, 2000). 
Plot characteristics used in the plot-level models included plot location (lowland/upland), soil 
fertility (fertile/unfertile), plot manager, field-leveling, crop damages (whether or not external 
damages occurred), plot distance from homestead, land ownership status and titling, 
mechanization, and plot size (only in the outcome model). In household-level analyses, these 
factors would be considered ‘unobservables’. Plot-level factors, such as soil fertility, field 
leveling, technology use, and ownership status, are likely to affect adoption behavior and may 
affect yields independent of the technology used. Household characteristics in both the plot- 
and farm- or household-level models included household demographics (head of household’s 
age, education, and sex, and number of working-age household members), which are expected 
to raise yields by affecting human capital – independent of the inputs. Institutional and social 
capital (e.g., belonging to an organization, being born in the village, owning a mobile phone), 
as well as farm assets (total landholding and livestock ownership), credit access, and non-farm 
income, are expected to affect technology access and overall income-generating capabilities. 
Correct identification in the TEM relies on an exclusion restriction – an additional variable in 
the first stage that influences participation but not the outcome variable, except through 
participation. Two exclusion restrictions were used: (1) the share of project participants in the 
village population and (2) a perception index to measure a farmer’s openness to new 
technologies. These were derived from five questions (such as whether the household is 
among the first in the village to adopt new technologies, or perceptions of change) using a 
Likert scale, with the lower number suggesting greater openness. I include these variables 
because we expect the overall share of participants in a village to influence the probability of 
adopting because of observation or social network effects. I also expect that farmers’ overall 
openness to new technologies will increase their adoption. However, I cannot know for sure 
                                                 
24Plot-specific information for agro-industry workers was not collected for this study, whose main outcome indicators are  
overall agricultural income and household income. 
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that these instruments independently affect the outcome variable.
25
 For that reason, the TEM 
results are compared using OLS and PSM for robustness checks. 
4.4 Descriptive results 
Household-level characteristics 
This subsection examines the descriptive results by comparing the household characteristics 
of farmers participating in the rice project, agro-industry workers, and non-participants (Table 
1). The groups differ across a number of variables referred to in the previous section, 
including the age of the head of household, their education level, land ownership, 
organizational membership(s), and credit access. Although organizational membership (e.g., 
belonging to a rice association) and better credit access may be due to their participation, 
other factors, such as better education, the household head’s greater age, and larger 
landholdings, suggest systemic differences between the groups. Agro-industry workers, 
however, differ in fewer aspects from non-participants; for example, they have slightly 
younger household heads, higher educational levels, and smaller landholdings. 
Table 1. Household characteristics  
  
Non-participants 
(NP) (n=146) 
 
Project 
participants 
(PP) (n=132) 
 
Agro-industry 
workers 
(AIW) 
(n=61) 
 NP vs PP 
NP vs 
AIW 
  Mean SD   Coeff SD   Mean SD    t-test t-test 
Age of household (HH) head 42 10.13  45 9.54  39 11.01  20.6*** 1.7 
Female-headed HH (%) 8% 0.27  5% 0.22  7% 0.25  1.8*** 0.1 
HH member has at least 
secondary education (%) 46% 0.50  52% 0.50  61% 0.49  -2.1** 4.58** 
HH head born in village (%) 41% 0.49  47% 0.50  52% 0.50  -2.1** 2.2 
Organizational membership 
(%) 37% 0.48  79% 0.40  44% 0.50  -2.3** 0.8 
HH size 4.71 1.72  5.02 1.64  4.34 1.64  11.8*** 1.9 
Number of working-age HH 
members 2.69 1.21  2.96 1.26  2.69 1.23  11.9*** 0.02 
Credit access (%) 7% 0.26  73% 0.45  18% 0.39  -11.1*** 2.33 
Access to non-farm 
employment (%) 44% 0.50  34% 0.47  100% 0.00  3.6*** 51*** 
Livestock ownership (%) 71% 0.45  79% 0.40  74% 0.44  -3.2*** 0.45 
                                                 
25With regard to the first exclusion restriction, it could be argued that project placement is affected by market access or the 
suitability of soils in the area, although we control for this variable in the model. For the technology perception variable, one 
could argue that the effect on the outcome variable is also because more highly skilled farmers tend to be more likely to be 
open to new technologies, and independently generate higher yields or incomes. 
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TLU
 a
 0.38 0.92  0.72 1.30  0.38 0.68  6.4** 1.26 
Owns a mobile phone (%) 84% 0.37  89% 0.31  77% 0.42  -2.3** 0.5 
Average landholding (ha) 1.48 0.99   1.91 1.40   0.93 0.80   34.1*** 16.5*** 
Note: ** and *** indicate the significance of the t-statistic of the mean difference at the 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
a 
Tropical Livestock Unit. Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
 
Comparisons at rice plot and rice farm level 
This subsection focuses on project participants and non-participants to explore rice 
technology adoption patterns and plot-level gross margins. Table 2 shows the importance of 
rice production, with almost all participants producing – and more than 90% of them selling – 
rice. An average of 50%–70% of the total rice production is sold. Project participation is 
associated with the use of modern inputs, with 96% of participants using the promoted SARO 
5 variety,
26
 as opposed to only 14% of the non-participants. Improved varieties still only 
account for 42% of the participants’ rice farm area. While low use is due to the project’s early 
stage, farmers also explained a reluctance to adopt SARO 5 due to consumers negative 
perceptions of SARO 5. Chemical fertilizer is used by 87% of participants, but applied to only 
37% of their rice areas. Of non-participants, only 4% use fertilizer, which could be due to 
financial constraints but also because traditional rice varieties respond less well to fertilizer. 
Of the training participants, 77% applied the full rice technology package of improved seeds, 
fertilizer, and crop husbandry (transplanting and straight-line planting), but to only 26% of 
their rice areas. In contrast to the low use of modern inputs, mechanization of certain farming 
operations is very common, especially the use of hired tractor services, relied on by 70%–
80% of the participants and non-participants. Hiring labor for weeding and harvesting 
operations is also common among more than 90% of the participants and 75% of the non-
participants. Differences in technology adoption are also associated with yield differences. 
Whereas non-participants produce only 1.1 tons per acre, participants produce 1.5 or even 2.4 
tons per acre on the plots in the project technology package.  
Table 2. Rice farm characteristics  
  
Project 
participants 
(n=132) 
 
Non-participants 
(n=146) 
 
  Mean  SD  Mean  SD t-test 
Households producing rice (%) 100%  98%  
                                                 
26Most farmers in Tanzania grow older improved varieties which suit the environment and consumer tastes, but produce low 
yields. SARO 5 is the most common modern variety but is not widely adopted (Nakano and Kajisa, 2012). 
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Rice farm size (acre) 3.85 2.7  2.75 1.9 12.20*** 
Share of farmers selling rice (binary) 98% 0.27  92% 0.15 -2.11** 
Rice commercialization (sale/total production in kg) 69% 0.33  51% 0.89 -2.57** 
Uses modern rice variety (binary) 94% 0.24  17% 0.38 -12.91*** 
Share of total area with improved rice variety  41% 0.38  15% 0.35 34.38*** 
Uses chemical fertilizer (binary) 85% 0.36  4% 0.20 -13.48*** 
Share using chemical fertilizer (% of total ha) 37% 0.20  4% 0.20 82.71*** 
Applies technology package (binary) 85% 0.37  2% 0.14 -13.77*** 
Share using new technology package (% of total area)  29% 0.32  2% 0.14 84.15*** 
Uses tractor for farm operations (binary) 83% 0.38  68% 0.47 -2.86*** 
Hires labor for farm operations (binary) 90% 0.30  77% 0.42 -3.06*** 
Rents land for rice farming (binary) 21% 0.41  21% 0.46 1.85* 
Uses pesticides on the rice farm (binary) 0.71 0.45  0.55 0.55 -2.82*** 
Total rice yields (t / acre) 1.5 0.8  1.1 1.6 13.78*** 
Rice yields of improved plots (t / acre) 2.4 1.2     
Note: *, **, *** indicate the significance of the t-statistic of the mean difference at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
Qualitative discussions with farmers about production constraints underscored the potentials 
of such technology packages (Table 3) with – apart from weeds and pests – a lack of access to 
inputs such as seeds and fertilizer, and a lack of farming knowledge are seen as the main 
constraints. A lack of markets and buyers were not considered to be major constraints. 
However, farmers complained about low rice prices as a result of the government’s decision 
to waive rice import duties on 60,000 tons in 2013 (Agritrade, 2014). 
Table 3. Major rice business constraints 
Production challenges  
Important 
challenge 
(%) 
Most important 
challenge 
(%) 
Cost and access to inputs   65 27 
Low rice prices  50 11 
Lack of rice farming knowledge  41 22 
Lack of transport  41 10 
High price fluctuations  41 7 
Lack of buyers or markets  30 8 
Weeds and pests  24 24 
Climatic conditions   10 10 
Source: Kilombero survey rice 
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During the 2011–12 survey, prices were relatively high, reaching more than 90,000 Tanzanian 
shillings (TSH) (Table 4). Prices for SARO 5 and local varieties differed only slightly, not 
confirming worries that SARO 5 gets substantially lower prices. Given that season’s high 
demand, preferences might have played a minor role in price determination so that price 
differences may be more pronounced in years with an oversupply. Nonetheless, prices 
fluctuated throughout the season, increasing by more than 30% over post-harvest prices 
towards the end of the year. 
Table 4. Rice price comparison – improved and local varieties  
  SARO 5   Local variety  
  Mean SD  Mean SD t-test 
Average price (TSH/80 kg-bag) 85,777 24,547  91,054 26,042 1.877** 
Price after harvest (April–September) 76,273 22,563  78,068 24,074 0.497 
End-of-season price (October–March) 99,226 20,796  100,289 23,376 0.289 
Note: In late 2012, USD 1 = TSH 1.578;  *, **, and *** indicate the significance of the t-statistic of the mean 
difference at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
Although participation is associated with increased land yields, income may be compromised 
by costs of hired labor, imputed family labor costs and other input costs. Rice labor input in 
person-days, for example, was 13% higher among project participants; when comparing plots 
with the technology package to unimproved plots, the gap reached 70%.  
Table 5 combines the information regarding plot-level gross margins for rice grown on plots 
with no improvements, plots with the improved variety of rice, and plots using the full-
technology package. While improved-variety plots have revenues per acre almost double 
those of unimproved plots, the full-technology-package plots have revenues that are 139% 
higher. Costs are also substantially higher, with hired and imputed family labor costs more 
than double on technology package plots compared to unimproved plots. Still income 
differences remain substantial, with net returns (profits) more than double for full-technology-
package plots. 
Table 5. Plot-level rice income (per acre)  
  
Unimproved  
plots
1
 
(N=168) 
 
Improved  
variety
2
  
(N=213) 
Technology 
package
3
 
(N=118) 
  Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD 
Number of plots (with labor & seed info) 168   213  118  
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Plot characteristics        
Plot location (1=plot in flat bottom – not 
sloped or flat top) 
64%   59%  58%  
Soil fertility (1=fertile & very fertile soil) 85%   84%  86%  
Plot manager (1=HH head involved) 71%   62%  58%  
Field-leveling (1=well-leveled) 85%   89%  92%  
Rice crop damage (1=rice crop damage 
during 2011–12) 
72%   65%  65%  
Mechanization (1=use of mechanization) 79%   77%  77%  
Plot distance (minutes) 63.1 52.5  51.9 38.5 55.3 41.2 
Ownership status of plot (1=plot owned by 
HH) 
90%   91%  95%  
Plot title (1=title deed) 15%   15%  17%  
Gross margin analysis ('000 TSH/acre):        
Plot area (acre) 2.4 1.8  1.4*** 1.2 0.9*** 0.9 
Yield (tons per acre) 1.1 0.6  2.0*** 1.3 2.4*** 1.2 
Value of production  646 331  1,269*** 799 1,545*** 802 
Labor costs 263 157  458*** 431 587*** 501 
Hired labor  70 67  126*** 193 152*** 245 
Imputed labor  192 169  332*** 378 435*** 434 
Current input costs        
Seed  3 9  14*** 15 16*** 16 
Fertilizer  0 0  32*** 45 56*** 48 
Pesticides 8 13  15*** 28 18*** 36 
Machinery  33 29  43** 65 46* 73 
Total paid-out costs 137 94  265*** 258 325*** 313 
Total costs
4
 329 161  597*** 476 760*** 538 
        
Income (paid out) 509 307  1,004*** 736 1,221*** 770 
Net return (profit) (imputed labor costs) 317 357  673*** 792 786*** 917 
Labor share (labor costs/total costs) 56%   48%  52%  
Note: In late 2912, USD 1=TSH 1.578; *, **, and *** indicate the significance of the t-statistic of the mean 
difference at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
1
Without improved rice varieties, fertilizer, or modern 
farming methods. 
2
Used improved rice varieties. 
3
Used the full package of improved rice varieties, fertilizer, and 
modern farming methods.
4
Imputed family labor costs added to total paid-out costs. Source: Author’s 
calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
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Comparisons at rice plot and rice farm level 
Given the early stage of the project and the resulting heterogeneous adoption pattern of the 
participants, the farm- and household-level analysis focuses on a comparison of households 
that had at least partly adopted the full technology package with those who were still relying 
on unimproved systems. These groups are compared with the benefits from participating in 
the agro-industry labor market channel, the most relevant alternative impact channel of 
LSAIs. Table 6 reports farm- and household-level yield and income data for the different 
groups. Rice income per acre is substantially higher for technology adopters than for non-
adopters but these differences are much lower than in the previous plot-level comparison. 
Although differences in non-farm income are not significant, among technology adopters 
agricultural incomes as well as total and per capita household income are around 50% higher. 
Differences between agro-industry workers and non-adopters are negligible in terms of total 
household income but because of workers’ smaller household size, their per capita income is 
23% higher. 
Table 6. Rice farm- and household-level income calculation (in '000 TSH) (Adopters, 
non-adopters, agro-industry workers) 
  
Non adopters 
(NA)
1
 
(n=117) 
  
Adopters  
(n=112)  
Agro-industry 
workers 
(AIW) (n=61 ) 
 
NA vs 
OG 
NA vs 
AIW 
 
Mean SD 
  
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
 
T-test T-test 
Rice farm income (per 
acre): 
   
                  
Yields (tons/acre) 1.02 0.52 
  
1.59 0.87 
    
35.82*** 
 Total production value 640 359 
  
1,027 595 
    
35.22*** 
 Rice farm income 508 332 
  
818 535 
    
27.45*** 
 Rice farm net return 
(profit) 316 368 
  
612 566 
    
21.70*** 
 Household income: 
            Agricultural income 1,527 1,373 
  
2,973 3,443 
 
1,278 1,232 
 
16.25*** 1.53 
Non-agricultural income 676 1,244 
  
679 1,972 
 
1,303 1,088 
 
0.01  12.16*** 
Total household income 2,204 1,849 
  
3,653 4,066 
 
2,580 1,649 
 
11.57*** 1.94 
Total household income 
(per capita) 516 419     795 989   661 425   7.49*** 4.79** 
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Note: *, **, and *** indicate the significance of the t-statistic of the mean difference at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
1
Non-adopters in this table refer to farmers not having adopted any technology (fertilizer, new 
variety, improved methods). Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
4.5 Econometric results 
The differences between the groups reported in the last section suggest positive effects from 
adoption and participation. However, they could also result from other factors. This section 
therefore conducts an econometric analysis, by first evaluating the plot-level yield and income 
effects of two different treatments – (1) the improved variety SARO 5 was planted and (2) the 
entire technology package (SARO 5, fertilizer, and improved planting methods) was applied – 
and compares improved with unimproved plots. In a second step, agro-industry worker data is 
integrated to evaluate farm- and household-level effects on both impact channels. 
4.5.1 Plot-level analysis 
Table 7 reports the plot-level probit regressions for adopting at least improved varieties and 
the full technology package, which are used to estimate the propensity scores for PSM and 
calculate the IMR of the TEM.
27
 Most variables have the same direction in both models. 
Having a plot title, owning livestock, being open to new technologies, as well as having a 
high share of participants living in the village all correlate positively and significantly with 
adoption on a given plot. For female-headed households, having been born in the village, and 
the distance between house and plot are significant and negative for the improved variety 
model but not for the full package. In contrast, a well-leveled plot positively influences 
adoption of the full package. 
Table 7. Plot-level adoption of technology package 
  Improved variety  Technology package 
 Independent probit model  Independent probit model 
  Coef.  Coef. 
Plot location (binary) 0.199  0.102 
 (0.236)  (0.198) 
Soil fertility (binary) -0.0318  -0.133 
 (0.290)  (0.263) 
Plot manager (binary) -0.145  -0.347* 
 (0.239)  (0.204) 
Field-leveling (binary) 0.0173  0.575** 
 (0.281)  (0.235) 
                                                 
27
The probit model estimations in the TEM are in A1 and A2, which differ only slightly in their parameters. 
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Rice crop damage (binary) -0.451**  -0.010 
 (0.184)  (0.188) 
Plot distance (minutes) -0.006***  -0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Ownership status of plot (binary) -0.004  0.204 
 (0.269)  (0.302) 
Plot title (binary) 0.484*  0.445* 
 (0.281)  (0.243) 
Mechanization (binary) -0.190  0.0135 
 (0.214)  (0.187) 
Age of HH head -0.001  0.014 
 (0.010)  (0.009) 
Female-headed HH (binary) -0.730***  -0.243 
 (0.280)  (0.288) 
Secondary education in HH (binary) 0.258  -0.0171 
 (0.197)  (0.188) 
Working-age HH members 
(numbers) 
0.0004  -0.0412 
 (0.077)  (0.069) 
Non-agricultural income (binary) 0.241  0.309* 
 (0.218)  (0.178) 
Total rice area (acre) 0.0211  0.0250 
 (0.038)  (0.039) 
Born in the village (binary) -0.551***  0.0504 
 (0.168)  (0.167) 
Owns livestock (binary) 0.443**  0.339* 
 (0.218)  (0.195) 
Owns a mobile phone (binary) -0.111  0.120 
 (0.260)  (0.220) 
New technology index
a
 -0.0648**  -0.0463* 
 (0.0298)  (0.025) 
Participants of overall village 
population (%) 
1.884*  3.003*** 
 (1.139)  (1.058) 
Constant 0.173  -2.680*** 
 (0.758)  (0.787) 
Observations 376  376 
Pseudo R2 0.175  0.118 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the robust standard errors; *, **, and *** indicate the significance of the t-
statistic of the mean difference at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
a
 The innovativeness index comprises 
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five dimensions of openness to new technology and willingness to adopt (1=very willing to adopt, 5=very 
unwilling to adopt). Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
 
 As mentioned before, the treatment variables are likely to suffer from selection bias; hence, 
to derive the plot-level impacts, TEM and PSM were used along with simple OLS. Table 8 
reports the main outcome coefficients for yields, income, and net return. The complete 
regression results are reported in Annexes 1 to 3. The magnitudes between the models differ 
substantially, with TEM showing significantly higher ATTs than OLS and PSM. 
Nevertheless, all models predict substantial ATTs for all outcome variables significant at the 
1% level, suggesting that simply adopting SARO 5 is associated with significant yield and 
income improvements. When the entire technology package is adopted, the improvements are 
even greater. These positive effects hold even after accounting for imputed family labor costs 
(net return). Specifically, adopting at least SARO 5 leads to improvements associated with 
yields of 0.8 to 1.1 tons per acre (80%–100% yield improvements) and around 1.3 to 1.5 tons 
(122%–145%) when the full technology package is adopted. Rice income is predicted to 
increase by at least TSH 440,000 (around 90%) when SARO 5 is adopted, and TSH 660–
770,000 for the full package, an improvement of at least 135% per acre. Improvements in net 
returns are also substantial, doubling with just SARO 5 and the full package, in spite of the 
substantially higher labor costs for these plots. 
Table 8. Plot-level ATT of rice yields, revenues and gross margins (improved variety) 
(income in TSH '000) 
    OLS  Treatment effects model  PSM (KM
a
) 
    ATT 
Robust 
SE 
% 
change 
 ATT 
Robust 
SE 
% 
change 
 ATT 
Robust 
SE 
% 
change 
Adoption of improved variety:          
Rice yields 
(kg/acre)  
826*** 120 78%  1,073*** 152 101%  1,083*** 119 
98% 
Rice income   442*** 79 87%  626*** 108 123%  559*** 72 104% 
Total rice income  355*** 80 114%  599*** 117 193%  364*** 89 106% 
Adoption of technology package:          
Rice yields 
(tons/acre) 
1,259*** 132 122%  1,496*** 173 145%  1,313*** 147 
122% 
Rice income  663*** 82 137%  768*** 112 159%  713*** 84 139% 
Total rice income 467*** 90 174%  617*** 118 230%  445*** 100 129% 
Note: ∗∗∗ indicates the significance of the t-statistic of the mean difference at the 1% level. aKernel matching. 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
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In Annexes 1 to 3, the full OLS- and TEM-regression results for Models 2 and 4 show the 
endogeneity-tests (athrho), which are significant at 1% or 5% levels, suggesting that 
endogeneity is indeed a problem, supporting the use of TEM over OLS and thus higher 
treatment effects. Apart from that, the explanatory variables reveal that better perceived soils 
are positively correlate with yields, whereas external production shocks lower yields and 
incomes. Larger total rice areas negatively correlate with yield as expected. Education is 
positively correlated with both yield and income.
28
 
4.5.2 Farm- and household-level analysis 
With the adopters’ land share of the full technology package small, it is important to ask if 
plot-level effects of the project technology package translate into overall household-level 
welfare effects and how these compare with participation in an alternative impact channel of 
LSAIs, namely the agro-industry labor market effect. 
Table 9 presents bivariate probit models of technology adoption at the household level and 
participation in the agro-industry labor market to derive the propensity scores needed to 
implement PSM. Two different probit models for each channel are derived, comparing 
adopters of the technology package or workers with farmers not adopting the full technology 
package (Model 2 and 4) as well as with farmers relying completely on traditional methods 
(Model 1 and 3). For the technology adoption case at the household level (Model 1 and 2), the 
household head’s age is positively correlated with adoption. Livestock ownership and the 
availability of non-agricultural income – factors that may relate to rice farming – are also 
positively correlated household wealth or asset ownership. The innovativeness index 
previously explained explaining the openness to new technologies is significant, suggesting 
that farmers with more positive perceptions of new technologies and towards risk are more 
likely to adopt the technology. In the agro-industry wage labor model (Model 3 and 4), the 
availability of male household members and the household head’s secondary education 
increase participation probability, with the latter potentially relating to the skill bias of some 
factory jobs, as well as the fact that some younger graduates take these jobs because there are 
no others. Land ownership is negatively related to participation, which could suggest push 
effects because such households have fewer opportunities to make a livelihood from 
agriculture. 
                                                 
28
Balancing tests of the PSM model are not presented here because of limited space, but they indicate significant 
reductions in covariate differences from before to after matching between improved and unimproved plots. 
Results are available upon request. 
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Table 9. Household-level participation in the smallholder project & agro-industry labor market (probit model) 
  
Technology package adoption 
(1)  
Technology package 
adoption  (2)  
Agro-industry 
employment (3)  
Agro-industry 
employment (4) 
  
Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err.  
Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err.  
Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err.  
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Age of hh head 0.198*** 0.077 
 
0.119* 0.064 
 
-0.057 0.074 
 
-0.070 0.071 
Age of hh head (squared) -0.002** 0.001 
 
-0.001 0.001 
 
0.000 0.001 
 
0.001 0.001 
Sex of hh head -0.399 0.309 
 
-0.277 0.319 
 
0.388 0.562 
 
0.283 0.552 
At least secondary education in hh (binary) 0.196 0.205 
 
0.032 0.193 
 
0.565** 0.286 
 
0.726*** 0.269 
Working age male members -0.143 0.136 
 
-0.109 0.128 
 
0.515** 0.232 
 
0.394* 0.211 
Working age female members -0.026 0.142 
 
-0.007 0.131 
 
-0.356 0.218 
 
-0.278 0.227 
Number of dependents -0.034 0.062 
 
-0.099* 0.056 
 
-0.055 0.108 
 
-0.083 0.097 
Non agricultural income (binary) 0.433** 0.211 
 
0.447** 0.185 
      Total land owned  0.026 0.037 
 
0.010 0.031 
 
-0.239*** 0.072 
 
-0.246*** 0.067 
Born in the village (binary) -0.065 0.198 
 
0.112 0.193 
 
-0.527* 0.295 
 
-0.348 0.266 
TLU 0.342* 0.184 
 
0.285* 0.163 
 
0.717* 0.377 
 
0.450* 0.271 
Owns a mobile phone (binary) -0.126 0.260 
 
-0.068 0.240 
 
-0.880** 0.392 
 
-0.969** 0.393 
New technology perception
 a
 -0.102*** 0.032 
 
-0.055** 0.025 
      Village fixed effects Yes 
  
Yes 
  
No 
  
No 
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Constant -4.786*** 1.821 
 
-3.649** 1.536 
 
2.622 1.613 
 
2.792* 1.525 
Obs 239     277     114     128   
Pseudo R2 0.250     0.174     0.224     0.205   
Note: Model (1) compares technology package (TP) adopters (including 7 worker households) with farmers using no improvements; model (2) compares the TP adopters with 
farmers not adopting the TP; model (3) compares agro-industry employment with farmers using no improvement from the worker villages; model (4) compares agro-industry 
workers with farmers not adopting the TP. *, **, and *** indicate the significance of the t-statistic of the mean difference at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. aThe 
innovativeness index comprises five dimensions of openness towards new technology and willingness to adopt (1 = very willing to adopt, 5 = very unwilling to adopt). Source: 
Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
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Table 10 and 11 present the ATTs of the two treatments – adoption of the technology package 
and agro-industry wage employment – using PSM with three different matching algorithms 
(nearest-neighbor, kernel, and radius matching) and OLS.
29
 In both cases, the treatments are 
compared to the group of farmers not adopting the full technology package, but who might 
use improved varieties, and to the group of farmers not adopting any modern technology.  
Although in terms of overall rice farm yields, incomes, and net returns, the estimated ATTs of 
technology adoption are still positive and significant –especially when comparing to those 
farmers not adopting any technology at all – they are significantly lower than plot-level 
estimates. PSM and OLS results are very similar, with both models showing that technology 
adoption is associated with significant farm-level yield differences between adopters and non-
adopters of around 300 to 500 kg per acre (24%–47% higher yields). Rice income differences, 
even accounting for family labor costs, are still significant and differ by 30%–65%. When 
considering overall household-level outcomes, differences are still positive, with agricultural 
income and per capita income around 29%–50% higher for adopters. However, these overall 
household income differences are only statistically significant when compared to farmers not 
using any technology.  
For agro-industry worker participation, the models predict negative ATTs for agricultural 
income, which may suggest some negative – but statistically insignificant – intra-household 
substitution effects. In fact, household income-level effects are similar, but slightly lower than 
the technology adoption case:  between 10%– 24%, or 18%–36% for total and per capita 
income, respectively, but with only weak statistical significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
The full OLS-regression results are presented in Table A4 to A7 of the attachment.  
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Table 10. Household-level ATT of rice farm and household income – Technology adoption (income in TSH '000) 
    NNM     KM     RM     OLS   
    ATT 
% 
change   ATT 
% 
change   ATT 
% 
change   ATT 
% 
change 
             Adoption of technology package (compared to farmers not adopting full package) 
  
 
Rice farm level: 
           
 
Rice yields (kg/acre) 340*** 27% 
 
307*** 24% 
 
338*** 27% 
 
347*** 31% 
  
110 
  
119 
  
119.1887 
  
105 
 
 
Rice income (per acre) 210,591***  35% 
 
197,262*** 32% 
 
192,617*** 31% 
 
179,891** 32% 
  
68,587 
  
70,718 
  
70717.68 
  
71,116 
 
 
Rice net return 202,890**  50% 
 
199,715**  49% 
 
181,559** 43% 
 
157,911** 44% 
  
78,824 
  
74,857 
  
74857.32 
  
72,805 
 
 
Household level: 
           
 
Total agricultural income  863,724**  42% 
 
809,217  39% 
 
734,722 34% 
 
510,811* 29% 
  
402,154 
  
451,843 
  
451842.6 
  
305,427 
 
 
Household income 758,719 26% 
 
759,552 26% 
 
731,511 25% 
 
574,102 24% 
  
475,524 
  
504,892 
  
504891.5 
  
422,710 
 
 
Household income (per capita) 180,053*  30% 
 
188,599 32% 
 
178,028 30% 
 
159,554 30% 
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109,301 
  
112,133 
  
112133.4 
  
113,075 
 
             Adoption of technology package (compared to farmers not adopting any technology) 
      
 
Rice farm level: 
           
 
Rice yields (kg/acre) 512*** 47% 
 
479*** 43% 
 
478*** 43% 
 
448*** 44% 
  
118 
  
124 
  
102 
  
104 
 
 
Rice income (per acre) 283,932*** 52% 
 
247,031*** 43% 
 
252,907*** 45% 
 
237,796*** 47% 
  
70,966 
  
68,391 
  
60,563 
  
65,776 
 
 
Rice net return 234,946** 62% 
 
199,296*** 48% 
 
204,102*** 51% 
 
204,572*** 65% 
  
70,563 
  
67,848 
  
66,286 
  
68,690 
 
 
Household level: 
           
 
Total agricultural income  1,008,360** 53% 
 
937,616*** 48% 
 
974,687** 52% 
 
763,746*** 50% 
  
436,361 
  
385,652 
  
419,202 
  
265,697 
 
 
Household income 1,051,468* 41% 
 
982,834** 37% 
 
1,015,982** 40% 
 
853,282** 39% 
  
531,183 
  
483,999 
  
504,789 
  
426,080 
 
 
Household income (per capita) 266,181** 51% 
 
235,376** 42% 
 
243,407** 46% 
 
216,392* 42% 
  
113,388 
  
110,480 
  
104,045 
  
123,084 
 
Note: Numbers in the parentheses are the robust standard errors; *, **, and *** indicate the significance of the t-statistic of the mean difference at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. NNM = Nearest Neighbor Matching; KM = Kernal Matching; RM = Radius Matching. Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
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Table 11. Household-level ATT of rice farm and household income –agro-industry wage employment (income in TSH '000) 
    NNM    KM    RM    OLS 
    
ATT 
% 
change  
ATT 
% 
change  
ATT 
% 
change  
ATT 
% 
change 
             Participation in agro-industry labor market (compared to farmers not adopting full package) 
     
 
Household level: 
           
 
Total agricultural income  -70,289 -5% 
 
-189,695 -13% 
 
-165,140 -11% 
 
-6,171 0% 
  
299,049 
  
220,529 
  
211,294 
  
202,266 
 
 
Household income 589,784 24% 
 
477,727 23% 
 
467,189 22% 
 
445,723 18% 
  
366,111 
  
310,127 
  
289,658 
  
302,825 
 
 
Household income (per capita) 200,713** 33% 
 
170,233** 35% 
 
175,738** 36% 
 
96,808 18% 
  
86,694 
  
75,086 
  
72,422 
  
71,757 
 
             Participation in agro-industry labor market (compared to  farmers not adopting any technology) 
    
 
Household level: 
           
 
Total agricultural income  -37,179 -3% 
 
-41,202 -3% 
 
12,900 1% 
 
238,653 16% 
  
238,251 
  
242,985 
  
228,221 
  
170,195 
 
 
Household income 400,371 10% 
 
384,648 17% 
 
538,214 26% 
 
630,599** 29% 
  
366,111 
  
349,674 
  
316,368 
  
292,781 
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Household income (per capita) 101,423 18% 
 
136,119* 26% 
 
157,756** 31% 
 
117,410 23% 
   112,938     85,012     78,010     72,354   
Note: Numbers in the parentheses are the robust standard errors; ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate the significance of the t-statistic of the mean difference at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. NNM = Nearest Neighbor Matching; KM = Kernal Matching; RM = Radius Matching. Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
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4.6 Conclusions 
The study investigated household welfare effects of large-scale rice investments in Tanzania’s 
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor region, focusing on two potential impact channels: 
productivity spillovers on small-scale rice farmers and agro-industry labor market linkages. 
This article evaluates yield and income effects of a PPP project implemented by Tanzania’s 
largest rice producer and USAID that aims at distributing a type of Asian Green Revolution 
technology package of high-yielding rice varieties, chemical fertilizer, and modern planting 
methods. The article also compares these technology spillovers to alternative LSAI-
participation channels of estate and factory labor markets to understand their differential 
welfare implications (cf. Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010; Ali et al., 2015). Unlike previous 
studies, analysis of farm and household levels is complemented with detailed plot-level yield 
and profit information, using TEM and PSM with cross-section data.  
One main finding of the study is that technology adoption along the lines of an Asian Green 
Revolution type leads to substantial plot-level differences between adopters and non-adopters, 
suggesting large pay-offs for smallholder rice incomes. Plot-level yield improvements were 
estimated to be at least 122%. In spite of higher production costs, rice income effects are 
substantial (around 140%), even when accounting for imputed family labor costs. These 
results are broadly in line with similar empirical studies on technology adoption by rice 
farmers in other SSA countries (Mozambique: Kajisa and Payongayong, 2011; Uganda: 
Kijima et al., 2012; Ghana: DeGraft-Johnson et al., 2014). Moreover, in line with the results 
of DeGraft-Johnson et al. (2014), this study found that the joint adoption of a bundle of 
innovations, such as improved high-yielding varieties, inputs, and planting methods, promises 
much higher effects than only adopting improved seeds.  
However, the study also found that looking at farm level effects to account for only partial 
adoption, the yield and income differences per acre decline to around 25% and 35%, 
respectively. In terms of total and per capita household income, the estimated differences are 
only weakly significant. However, most likely a major reason for the absence of substantial 
differences at the household level was that the project was new: even at farm level there was 
little diffusion of technologies and techniques. With the increased technology experience of 
farmers and other value chain actors, greater household-level effects may be created through 
diffusing improved rice technologies. Qualitative interviews also point to open questions 
regarding further diffusion and scaling-up: The project provided farmers the technology 
package free of charge, but only some of them were making use of microcredit to purchase 
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improved seeds and fertilizer. There was still no information about credit repayment, but 
which is central to the sustainability of such a project. Moreover, the labor-intensive nature 
(in-line planting and increased weeding) of improved rice-planting techniques may limit 
scaling-up by labor-constrained farmers. As the survey was being conducted, the use of 
mechanical weeding machines piloted in the area was marginal: this may require further 
research. In addition, the benefits of increased access to modern rice technology are 
dependent on the market environment. For example, in recent years short-term trade policy 
decisions in Tanzania have resulted in imports of cheap rice, and caused a 50% decline in rice 
prices (Agritrade, 2014). Such changes in the market environment are likely to outweigh any 
positive effects of adopting innovations and may constrain the scaling-up of new technologies 
at the farm and village levels. 
Another finding is that the household income effects from participation as estate or factory 
workers range between 25% and 35% – only slightly below those linked to the technology 
package adoption. Yet if technology adoption can be scaled up at the household and 
community levels with prices remaining competitive, there are likely to be substantially larger 
direct benefits for farmers in terms of overall household welfare (as opposed to simply 
providing low-skilled employment opportunities). Working for the agro-industry may remain 
an important strategy to overcome extreme household poverty, although it may not 
substantially increase incomes. Apart from direct income effects for participants, the broader 
welfare effects of agro-industry employment also depend on the employment intensity of the 
investment, which varies greatly among crops and production systems (Deininger et al., 
2011). For example, for tree or perennial crops (e.g., palm or manual sugarcane production), 
benefits from substituting labor with capital in key tasks is more limited than for grains and 
other annual crops. This could cause employment-intensity differences by a factor of 70 per 
ha (see Deininger et al., 2011). 
To sum up, the study underlines the potentials of making LSAIs more inclusive by linking 
plantation investments to the introduction of new farming methods and access to microfinance 
through collateral provided by the investor. However, other indirect effects must be 
considered for evaluating LSAIs more generally. For example, potential sector-wide positive 
effects may relate to a large rice producer’s greater ability to influence producer-favorable 
policies. At the same time, however, if such large producers primarily target the domestic 
market, they are likely to push small farmers and local processors out of the market. Such 
investments are also likely to have substantial intra-household effects and indirect 
implications for the community, and perhaps for the environment, such as the risks of water 
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depletion, overuse of pesticides, deforestation, and biodiversity loss – all which must be 
accounted for in any strategy to develop sustainable and inclusive investments.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Yield functions with OLS and TEM   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLSyieldNV treatregyieldNV OLSyieldTP treatregyieldTP 
main     
variety_saro5P 826*** 1073.154***   
 (120) (151.645)   
location -84 -91.918 -101.477 -100.021 
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 (108) (108.821) (94.938) (92.157) 
fertility 295** 307.035** 291.950** 306.976*** 
 (116) (119.328) (118.074) (118.585) 
manager -190 -175.850 -46.681 -19.666 
 (125.) (124.610) (104.916) (103.870) 
leveling 10.924 11.188 45.467 26.450 
 (127.962) (130.035) (90.942) (89.244) 
ricecrop_damage -370.810*** -341.002*** -436.067*** -434.569*** 
 (124.171) (131.096) (102.179) (101.751) 
S52landprep_machine 104.991 111.706 84.984 81.632 
 (100.618) (102.958) (83.067) (82.843) 
S51plot_dist 0.763 1.222 0.754 0.934 
 (0.900) (0.897) (0.888) (0.875) 
S51_ownership 178.353 188.510 128.758 132.645 
 (125.232) (127.720) (125.414) (126.296) 
S51_title 160.374 140.566 228.842 216.018 
 (164.675) (165.273) (149.705) (146.619) 
age_head 1.457 1.441 1.429 1.068 
 (4.481) (4.278) (4.225) (4.000) 
sex_head -126.169 -83.711 -117.971 -105.315 
 (141.770) (145.219) (149.314) (149.831) 
edu_type_bin 200.159* 161.829 176.215* 152.557 
 (113.181) (114.388) (102.711) (100.031) 
agework -51.387 -45.544 -43.536 -40.054 
 (46.596) (46.453) (41.731) (39.867) 
total_rice_area -54.947** -58.129** -45.395** -48.988** 
 (24.584) (24.905) (22.115) (22.111) 
village_price -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
sri_varplantfert_v2   1259.051*** 1495.609*** 
   (132.016) (172.946) 
_cons 1844.665*** 1505.185*** 1615.726*** 1508.341** 
 (559.851) (580.641) (568.213) (588.094) 
variety_saro5P     
location  0.131  0.113 
  (0.260)  (0.229) 
fertility  -0.364  -0.390 
  (0.328)  (0.325) 
manager  -0.105  -0.363 
  (0.264)  (0.232) 
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leveling  -0.140  0.386 
  (0.309)  (0.295) 
ricecrop_damage  -0.496**  -0.116 
  (0.207)  (0.210) 
S51plot_dist  -0.007***  -0.004** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
S51_ownership  -0.017  0.110 
  (0.294)  (0.353) 
S51_title  0.480  0.470* 
  (0.300)  (0.280) 
S52landprep_machine  0.133  0.257 
  (0.242)  (0.235) 
age_head  0.000  0.010 
  (0.010)  (0.010) 
sex_head  -0.822**  -0.522 
  (0.319)  (0.332) 
edu_type_bin  0.157  0.054 
  (0.216)  (0.217) 
working_ageb  0.035  0.010 
  (0.078)  (0.078) 
non_agric_inc  0.377*  0.499** 
  (0.216)  (0.210) 
total_rice_area  -0.004  0.012 
  (0.041)  (0.040) 
born_village  -0.539***  -0.110 
  (0.182)  (0.189) 
livestock_binary  0.715***  0.705*** 
  (0.224)  (0.215) 
phone_bin  -0.107  0.052 
  (0.261)  (0.252) 
village_price  -0.000**  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
new_technology_b  -0.093***  -0.094*** 
  (0.031)  (0.031) 
sri_share_vill  3.433***  4.287*** 
  (1.201)  (1.207) 
_cons  2.725**  -0.397 
  (1.234)  (1.373) 
athrho     
_cons  -0.236**  -0.256*** 
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  (0.101)  (0.092) 
lnsigma     
_cons  6.598***  6.395*** 
  (0.073)  (0.062) 
N 329 329 283 283 
adj. R
2
 0.293  0.427  
Note: 
a
 Tropical Livestock Unit; *, **, and *** indicate significance of t-statistic of the mean difference at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
 
 
 
Table A2: Income  functions with OLS and TEM   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLSincomeNV treatregincomeNV OLSincomeTP treatregincomeTP 
main     
variety_saro5P 441,934.355*** 626,090.455***   
 (79,114.749) (108,086.136)   
location -98,523.558 -103,945.145 -103,818.546* -103,196.088* 
 (77,568.491) (75,167.731) (62,813.944) (601,34.395) 
fertility 193,821.329** 202,665.822*** 191,797.596*** 198,499.564*** 
 (76,416.160) (78,649.253) (66,198.375) (65,969.574) 
manager -31,886.235 -21,027.813 17,075.167 29,153.325 
 (84,218.865) (82,229.995) (75,818.441) (74,184.367) 
leveling 68,212.733 68,406.991 85,570.343* 77,069.586 
 (94,583.452) (94,444.771) (48,850.467) (48,168.844) 
ricecrop_damage -127,321.186 -105,088.194 -179,910.759** -179,270.135*** 
 (84,100.878) (87,985.153) (69,854.028) (68,733.934) 
S52landprep_mac
hine 
-16,045.803 -11,040.399 -43,604.245 -45,086.019 
 (69,000.776) (71,647.114) (64,843.175) (64,867.405) 
S51plot_dist -742.971 -400.558 -598.165 -517.944 
 (539.903) (533.123) (539.432) (529.782) 
S51_ownership 36,195.191 43,777.498 -7,297.583 -5,563.305 
 (84,694.118) (88,194.892) (86,324.109) (85,518.571) 
S51_title 88,103.742 73,335.269 115,782.335 110,058.042 
 (119,087.800) (119,404.202) (113,755.019) (111,345.692) 
age_head -1,951.579 -1,965.244 -2,447.605 -2,603.873 
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 (2,905.655) (2,840.725) (2,955.772) (2,866.898) 
sex_head -32,212.993 -515.566 -23,280.584 -17,740.948 
 (87,181.557) (87,397.789) (92,568.613) (90,446.796) 
edu_type_bin 113,409.607 84,792.538 76,528.293 66,062.072 
 (71,310.638) (68,489.845) (64,731.882) (62,558.243) 
agework -3,056.992 1,331.706 -253.756 1,175.139 
 (26,819.153) (27,023.178) (23,415.466) (22,785.108) 
total_rice_area -7,641.765 -10,019.267 -2,998.027 -4,589.649 
 (15,660.868) (16,034.740) (14,396.229) (14,330.242) 
village_price 0.492 2.174 3.286 3.623 
 (4.324) (4.203) (3.502) (3.500) 
sri_varplantfert_v
2 
  662,715.565*** 768,437.015*** 
   (82,391.273) (112,286.944) 
_cons 488,685.125 235,451.692 288,243.219 240,171.859 
 (405,076.750) (394,884.931) (331,192.015) (331,556.710) 
variety_saro5P     
location  0.145  0.105 
  (0.264)  (0.235) 
fertility  -0.368  -0.424 
  (0.325)  (0.327) 
manager  -0.131  -0.379 
  (0.267)  (0.236) 
leveling  -0.144  0.446 
  (0.310)  (0.297) 
ricecrop_damage  -0.505**  -0.129 
  (0.208)  (0.214) 
S51plot_dist  -0.007***  -0.004** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
S51_ownership  -0.027  0.054 
  (0.292)  (0.353) 
S51_title  0.511*  0.496* 
  (0.297)  (0.279) 
S52landprep_mac
hine 
 0.144  0.232 
  (0.243)  (0.234) 
age_head  0.000  0.011 
  (0.010)  (0.010) 
sex_head  -0.826***  -0.497 
  (0.319)  (0.336) 
edu_type_bin  0.175  0.115 
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  (0.212)  (0.214) 
working_ageb  0.045  -0.001 
  (0.078)  (0.077) 
non_agric_inc  0.392*  0.445** 
  (0.211)  (0.210) 
total_rice_area  -0.006  0.015 
  (0.041)  (0.040) 
born_village  -0.559***  -0.069 
  (0.183)  (0.192) 
livestock_binary  0.711***  0.664*** 
  (0.221)  (0.216) 
phone_bin  -0.077  0.102 
  (0.259)  (0.249) 
village_price  -0.000**  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
new_technology_
b 
 -0.093***  -0.090*** 
  (0.031)  (0.031) 
sri_share_vill  3.140***  3.865*** 
  (1.190)  (1.207) 
_cons  2.760**  -0.330 
  (1.214)  (1.367) 
athrho     
_cons  -0.280***  -0.176** 
  (0.092)  (0.089) 
lnsigma     
_cons  13.045***  12.851*** 
  (0.073)  (0.057) 
N 329 329 283 283 
adj. R
2
 0.199  0.310  
Note: 
a 
Tropical Livestock Unit; *, **, and *** indicate significance of t-statistic of the mean difference at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Total income functions with OLS and TEM   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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 OLSToIncNV treatregoIncNV OLSToIncTP treatregoIncTP 
main     
variety_saro5P 354,749.255*** 598,983.056***   
 (79,990.486) (117,059.781)   
location -54,961.570 -62,158.710 -59,280.501 -58,398.857 
 (88,072.408) (83,520.079) (78,472.967) (74,521.942) 
fertility 184,742.386** 196,469.177** 176,268.199** 185,827.690** 
 (82,593.714) (85,816.003) (84,569.622) (87,186.716) 
manager -49,316.048 -34,918.575 -31758.783 -14524.269 
 (94,789.286) (89,863.453) (91991.616) (88279.876) 
leveling 69,850.045 70,110.089 111889.502 99760.084 
 (98,603.214) (96,980.300) (67836.172) (67049.107) 
ricecrop_damage -162,960.020** -133,471.862 -186008.518** -185101.107** 
 (82,807.941) (87091.590) (75756.195) (74662.628) 
S52landprep_ma
chine 
112,234.884 118876.565 96074.236 93963.800 
 (71,364.360) (73156.853) (66980.254) (66845.086) 
S51plot_dist -550.588 -96.557 -364.287 -249.918 
 (585.408) (584.056) (593.907) (580.867) 
S51_ownership -79,656.691 -69605.589 -122277.839 -119803.998 
 (85,075.080) (88805.301) (87748.859) (86552.227) 
S51_title 67,855.669 48262.566 72105.412 63939.531 
 (11,8423.516) (117282.617) (116479.637) (113117.362) 
age_head -2,945.098 -2962.065 -3370.081 -3591.862 
 (2,966.620) (2956.883) (2936.002) (2866.928) 
sex_head 9,661.415 51676.983 28471.199 36348.431 
 (9,6471.095) (99704.681) (105006.414) (104013.452) 
edu_type_bin 151,356.193** 113425.207 92833.496 77924.814 
 (74,499.743) (71437.156) (71697.865) (69653.220) 
agework -30,564.555 -24770.899 -24843.632 -22834.246 
 (31,406.629) (31198.280) (30328.014) (29215.263) 
total_rice_area 23,231.161 20081.440 28518.955* 26251.227* 
 (15,926.690) (16255.916) (15489.950) (15221.122) 
village_price -1.458 0.773 1.563 2.044 
 (4.527) (4.416) (3.534) (3.590) 
sri_varplantfert_v
2 
  466587.812*** 617433.544*** 
   (90179.325) (118403.494) 
_cons 466,610.233 130760.178 219124.252 150516.654 
 (432,468.769) (422362.844) (341994.132) (347832.925) 
variety_saro5P     
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location  0.143  0.094 
  (0.263)  (0.233) 
fertility  -0.353  -0.398 
  (0.326)  (0.328) 
manager  -0.130  -0.381 
  (0.266)  (0.233) 
leveling  -0.176  0.413 
  (0.306)  (0.297) 
ricecrop_damage  -0.511**  -0.129 
  (0.207)  (0.214) 
S51plot_dist  -0.007***  -0.004** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
S51_ownership  -0.023  0.063 
  (0.288)  (0.350) 
S51_title  0.526*  0.515* 
  (0.294)  (0.280) 
S52landprep_ma
chine 
 0.163  0.247 
  (0.243)  (0.233) 
age_head  0.000  0.010 
  (0.010)  (0.010) 
sex_head  -0.862***  -0.513 
  (0.326)  (0.337) 
edu_type_bin  0.153  0.093 
  (0.211)  (0.215) 
working_ageb  0.064  0.016 
  (0.079)  (0.080) 
non_agric_inc  0.426**  0.460** 
  (0.212)  (0.212) 
total_rice_area  -0.009  0.012 
  (0.041)  (0.040) 
born_village  -0.570***  -0.063 
  (0.182)  (0.188) 
livestock_binary  0.734***  0.697*** 
  (0.220)  (0.218) 
phone_bin  -0.110  0.073 
  (0.258)  (0.250) 
village_price  -0.000***  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
new_technology_
b 
 -0.089***  -0.087*** 
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  (0.031)  (0.032) 
sri_share_vill  3.243***  4.030*** 
  (1.177)  (1.199) 
_cons  2.700**  -0.386 
  (1.206)  (1.357) 
athrho     
_cons  -0.351***  -0.222** 
  (0.103)  (0.093) 
lnsigma     
_cons  13.121***  12.983*** 
  (0.071)  (0.058) 
N 329 329 283 283 
adj. R
2
 0.164  0.197  
Note: 
a 
Tropical Livestock Unit; ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance of t-statistic of the mean difference at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
 
 
Table A4: Total rice farm yields and rice income regression (household-level) (OLS)   
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLSyieldHHfarm OLSrincHHfarm OLSrnretHHfarm 
improved_hh_prod 346.705*** 179891.541** 157911.308** 
 (105.057) (71116.495) (72804.890) 
age_head 8.710 -682.140 -8518.330 
 (29.512) (20224.324) (20913.923) 
age_head_sq -0.081 16.543 99.474 
 (0.303) (205.963) (212.470) 
sex_head -146.312 -83127.129 -90394.861 
 (140.345) (74222.898) (73026.221) 
edu_type_bin -32.699 34203.490 99863.836 
 (110.018) (71231.484) (74813.973) 
agework_male -14.699 33451.386 42679.607 
 (72.664) (47754.799) (47958.813) 
agework_female -2.079 -8507.950 -25332.084 
 (67.220) (43511.432) (48393.252) 
dependents -7.653 -10028.685 -21038.720 
 (21.648) (13013.183) (13901.314) 
non_agric_binary 110.765 107534.694* 153425.127** 
 (92.860) (58326.920) (66303.369) 
total_land -37.940** -16540.728* -5721.774 
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 (17.686) (9884.841) (10605.380) 
born_village -86.234 -43475.639 -64971.178 
 (108.269) (66365.509) (68628.699) 
tlu 197.255** 171681.646*** 197577.930*** 
 (81.220) (56074.144) (58106.967) 
phone_bin -14.780 38083.849 77372.177 
 (110.364) (72416.653) (78963.749) 
new_technology_b -11.958 -4386.130 -3691.033 
 (14.577) (9603.684) (10260.038) 
news1vn1 -369.017** -221256.915** -239216.144** 
 (155.538) (105980.929) (111819.505) 
news1vn2 -138.228 -24092.340 -104002.487 
 (163.152) (122037.615) (136313.491) 
news1vn3 188.365 135924.235 121594.725 
 (207.986) (132119.905) (144324.749) 
news1vn4 7.028 -97350.851 -109664.273 
 (179.297) (120197.964) (132278.579) 
news1vn5 104.734 120463.144 160368.428 
 (180.422) (113835.470) (126341.483) 
news1vn6 -265.847 -86543.568 -88757.821 
 (169.458) (119212.425) (127562.430) 
news1vn7 309.028* 157233.464 140045.478 
 (168.952) (108349.241) (117898.072) 
news1vn8 -88.226 33377.773 8688.292 
 (203.294) (156785.683) (171418.630) 
news1vn9 520.149*** 203761.347 45606.459 
 (188.361) (160637.424) (175308.339) 
news1vn10 . . . 
 . . . 
_cons 1149.619 482905.454 377130.037 
 (712.140) (486058.924) (506773.773) 
N 274 274 274 
adj. R
2
 0.168 0.136 0.151 
Note: 
a 
Tropical Livestock Unit; ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance of t-statistic of the mean difference at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
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Table A5: Agricultural income and total household income regressions (smallholder project and agro-industry workers) (household-level) 
(OLS)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 
aincHHfarm 
OLS 
incHHfarm 
OLS 
pcincHHfarm 
OLS 
aincHHwork 
OLS 
incHHwork 
OLS pcinc 
HHwork 
improved_hh_prod 510810.605* 574102.073 159554.319    
 (305426.776) (422710.092) (113074.802)    
age_head 23560.561 -147430.400 -63560.989** 97896.191 9467.448 -35392.646* 
 (98534.479) (120758.337) (29870.759) (65515.920) (81379.494) (19757.671) 
age_head_sq 87.774 1875.152 770.279** -1110.145 -250.064 395.278* 
 (1151.849) (1348.993) (317.800) (714.225) (906.223) (213.881) 
sex_head -306154.311 -736015.876** -83581.415 -20675.991 -30791.648 139970.440 
 (333814.745) (371284.560) (98581.282) (207980.724) (319206.226) (103911.700) 
edu_type_bin -77966.859 313540.279 36614.950 203768.319 811874.677*** 203663.919*** 
 (319022.506) (375819.151) (88296.828) (246808.913) (311398.436) (67876.251) 
agework_male 29900.228 -65300.409 -107679.822** 82547.807 124319.728 -76908.414* 
 (267314.540) (262789.068) (50503.637) (176680.203) (220998.736) (45747.235) 
agework_female 4726.166 -131335.321 -124234.721** 172781.047 13771.971 -111680.926** 
 (231421.264) (249505.005) (53573.513) (180409.826) (229423.264) (51138.714) 
dependents -30841.638 -85375.245 -82577.133*** 19227.543 -584.374 -60807.047*** 
 (59207.755) (76721.981) (18347.474) (51077.824) (77328.233) (14851.015) 
non_agric_binary 646669.473* 1211591.841**
* 
254009.896***    
 (341397.866) (377338.397) (78236.405)    
total_land 377914.218*** 402467.061*** 80167.273*** 294699.685*** 288390.240** 45480.523** 
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 (135802.656) (139295.749) (27421.136) (93620.668) (113514.155) (20842.484) 
born_village 313089.968 223557.263 46098.150 -190078.422 -237063.235 -32832.708 
 (391302.634) (416784.828) (86020.419) (268778.588) (318152.533) (70008.252) 
tlu 568209.776 628749.906 109431.584 400264.159 474070.907* 86243.634 
 (345463.863) (388286.715) (78462.104) (253407.632) (270094.274) (57290.253) 
phone_bin 376711.895 594262.856* 131662.540* 135368.559 260935.451 79088.559 
 (261299.253) (305430.077) (67124.416) (223339.078) (281760.798) (61317.954) 
new_technology -97544.712* -96691.508 -15296.481    
 (54750.211) (59748.690) (12328.517)    
news1vn1 -887760.654* -1448219.716 -375419.476    
 (477520.619) (1059409.997) (331569.300)    
news1vn2 -301440.108 -874013.053 -373074.347    
 (535810.976) (1195392.923) (366711.773)    
news1vn3 112675.191 -770884.447 -319644.592    
 (490354.301) (1081250.826) (341469.150)    
news1vn4 374540.722 -468214.142 -270663.749    
 (1091523.825) (1472501.567) (405122.921)    
news1vn5 -29114.790 -522000.339 -281126.022    
 (486601.311) (1175700.441) (367406.619)    
news1vn6 -934204.515 -1678570.289 -484156.640    
 (594926.382) (1200119.168) (366794.676)    
news1vn7 -137218.871 -664851.555 -336372.233    
 (564493.296) (1198742.637) (371693.092)    
news1vn8 -510376.574 -653883.154 -285888.033    
 (567397.689) (1168267.480) (353870.214)    
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news1vn9 37677.893 -667806.279 -368092.240    
 (589189.195) (1223391.899) (374646.627)    
news1vn10 . . .    
 . . .    
treat_worker    -6170.998 445723.050 96807.879 
    (202266.346) (302824.898) (71756.993) 
_cons -481793.489 4187199.990 2099140.981** -2031292.311 572307.881 1328446.405**
* 
 (2054913.974) (3169612.535) (901418.882) (1372305.624) (1738528.646) (425245.460) 
N 277 277 277 219 219 219 
adj. R
2
 0.292 0.250 0.200 0.289 0.207 0.179 
Note: 
a 
Tropical Livestock Unit; ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance of t-statistic of the mean difference at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice
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Table A6: Total rice farm yields and rice income regression (OLS) (comparing technology 
package adopters to farmers without any improved technology) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLSyieldHHfarm2 OLSrincHHfarm2 OLSrnretHHfarm2 
techn_package_n
on 
447.999*** 237796.603*** 204572.346*** 
 (104.349) (65776.027) (68690.399) 
age_head -6.423 -16033.704 -27790.230 
 (30.829) (20209.783) (21089.750) 
age_head_sq 0.130 190.606 306.323 
 (0.319) (206.568) (215.880) 
sex_head -132.814 -80774.220 -84170.985 
 (147.448) (76643.368) (76249.194) 
edu_type_bin -129.891 -26283.626 22235.396 
 (115.893) (74901.190) (77574.232) 
agework_male 14.032 48118.559 54784.649 
 (71.626) (47563.494) (48303.723) 
agework_female 34.613 7636.054 287.331 
 (67.764) (42982.705) (47931.133) 
dependents -12.790 -11498.185 -25307.796* 
 (23.056) (13800.959) (14779.683) 
non_agric_binary 165.468* 119328.442* 163580.072** 
 (98.477) (61757.412) (67815.873) 
total_land -68.265*** -34114.625*** -16554.065 
 (18.256) (11517.204) (12372.436) 
born_village -129.728 -83209.295 -97765.816 
 (103.021) (63419.141) (66538.490) 
tlu 174.415** 150371.351*** 180012.590*** 
 (85.120) (48565.477) (51976.470) 
phone_bin 99.605 98525.968 128267.240 
 (116.474) (77257.086) (82103.778) 
new_technology -8.125 2534.046 2507.843 
 (16.052) (10744.398) (11394.106) 
news1vn1 -658.981** -395031.434** -390017.498** 
 (294.364) (165492.505) (166996.413) 
news1vn2 -378.639 -169784.193 -221954.368 
 (308.786) (177285.279) (187234.673) 
news1vn4 -160.138 -223426.833 -219481.071 
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 (311.135) (178513.015) (187263.800) 
news1vn5 -57.690 -8519.269 67373.803 
 (304.700) (171556.315) (180235.486) 
news1vn6 -487.700 -232281.584 -207578.588 
 (313.912) (178301.131) (182013.917) 
news1vn7 47.601 -5032.880 12303.939 
 (309.448) (173163.591) (177709.521) 
news1vn8 -387.723 -92385.382 -85582.367 
 (323.787) (208209.850) (218103.965) 
news1vn9 -4.490 -78506.394 -173857.286 
 (347.060) (210883.785) (215735.207) 
news1vn10 -181.540 -148546.016 -129869.987 
 (286.907) (179285.043) (189940.330) 
worker_trad_tech    
    
_cons 1501.333* 878115.675* 844633.419 
 (782.081) (503336.253) (533985.379) 
N 236 236 236 
adj. R
2
 0.213 0.179 0.186 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
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Table A7: Agricultural income and total household income regressions - smallholder project and agro-industry workers (comparing to all farmers 
without improved technology)   
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 OLSaincHHfarm2 OLSincHHfarm2 OLSpcincHHfarm2 OLSaincHHwork2 OLSincHHwork2 OLSpcincHHwork2 
techn_package_n
on 
763746.880*** 853282.406** 216392.581*    
 (265696.952) (426080.525) (123084.494)    
age_head -96845.459 -287545.677** -88450.311** 34484.345 -42897.213 -38789.875** 
 (107865.606) (135108.530) (34911.199) (49939.961) (75066.826) (19204.194) 
age_head_sq 1302.651 3316.722** 1008.241*** -549.628 231.558 397.205* 
 (1323.292) (1562.028) (379.174) (594.975) (882.501) (206.213) 
sex_head -136863.051 -530253.635 -33123.372 34891.519 20079.759 156729.516 
 (362785.751) (399489.063) (106012.139) (209680.676) (316566.227) (105143.855) 
edu_type_bin -384510.199 -77932.936 -47458.568 -139833.510 490018.618* 161782.176** 
 (327529.972) (412035.273) (101632.638) (173116.504) (287873.744) (67098.151) 
agework_male 107502.202 28415.347 -77347.309 159896.390 196015.509 -52690.167 
 (285980.417) (275107.545) (53616.367) (140853.810) (204127.153) (43740.823) 
agework_female 95934.542 -80046.851 -116228.954** 327702.490** 96343.216 -94982.902* 
 (227741.543) (248429.593) (53294.715) (128764.229) (201507.906) (49425.963) 
dependents -37805.015 -107800.633 -91617.745*** 922.696 -30182.721 -69519.092*** 
 (63908.985) (87360.018) (21704.833) (52815.537) (83509.160) (16258.534) 
non_agric_binary 575329.500 1114464.990*** 231318.116***    
 (348357.991) (392771.939) (83651.643)    
total_land 430467.355*** 459488.234*** 95837.178*** 345292.798*** 325558.512*** 51191.694*** 
 (154998.471) (149979.267) (29583.704) (63925.630) (70826.668) (13499.003) 
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born_village 263538.666 136325.839 29945.823 -219805.050 -303017.006 -52656.203 
 (394813.444) (424295.062) (87575.166) (156244.468) (248705.919) (61859.814) 
tlu 370304.570 447070.256 53892.364 50163.902 135584.021 2342.758 
 (336987.140) (392908.446) (84695.484) (145568.571) (168570.334) (34552.743) 
phone_bin 436088.621 661333.023** 114310.460 157339.648 250344.478 52762.090 
 (278310.130) (314760.820) (69282.345) (230305.183) (304241.544) (64158.907) 
new_technology_
b 
-88978.454 -77445.460 -11003.724    
 (63081.613) (69995.282) (14532.087)    
news1vn1 -321585.924 9902.864 200812.668    
 (522352.917) (669509.382) (161191.793)    
news1vn2 302935.398 595247.223 183381.102    
 (519442.817) (684244.443) (151424.573)    
news1vn3 536043.311 536586.520 208434.343    
 (561121.129) (634046.031) (141877.675)    
news1vn4 962954.914 937411.662 216400.587    
 (1247920.067) (1219747.363) (240052.213)    
news1vn5 638677.130 974231.667 277181.884*    
 (527882.638) (698729.628) (145778.760)    
news1vn6 -380205.937 -311528.524 42970.236    
 (524935.809) (607929.564) (123156.131)    
news1vn7 330717.117 596747.768 173075.012    
 (494828.732) (570477.890) (116011.535)    
news1vn8 270748.223 1057946.726 334776.716*    
 (667405.983) (808487.419) (176906.564)    
news1vn9 . . .    
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 . . .    
news1vn10 559868.382 1439526.277 571419.794    
 (706492.698) (1532224.206) (480085.602)    
worker_trad_tech    238653.877 630599.719** 117409.566 
    (170195.003) (292780.617) (72354.022) 
_cons 1342804.170 5577131.320** 2095569.961*** -765962.615 1764101.393 1469730.995*** 
 (2019722.342) (2735472.809) (710192.846) (1052720.946) (1602096.895) (419209.522) 
N 239 239 239 181 181 181 
adj. R
2
 0.323 0.262 0.210 0.383 0.197 0.200 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
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Additional information 
 
1) Plot-level balance testing 
Deriving reliable PSM-estimates requires that the distribution of propensity scores of adopters 
and non-adopters are similar and that pre-adoption differences are eliminated by matching. 
Figure 2 compares the distribution of the propensity scores for the adoption plots and the 
conventional plots and reveals that propensity scores are of a relatively equal distribution, 
suggesting comparability.  
Figure 2: propensity score distribution – plot-level analysis 
  
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey 1 
The matching quality is assessed using group mean and median comparisons. Table 1 reports 
the summary indicators of differences between explanatory variables before and after 
matching (model P-Values, R-squared, and mean / median biases). In spite of some remaining 
differences, the results indicate a significant reduction in the overall covariate median and 
mean differences between the two groups.  
Table 1: Plot-level matching quality (summary indicators)  
Model Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 MeanBias MedBias 
Improved variety Raw 0.121 55.21 0.000  15.7 13.2 
  Matched 0.057 24.94 0.204 9.4 6.5 
Full package Raw 0.113 43.33 0.002 16 12.9 
  Matched 0.044 14.21 0.819 8.5 6.5 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
improved variety
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
full technology package
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Likewise, Table 2 and Table 3 of the detailed t-test comparisons of individual explanatory 
variables before and after matching of the improved and unimproved plots, suggest that initial 
differences in most variables (plot manager, crop damage, livestock ownership, 
innovativeness, village share of project participants) is eliminated due to matching (except for 
village price differences), suggesting well balancing after matching.  
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Table 2: Plot-level covariate mean differences between & after matching (improved variety) 
  Unmatched Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
location Unmatched 0.60123 0.63855 -7.7 
 
-0.7 0.487 
 
Matched 0.60759 0.6628 -11.3 -47.9 -1.02 0.31 
fertility Unmatched 0.84049 0.84337 -0.8 
 
-0.07 0.943 
 
Matched 0.83544 0.84142 -1.6 -107.5 -0.14 0.886 
manager Unmatched 0.61963 0.71084 -19.4 
 
-1.76 0.08 
 
Matched 0.62025 0.69165 -15.2 21.7 -1.34 0.183 
leveling Unmatched 0.90798 0.85542 16.3 
 
1.47 0.141 
 
Matched 0.90506 0.86043 13.8 15.1 1.23 0.219 
Rice_crop_damage Unmatched 0.61963 0.71687 -20.7 
 
-1.88 0.061 
 
Matched 0.63291 0.64544 -2.7 87.1 -0.23 0.817 
S51plot_dist Unmatched 52.957 63.361 -22.5 
 
-2.03 0.043 
 
Matched 53.937 51.951 4.3 80.9 0.43 0.666 
S51_title Unmatched 0.18405 0.15663 7.3 
 
0.66 0.51 
 
Matched 0.17089 0.20147 -8.1 -11.5 -0.7 0.487 
S52landprep~e Unmatched 0.73006 0.78313 -12.4 
 
-1.12 0.263 
 
Matched 0.72152 0.74257 -4.9 60.3 -0.42 0.674 
age_head Unmatched 44.607 43.892 7.2 
 
0.65 0.515 
 
Matched 44.405 44.579 -1.8 75.6 -0.16 0.876 
sex_head Unmatched 0.04908 0.09036 -16.2 
 
-1.47 0.143 
 
Matched 0.05063 0.05345 -1.1 93.2 -0.11 0.911 
edu_type_bin Unmatched 0.55828 0.48795 14.1 
 
1.28 0.203 
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Matched 0.5443 0.55557 -2.3 84 -0.2 0.841 
working_age Unmatched 2.9141 2.8012 8.4 
 
0.76 0.448 
 
Matched 2.8987 2.8582 3 64.1 0.27 0.785 
non_agric_inc Unmatched 0.74847 0.72289 5.8 
 
0.52 0.6 
 
Matched 0.74051 0.7513 -2.4 57.8 -0.22 0.826 
total_rice_land Unmatched 3.3086 3.1705 5.8 
 
0.52 0.602 
 
Matched 3.2899 3.677 -16.1 -180.3 -1.28 0.201 
born_village Unmatched 0.39264 0.45181 -12 
 
-1.08 0.279 
 
Matched 0.40506 0.32333 16.5 -38.1 1.51 0.132 
livestock_binary Unmatched 0.84049 0.65663 43.2 
 
3.92 0.00 
 
Matched 0.83544 0.73999 22.4 48.1 2.08 0.038 
phone_bin Unmatched 0.84663 0.83133 4.2 
 
0.38 0.707 
 
Matched 0.85443 0.84566 2.4 42.7 0.22 0.828 
village_price Unmatched 87859 90807 -33.8 
 
-3.07 0.002 
 
Matched 87820 90975 -36.2 -7 -3.24 0.001 
new_technology_index Unmatched 10.472 11.325 -29.9 
 
-2.71 0.007 
 
Matched 10.481 10.786 -10.7 64.2 -0.95 0.344 
sri_share_village Unmatched 0.14992 0.12817 26.6 
 
2.41 0.017 
  Matched 0.14889 0.13932 11.7 56 1.01 0.311 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
 
Table 3: Plot-level covariate mean differences between & after matching (full technology package) 
  Unmatched Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
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location Unmatched 0.5812 0.63855 -11.7 
 
-0.97 0.331 
 
Matched 0.5812 0.54126 8.2 30.4 0.61 0.54 
fertility Unmatched 0.8547 0.84337 3.2 
 
0.26 0.795 
 
Matched 0.8547 0.78628 19 -504 1.36 0.174 
manager Unmatched 0.57265 0.71084 -29 
 
-2.42 0.016 
 
Matched 0.57265 0.55108 4.5 84.4 0.33 0.741 
leveling Unmatched 0.93162 0.85542 24.8 
 
2 0.046 
 
Matched 0.93162 0.90923 7.3 70.6 0.63 0.529 
rice_crop_damage Unmatched 0.64957 0.71687 -14.4 
 
-1.2 0.23 
 
Matched 0.64957 0.64295 1.4 90.2 0.11 0.916 
S51plot_dist Unmatched 55.624 63.361 -16.4 
 
-1.33 0.185 
 
Matched 55.624 55.933 -0.7 96 -0.06 0.956 
S51_title Unmatched 0.17094 0.15663 3.9 
 
0.32 0.749 
 
Matched 0.17094 0.22294 -14 -263.3 -1 0.319 
S52landprep~e Unmatched 0.76923 0.78313 -3.3 
 
-0.28 0.783 
 
Matched 0.76923 0.82876 -14.2 -328.2 -1.13 0.258 
age_head Unmatched 45.265 43.892 13.8 
 
1.13 0.26 
 
Matched 45.265 45.67 -4.1 70.5 -0.31 0.758 
sex_head Unmatched 0.05983 0.09036 -11.6 
 
-0.94 0.347 
 
Matched 0.05983 0.06953 -3.7 68.2 -0.3 0.764 
edu_type_bin Unmatched 0.5641 0.48795 15.2 
 
1.26 0.208 
 
Matched 0.5641 0.54605 3.6 76.3 0.28 0.782 
working_ageb Unmatched 2.9658 2.8012 12 
 
1 0.32 
 
Matched 2.9658 2.9824 -1.2 89.9 -0.09 0.926 
non_agric_inc Unmatched 0.76068 0.72289 8.6 
 
0.71 0.478 
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Matched 0.76068 0.78367 -5.2 39.2 -0.42 0.677 
total_rice_land Unmatched 3.4684 3.1705 12 
 
1 0.318 
 
Matched 3.4684 3.9903 -21.1 -75.2 -1.39 0.166 
born_village Unmatched 0.47863 0.45181 5.4 
 
0.44 0.657 
 
Matched 0.47863 0.44638 6.4 -20.2 0.49 0.623 
livestock_binary Unmatched 0.82906 0.65663 40.1 
 
3.26 0.001 
 
Matched 0.82906 0.74744 19 52.7 1.53 0.128 
phone_bin Unmatched 0.87179 0.83133 11.4 
 
0.93 0.352 
 
Matched 0.87179 0.8673 1.3 88.9 0.1 0.919 
village_price Unmatched 89141 90807 -20 
 
-1.69 0.093 
 
Matched 89141 90143 -12 39.9 -0.94 0.351 
new_technol Unmatched 10.359 11.325 -35 
 
-2.86 0.004 
 
Matched 10.359 10.824 -16.9 51.8 -1.35 0.178 
sri_share_village Unmatched 0.15178 0.12817 28.8 
 
2.39 0.017 
  Matched 0.15178 0.15713 -6.5 77.3 -0.47 0.639 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
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2) Household-level balance testing 
Figure 3 presents the distribution of propensity scores for adopters and non-adopters, which 
are fairly similar, suggesting that there is sufficient overlap and similarity between the groups 
to justify the use of PSM. Matching is performed only on those observations that are within 
the same common support area. Eight adopters with very high propensity scores are not used 
as they are outside the area of common support.
30
 Summary statistics (R-square, LR-test, 
Mean and Median bias) to compare the unmatched and matched sample (Table 13) show that 
differences in observable variables disappear after performing PSM. 
Figure 3: matching quality – Household-level propensity score distribution 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
 
Table 13: Covariate balance on household-level: summary statistics 
  Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 MeanBias MedBias 
NNM: Raw 0.169 56.4 0.000 18.1 19.0 
 
Matched 0.013 3.84 1.000 4.7 4.0 
KM: Raw 0.169 56.4 0.000 18.1 19.0 
  Matched 0.011 3.36 1.000 4.5 3.1 
  Off support On support 
    
Untreated 0 126 
    
Treated 8 107 
    
Source: Author’s calculations, Kilombero survey rice 
                                                 
30 Estimations (not reported here) including these observations, however, did not lead to large differences in the results. 
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